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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation explores the various online radicalization and recruitment 
practices of groups like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, as well as Salafi Jihadists in general. I 
will also outline the inadequacies of the federal government's engagement with terrorist / 
Islamist ideologies and explore the ways in which early 20th century foundational 
Islamist theorists like Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abul ala Mawdudi have affected 
contemporary extremist Islamist groups, while exploring this myth of the ideal caliphate 
which persists in the ideology of contemporary extremist Islamist groups. In a larger 
sense, I am arguing that exploitation of the internet (particularly social networking 
platforms) in the radicalization of new communities of followers is much more dangerous 
than cyberterrorism (as in attacks on cyber networks within the government and the 
private sector), which is what is most often considered to be the primary threat that 
terrorists pose with their presence on the internet. Online radicalization should, I argue, 
be given more consideration when forming public policy because of the immediate 
danger that it poses, especially given the rise of microterrorism. Similarly, through the 
case studies that I am examining, I am bringing the humanities into the discussion of 
extremist (religious) rhetorics, an area of discourse that those scholars have largely 
ignored. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: RHETORIC AND THE RELIGIOUS 
Religion has often been looked upon as a center from which all other forms of 
human motivation gradually diverged. It is seen as a unifying principle, the vision of an 
original Edenic one-ness, with endless varieties of action and passion deriving from it . . . 
the history of religions has also been the history of great discord. It would seem that 
nothing can more effectively set people at odds than the demand that they think alike. (v) 
--Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: A Study in Logology 
 
The Rhetorical Significance of Religious Texts  
 The epigraph above, from Kenneth Burke’s The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in 
Logology, is a fitting start for this dissertation in that it explores the effect of religion on 
the public, which is the general focus of the research presented here. Indeed, Burke goes 
on to claim that: “The study of religion falls under the head of rhetoric in the sense that 
rhetoric is the art of persuasion, and religious cosmogonies are designed . . . as 
exceptionally thoroughgoing modes of persuasion. . . . concerning the authorship of 
men’s motives” (v). Even though Burke addresses the power of religion in both unifying 
and dividing populaces, however, he does not actually focus on the rhetoric of the 
religious, as he suggests that he will in the Foreword (from which both of the previous 
quotations are taken), but instead analyzes the rhetoric of religion. Although it may seem 
that I am arguing about semantics, as my students often tell me, there is a marked 
difference between examining actual religious texts, like the Bible, as in Burke’s case, the 
Qu’ran or the Torah, and analyzing works created by those texts’ adherents, in that oft-
scrutinized (in many different disciplines over many centuries) religious works do not 
offer us insight into how religious devotees work to persuade others to join them in their 
faith. This is especially the case when we discuss the extremist rhetoric produced by 
groups occupying the fringes of mainstream culture—i.e. the cranks, crackpots, 
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conspiracy theorists, and, our particular focus here, Islamist radicals. The most extreme 
Islamist groups, which include Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Taliban, al-Shabaab, and Hezbollah have 
a myriad of different ideologies to which they ascribe, but they all share one common 
characteristic: the use of computer-mediated communication in propagating their 
message and radicalizing new followers. This dissertation seeks to unpack the online 
texts produced by prominent violent Islamist groups like Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, as 
well as semi-legitimate, but oppressive and violent governmental regimes like that of the 
Assads in Syria in order to better understand and, thus, better combat these organizations. 
Although I have included a more detailed explanation of the rationale for choosing these 
particular groups (one Sunni, one Shia, and one Alawite), it is important to note here that 
I have chosen the texts I will examine, because: A) They either evince a very effective or 
very ineffective way of utilizing new media in a way that brings light to larger trends in 
radicalists’ usage of the internet, B) They are high-profile targets of governmental 
counterterrorism efforts, and this dissertation is meant to be useful both in academic and 
non-academic settings, C) They use communicative strategies that can be most fruitfully 
be examined by my specialization in rhetoric and composition, and D) They represent a 
spectrum of contrasting ideologies, but similar persuasive strategies, hopefully proving 
that more studies that systematically apply rhetorical / communicative theories should be 
undertaken in order to better understand the ways in which violent extremist Islamists 
recruit new followers so as to prevent or intervene in the radicalization process. 
For those of my readers interested in the implications that this dissertation may 
have on changes in counterterrorism strategies, I am arguing that radicalization of new 
communities of followers and the exploitation of these social networking sites for 
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monetary gain are in fact much more dangerous than cyberterrorism (as in attacks on 
cyber networks within the government and the private sector), which is what is most 
often considered to be the primary threat that terrorists pose with their presence on the 
internet, and should be given more consideration when forming public policy. This is 
something that has recently been proven with the extended (and quite effective) media 
campaign undertaken by ISIS, so that there is an increasing awareness within the Federal 
Government that paying attention to how terrorist organizations are using the internet is 
important. Still, in order to fully engage in the war of ideas with these terrorist groups, 
however, the Intelligence Community (IC) must more clearly understand the rhetorical 
strategies of these groups so that they can understand how to diffuse their rapidly 
spreading messages of hate and terror that are so effective in provoking action in at-risk 
populations. 
The Academic Response to the Study of Radicalism and the Challenges of 
Interdisciplinary Research 
To address the last reason for which I am undertaking this research (to prove that 
rhetorical and communicative theories can be fruitfully brought to bear on the recruitment 
strategies of Islamist organizations), as well as explain the diversity of scholars cited in 
the following literature review, I will state at the outset of this section that inside my field 
of rhetoric and composition, texts coming from extremist groups of any color have been 
only minimally analyzed or written about. We only have to examine the most recent 
issues of scholarly journals to see that almost no one is talking about this issue. And, 
aside from a few scholars, my advisor Keith Miller, included, no one is addressing 
terrorist rhetoric or the rhetoric of contemporary radicalized religious organizations. 
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Perhaps this is because such rhetoric is largely based on pathos, which has been seen 
from the perspective of classical rhetors like Aristotle to be a “lesser” appeal that only 
works on an ill-informed and ignorant populace. Or, perhaps it is because the ideology of 
these groups is distasteful. In fact, when I have addressed the subject of my research both 
in my own department and at regional and national conference, the knee jerk response 
from many other scholars has been either “How can you read that stuff? Doesn’t it make 
you sad/angry/depressed?” or “Isn’t the government going to come after you?” or, “How 
are you really qualified to study Islam? Do you speak Arabic?”1  
In one sense, this speaks to an inherent bias in our field against extremist rhetorics 
of any shade (including extremist Christian rhetoric, radical environmental rhetoric, and 
even radical conservative rhetoric), an ingrained fear of government observation and 
interference in research dealing with intelligence and national security, as well addressing 
some of the difficulty in undertaking interdisciplinary work. When the research of a given 
project spans as many different areas of study as the focus of this dissertation has 
(political science, rhetoric / composition, communication, material studies, philosophy, 
counterterrorist studies, strategic intelligence, sociology, psychology, etc.), it is difficult 
to address every aspect of the project thoroughly and with an appropriate amount of 
knowledge in order to make an effective and cohesive argument. I have even used my 
dissertation as an example to my composition students of how complex a project can get 
even with a specific focus like rhetoric of the recruitment practices of extremist Islamist 
                                                
1 There are, of course, other researchers, including my mentors, who have continually emphasized that 
“This stuff is important” during those times in the writing process when I have doubted myself and my own 
skillset in exploring this incredibly complex set of issues. 
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terrorists online.2 There are so many texts (of varying quality) that engage in a study of 
Islamist terrorism and even Islamist terrorism and recruitment online, that it is almost 
impossible to “cover” this topic in a cohesive way.  
This problem was the inspiration for the title of this text, “Assemblages of 
Islamist Radicalism”, which was taken from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In their work, the authors describe the concept 
of the assemblage as the internal incoherence of any text:  
In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and  
territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and  
destratification. . . . All this, lines and measurable speeds, constitutes an  
assemblage. . . .We will never ask what a book means, as signified or signifier; 
we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions 
with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, 
in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed. (4-5) 
This is, indeed, the basic (non) structure of this dissertation and the theoretical basis for 
its formation — it is a collection of parts, mostly taken from other disciplines and applied 
to a (non) centralized selections of texts that fit within the genre of radical Islamist 
communications. I have not chosen theories at random to apply to these Islamist texts, but 
instead have peered through those lenses that render those texts clearer, more in focus. 
Thus, the interdisciplinary nature of this dissertation may not constitute a cohesive whole, 
                                                
2 This conversation usually happens after a student proposes to write a five-page paper on immigration, 
abortion, etc. and we discuss how difficult such topics are to manage in such a short paper. After I tell them 
the length of my dissertation and mention that I have only really scratched the surface of this issue, my 
students usually rethink such general topics, especially after I offer to let them write a paper of a 
comparable size on their very general topic.  
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but instead functions as assemblage like that described in Deleuze and Guattari’s work – 
full of “lines of flight”, segmentations of thought, and metamorphosed theories of beings. 
And this way of approach resonates well with the structure of contemporary terrorists and 
their communicative efforts, in that they are not organized into a clearly hierarchical 
organization that is internally consistent and centralized. Instead, these collections of 
like-minded individuals, like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome3 are scattered. They are, in 
some senses, the diaspora incarnate. Even those organizations like Assad’s cohort in 
Syria includes supporters worldwide (especially in Russia), and there is no real 
centralized leadership in al-Qaeda, which exists across several countries, including the 
United States. They, themselves, are an assemblage of actors — geographically and 
ideologically scattered, but focused on the spreading of fear. Similarly, their texts exist in 
temporary shelters throughout cyberspace where they are taken down one day and 
reposted the next. There is no centralized location, structure, or ideology of terrorists’ 
missives. Even one single document can have several iterations depending on where they 
are found, so that there is no one, true language of terrorism or one, singular authorized 
edition of the terrorist manual, even though these texts do share characteristic elements 
like the appeals to emotion, a reliance on those twentieth-century clerics detailed in 
Chapter 2, and the creation of myths surrounding the ideal Islamist state. So, the question 
then remains, how do we purge this sickness of terrorism from our bodies when all have 
                                                
3 “In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication and 
preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General 
and without an organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of states” (21). It 
would actually be quite interesting to teach the theory of the rhizome along with these Islamist texts, since 
they reflect so many of the characteristics outlined by Deleuze and Guattari. Similarly, A Thousand 
Plateaus is quite an opaque work with references and examples that are often difficult to grasp, especially 
for students. Islamist texts may help make to make more sense of the material in A Thousand Plateaus and 
vice versa. 
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are its symptoms to work from and when the only remedies we have available to us will 
kill the body in which the virus has replicated itself?  
Research Questions and Texts Examined 
 
This, in a general sense, is what I intend to remedy here. After I have outlined the 
inadequacies of the federal government’s engagement with terrorist / Islamist ideologies, 
this work will be focused on two major areas: the first is in tracing the influence that 20th 
century foundational Islamist theorists like Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abul ala 
Mawdudi have on contemporary extremist Islamist groups. In outlining these influences, 
I will also be analyzing the rhetorical strategies of these foundational scholars, looking 
primarily at the ways in which they create a certain kind of mythology – an ideal state 
(caliphate) built on their own interpretations of both Qu’ranic verses (itjihad) and 
excerpts from the Hadith –- that works to motivate their audiences. I will also examine 
their use of emotion (appeals to honor, religious zeal, shame, anger, etc.) as an added 
method of recruitment / radicalization, since it plays such a big part in the exhortations 
aimed at moderate Muslim audiences. 
 I will also focus on the use of new media, including websites, forums, online 
games, and especially social media outlets, by terrorist groups. I will look at the ways in 
which these Islamist organizations harness these new technologies as an inexpensive 
means of expanding their reach beyond what we might think of as their traditional 
audiences (local or regional at-risk communities) in order to radicalize a new, younger 
generation. Since Hezbollah, the Shi’a dominated Lebanese political party (and a terrorist 
organization according to the United States government) has a particularly elaborate 
website, I will explore their press releases and the interactive areas of their website. I will 
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also be examining the widely-circulated, English-language webzine published by Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Inspire. 
When undertaking research for this project, my questions were as follows: 
1) How does the myth of the caliphate function as both an immediate and ultimately 
unrealizable goal for Islamists? How is this appealing to audiences? 
2) What are the specific rhetorical techniques used by foundational clerics like Hasan Al-
Banna, Sayyid Qtub, and Abul ala Mawdudi? 
3) How does social networking impact the spread of influence of groups like Al-Qaeda? 
How are the ways in which ISIS and other Salafi Jihadists are utilizing social media 
different from how the Assads have been using these outlets? Why are the Salafi Jihadists 
more successful? 
4) What are the practical uses of Facebook, Twitter, and MMORPGs like World of 
Warcraft? What might theories of sociability online add to the discussion of the 
functioning of these online communities? 
5) Why and how are organizations like Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda reaching out to an 
English-speaking audience? 
6) What are the inadequacies of our government’s rhetorical / communicative strategies 
in combating extremism? How can we, as academics, work to influence public policy 
makers so that they can more effectively win the “war of ideas”? 
 Because the kind of work that I am undertaking in my dissertation is 
interdisciplinary, my theoretical framework must be comprised of scholars from many 
different fields. I have (and will) make limited usage of popular texts on terrorism by 
journalists and political analysts, mainly because their inquiry into Islamism is rarely 
 9 
systematic and is often plagued by inaccuracies and generalizations. I have / will also 
utilize works by social scientists like Marc Sageman, who has written several seminal 
texts on terrorism, and by Corman, Tretheway, and Goodall, the founders of Center for 
Strategic Communication, because they address the intricacies of the message influence 
model used by the federal government in fighting the “war of ideas” against extremists, 
as well as the ways in which strategic communication needs to adapt to radical 
ideologies. Texts from scholars in the Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict have 
also been useful in getting more of the background information about Islam and African / 
Arabic cultures that is necessary in understanding how Islamist groups function (such as 
their virulent hatred of all things that reek of colonialism). My advisor, Souad Ali, has 
provided me with valuable insight into the arguments for and against a mosque / state 
separation, which is integral to the diffusion of the Islamist myth of the caliphate. I have 
also been undertaking research into the Qu’ran and Hadith, since radical ideologues rely 
on these texts to justify both the establishment of the caliphate and the use of violence 
against non-military targets. 
 I have also made use of rhetorical theory both classic (Aristotle) and 
contemporary (Kenneth Burke) in examining the structure of terrorist missives and 
gauging their use of appeals to ethics and of “God terms” (heavily connotative language), 
and the ways in which reasoning and logic so often fall to the wayside in favor of 
emotional appeals. In examining emotion and the part that it has to play in radicalizing 
audiences, I have reached out to scholars in Emotion and Organization (which combines 
management and communication studies) like Sarah Tracy, who, as well as foundational 
scholars like Arlie Hochschild, has included detailed analyses of the ways that emotion 
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functions in the workplace. Emotional appeals are heavily utilized by extremist groups 
and extremely underestimated / underexamined in rhetorical studies. 
 Marxist theories of ideologies have also brought much needed light to the 
circulation of ideologies among and within groups, as well as how these ideologies 
contribute to the overall process of meaning-making, as has material cultures theories, 
most of which are based in the Marxism. Marxism, as a whole, has also had a contentious 
relationship with Islamism and has figured into most of the missives by Mawdudi, al-
Banna, and Qutb. Marxist concepts are also essential in defining the mythical ideal 
Islamic state that forms the basis for the extremists’ ideological struggle against what 
they conceive of as the corrupt and oppressive West as well as their own national 
governments which are, they say, immoral and unjust. Material culture theorists’ concept 
of “social capital,” “symbolic capital” (Pierre Bordieu), circulation, commodification, as 
well as new media scholars’ embedding of that term into computer mediated discourses / 
networks, will also be integral part of my study of how extremists use the Internet to 
radicalize audiences and garner ideological fealty. 
Methods and Major Theoretical Frameworks 
 As I am a humanities scholar, most of my research is text-based, rather than 
resulting from interviews, surveys, and the like. That is not to say that no humanities-
based scholars undertake research involving human subject (the amount of complaining 
I’ve heard from colleagues filling out IRB request forms would belie this claim), but very 
practical considerations prevent me from actually interviewing radicalized individuals. 
Also, there is plenty of research available from political scientists, psychologists, and 
counterterrorist specialists that includes these elements that I have not examined. In fact, 
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it is the texts produced by these individuals that is often underexamined or not taken 
seriously by academics, as I have noted before. As part of the text-based research 
undertaken here, I have been gathering a compendium of extremist websites, jihadist 
posts on Twitter, Facebook, and other social networking sites, and have compiled copies 
of most of the extremist tracts in circulation, including all issues of al-Qaeda’s English 
language Inspire magazine and their Lone Mujahid Handbook. I have so far corroborated 
by findings with the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations and have taken 
pains to obtain the original texts of works mentioned in my secondary research. 
 Because of the interdisciplinary nature of my project as well as the varied nature 
of my audience (addressing both academic institutions and governmental agencies), I 
have included both popular and academic secondary sources (more of the latter than the 
former), governmental reports on counterterrorism and terrorism, primary sources from 
contemporary Islamist groups and Islamist theorists, rhetorical and communication 
theory, theories of ideology, and social media / new media texts. Because of the breadth 
of this literature, as well as the incredible wealth of texts about Islamism, terrorism, and 
radicalization (not to mention all the recent scholarly work in new media and online 
social communities, including games), I have had to include only a sampling of each 
aspect of this issue in my research. To give a better idea of the shape and depth of the 
texts I am utilizing in this project, I will briefly overview the highlights of each of the 
major research areas that I will be using.  
 The first, and broadest, area of research on Islamism and (especially) terrorism 
has been undertaken by journalists, popular writers, political pundits, and former 
members of the military. The popularity of these works has surged in the wake of 
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September 11, 2001, as the focus of the United States has more and more often shifted to 
the Middle East and our federal government has emphasized the danger of “Islamic” 
terrorism. As outlined previously, the usefulness of these texts is limited, in that they tend 
to make sweeping generalizations and often eschew any kind systematic methodology.4 
There are, however, some very useful texts like The Al-Qaeda Reader that compile 
previously unpublished missives by Islamist groups. The majority of the works, however, 
are either first-hand accounts,5 general histories of / descriptions of terrorism,6 or are 
focused on describing actions taken by / against terrorist organizations. 
 Another theoretical framework that is especially useful in the discussion of 
Islamist texts is the study of emotion. Sarah Tracy, one of the foundational scholars in the 
communication field, Emotion and Organizations outlines the various valences of 
emotion and how it functions within the workplace7 (although I will argue that these 
same principles can also be applied to communities outside of workplaces). Emotions, 
she claims, are continually negotiated within communities and is fundamentally altered / 
constructed by communication. We see the same theme continued throughout much of 
the other literature that populates this field, which emphasizes the discursive construction 
and circulation of emotions. Fineman, in “Emotion and Organizing” also suggests that 
studying emotion in the workplace “has exposed [ . . . ] the hitherto uncharted, or 
                                                
4There are also quite a few fictional accounts, mostly in the form of novels set in the middle east featuring a 
hero / soldier combating against the forces of evil (Islamists / “Insurgents”). 
5 The Islamist: Why I Became an Islamic Fundamentalist, What I saw Inside, and Why I Left (Ed Husain) is 
a good example of one of these texts written from the perspective of a member of an Islamist group. 
6 The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda (Chaliand and Blin), Inside Terrorism (Bruce 
Hoffman), Terrorism and Homeland Security (Jonathan Randall White), When the Eagle Screams: 
America’s Vulnerability to Terrorism (Stephen Bowman), and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century 
(Cindy Combs) are only a few of the plethora of works out there on terrorism that mention or focus on the 
Middle East. 
7 “Emotion and Communication in Organizations.” 
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silenced, emotions and emotional structures that sustain and shape them [organizations]” 
(675), suggesting that studying emotion makes clear those unsaid structures and 
hierarchies that permeate workplaces. Indeed, if we look at articles like Sauer and Ropo’s 
“Leadership and the Driving Force of Shame,” which suggests that “shame can be 
constructed [by leaders] as a liberating and empowering emotion” (60), we see some that 
some of those underlying structures of leadership are shot through with emotional 
significance. Although emotion in organizations most often concentrates on the working 
world (it is no mistake that the seminal text in this field studies flight attendants) we can 
also connect some of these same principles as outlined in the Tracy’s quotation to 
terrorist organizations. Emotions bleed in and among our personal and professional 
selves, eliminating that clear rational / irrational (emotional) split suggested in 
enlightenment thinking and in classical rhetorical theory. 
Emotion needs to be taken into account when examining terrorist organizations, 
since pathetic appeals are so often used in their publications. Unfortunately, emotion is 
discussed minimally by political analysts, and has not been considered formally by 
humanities scholars, partially because of the lack of cross-talk between differing fields of 
study.8 However, if we look to Steven Corman, et al.’s descriptions of the needs of the 
varied audiences the federal government is attempting to reach in “A 21st Century Model 
for Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic 
Complexity,” we can see that emotion fits quite well in with the other “factors like 
autobiography, history, local context, culture, language / symbol systems, power 
                                                
8 There is a notable lack of any real analysis of discourse utilizing rhetorical or communicative theory 
within these texts. Therefore, I would argue that their attempts to thoroughly explain the functioning of 
terrorist networks is confined to an uninformed explanation of actions interspersed with political 
commentary. 
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relations, and immediate personal needs” (7) that impact the reception of messages. 
Similarly, terrorist networks consistently use emotional appeals to shame, honor, anger, 
and fear within their rhetoric, which makes a formal consideration of the intricacies of 
these appeals necessary. 
 Theories of social and new media are also especially useful for this kind of 
inquiry, since most of my text have been created and circulated online. My discussion of 
the ways that Islamists use the internet will necessarily include logistics as well as theory, 
in that there have been some developments since books like Gabriel Weimann’s Terror 
on the Internet, which has a comprehensive look at the various websites and forums built 
by radical groups, have been published. The more theoretical implications of online 
discourses will involve a discussion of strong and weak ties. Much of the current 
scholarship on strong and weak ties is based on Mark Granovetter’s 1973 article, “The 
Strength of Weak Ties” and his 1983 follow-up, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network 
Theory Revisited.” Although Granovetter is a sociologist and these articles are both 
concerned with formations of social networks in real life, there are some important 
implications of his work for those of us outside of the field interested in virtual 
communities and online social networking.  
Rhetorical theories will also play an explicit part in my discussion of Islamism, as 
will Marxist theories of ideology. What is most important, as briefly mentioned before, 
for this project is the discussion that scholars like Kenneth Burke, Althusser, Zizek, 
Horkheimer, Adorno, etc. have about the function and circulation of ideologies. This is 
actually quite strongly linked to the material culture theories that I have also included in 
my discussion of Hezbollah and the images hosted on their website because the same 
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kind of interplay of competing levels and forms of religious or ideological fealty takes 
place in most of these online communities. The whole goal of these kinds of sites is to 
either reinforce existing groups of followers or to radicalize new audiences, and this kind 
of discussion of ways that ideologies function is essential in understanding the power of 
radical computer-mediated discourses. 
Chapter List (beginning after the Introduction): 
 Chapter 2: Government Strategies in Combating Islamist Ideology: This section is 
primarily concerned with ways in which the United States’ intelligence and law 
enforcement communities have addressed violent Islamist ideologies, especially as they 
are circulated online. In general, I will argue that the dissemination and publicizing of 
intelligence is still too complex, even after the major overhaul in the wake of 9/11. I will 
also discuss the shortcomings of the federal government’s focus on action instead of 
communication, their use of outmoded communication models when such tactics are 
employed, and their lack of engagement with moderate Muslim communities.  
 Chapter 3: Islamist Ideology and the (Impossible) Reinstating of the Worldwide 
Caliphate: This chapter will be devoted to the exploration of the impact of Qtub, al-
Banna, and Mawdudi on current Islamists. I will also outline their justification for the 
caliphate system, since most current manifestations of radical Islam rely on their work. I 
will also explore these clerics’ presences in Islamist communities online. This chapter is 
really a lead in to the discussion of contemporary Islamists, since some knowledge of 
their forbearers and their intellectual inspiration is necessary if we are to understand the 
justification for their modes of thought. 
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 Chapter 4: Avatars of an Ideal Future: The (Empowering) Symbolic Capital of 
Computer Wallpapers: The focus here will be split between elements of design of the 
website, the kinds of content hosted, and the images presented. What I will argue is that 
the computer wallpapers presented are a depiction of an ideal future that has been created 
from a pastiche of decontextualized religious, political, military, and natural images. It is 
at this point, as well, that material culture theories of circulation, commodification, and 
social capital become most useful in examining the power of these wallpapers. The texts 
from this website (including speeches, religious and political articles, etc.) have proven to 
be most useful in my discussion of the function of emotion in appealing to / managing 
followers. It is also important to include Hezbollah’s website because it is one of the most 
elaborate in existence and it is affiliated with the Shi’a party, which should give some 
balance to my study, since many of the other groups I will be examining are Sunni (with 
the notable exception of the Assads in Syria, whom are Alawite Muslims). 
 Chapter 5: Making the Most of Web 2.0: Syria’s Beleaguered Media Feeds, Salafi 
Jihadist Networks, and Social(ly) Media(ted) Communities: What I will look at in the 
chapter is the power of community building in organizing and recruiting new followers. 
Much of the social media theory of strong and weak ties will come into play here in that 
these forums fulfill the needs of the members to belong to a tightly-knit social construct, 
especially when those needs are not being met in their everyday lives. This is something 
that has not been discussed thus far in the current literature about radicalism online, since 
the texts focused on that subject are mostly devoted to describing the different kinds of 
uses that Islamists have for the internet. This application of social media theory should 
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bring light to the reasons for the success and pervasiveness of websites / forums that 
support radicalism. 
 Chapter 6: Al Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine and Lone Mujahid Pocketbook: A Study 
in the Emotion-Laden Recruitment of (Digital) Western Audiences and the Spread of 
Microterrorism: In this chapter, I will examine al-Qaeda’s English language electronic 
magazine. I hope to examine both the magazine itself and the reactions to it by the 
various media and political / counterterrorism websites, since these responses are 
indicative of the effectiveness of al-Qaeda’s new tactics. The reaction to the magazine by 
American audiences is actually quite interesting in that it suggests that the animosity 
between “Western” and “Eastern” audiences is self perpetuating, rather than being a 
simple matter of the Islamists bringing violence and hatred and fear to the West. The 
magazine itself is useful in that it suggests that al-Qaeda is moving to a new method of 
micro-terrorism and what they call “open source jihad”, a movement that empowers 
individuals to act on their own rather than large groups working together to create large-
scale attacks. Similarly, their use of pathos as a method for overcoming the rule of inertia 
suggests that emotional appeals and the theories of emotions in organizations need to be 
given more credence in rhetorical studies.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Making Sense of the Radicalizing (Online) Assemblage: This 
section will be devoted not only to summarizing the argument of the dissertation, but also 
to outlining the larger impacts of this project. I intend to include a list of suggestions in 
combating the online presence of Islamists as well as ways that we, as academics, can aid 
in the discussion of this kind of rhetoric. 
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I am covering a good amount of territory while bringing a new theoretical 
framework with me in the hopes that I might: A) bring humanities-based research into the 
discussion of extremist texts, B) bring new light to a subject that has not been discussed 
by rhetorical theorists, C) influence our government’s communication strategies so that 
they might better combat radical Islamists, and D) eventually bring this discussion to the 
classroom, since fundamentalist rhetorics are understood and discussed very little by both 
humanities students and scholars. 
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CHAPTER 2: GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES IN COUNTERING TERRORIST 
IDEOLOGIES 
[W]e first need to better understand the mindset . . . of the al-Qa’ida movement, 
the animosity and the arguments that underpin it, and indeed the regions of the world 
from which its struggle emanated and upon which its hungry gaze still rests. Without 
knowing our enemy, we cannot . . . effectively counter their propaganda and messages of 
hate and their clarion calls to violence. And we cannot fulfill the most basic requirements 
of an effective counterterrorism strategy, preempting and preventing terrorist operations 
and deterring their attacks. 
--Bruce Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the 
Global Terrorist Threat: Al Qaeda on the Run or on the March?”  
 
Introduction 
 The previous quotation, taken from Bruce Hoffman’s 2007 testimony before the 
Committee on Homeland Security recognizes the essential nature of our understanding of 
terrorist rhetoric / ideologies in winning the “war of ideas” mentioned so often in the 
public sphere by both journalists and policymakers. Indeed, many of the unclassified 
reports, testimonies, and congressional hearings echo Hoffman’s sentiment, including the 
widely circulated 2007 report, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, 
authored by the intelligence arm of the New York Police Department, which claims that 
“[i]deology is the bedrock an catalyst for radicalization. It defines the conflict, guides 
movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment, and is the basis for action” (6) in 
terrorist groups. Despite a preponderance of evidence to suggest that the US must combat 
radicalism on an ideological level, the federal government has no systematic way to 
combat radicalism on an ideological level. This is the case for many reasons, including 
the following: a lack of cohesion in the US intelligence community, fundamental 
misunderstanding of the functioning of online communities, a misguided focus on 
fighting a war of action instead of a war of ideas, a reliance on outmoded forms of 
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strategic communication when ideological counterterrorism is attempted, and a deep-
seated lack of understanding of the process of radicalization, all of which has led to a 
failure to prevent the spread of terrorism. 
The Complex Networked Intelligence Community 
The lack of cohesion in the United States’ Intelligence Community (IC) has been 
a subject of much discussion (official and unofficial) since the September 11 attacks in 
2001. And, indeed, there has been a significant amount of change in the structure of the 
IC since that time.9 The Department of Homeland Security was formed and the FBI, the 
CIA, and international bodies like the UN and NATO pledged to be more open about 
sharing intelligence in the future. As part of the international effort to consolidate 
counterterrorism (CT) efforts, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) was formed in 
2011 by then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and a cohort of foreign ministers 
/ diplomats. Also, the executive branch formed the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC) in 2004 as hub combining both intelligence gathering and operational planning. 
The NCTC in particular was designed to “[integrate] foreign and domestic analysis from 
across the Intelligence Community (IC) and [produce] a wide-range of detailed 
assessments designed to support senior policymakers and other members of the policy, 
intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs 
communities.”10 In fact, the NCTC is responsible for the President’s daily briefing on 
issues relating to foreign terrorism (as opposed to domestic, which is the unique 
responsibility of the FBI) as well as the daily National Terrorism Bulletin (although the 
                                                
9 All general information taken from the various institutions’ websites. 
10 National Counterterrorism Center “Overview”. <http://www.nctc.gov/overview.html>.  
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purpose and scope of this publication is not clearly delineated on any of their webpages). 
The NCTC also runs a “Radicalization and Extremist Messaging Group” that keeps track 
of “radicalization issues”,11 as they call it, that overlaps with the State Department’s 
analyzing of communities / populations that are deemed “at risk” of radicalization. The 
NCTC reports to both the President’s office and the Director of National Intelligence, the 
latter of which oversees the following intelligence gathering / analysis agencies: the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the FBI 
National Security Branch (only when it cross international boundaries), the National 
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National 
Security Agency (NSA), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Office of National 
Security Intelligence, the Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the State 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Treasury Office of Intelligence and Research, 
and the five branches of the Armed Forces--the Coast Guard, the Marines, the Air Force, 
the Navy, and the Army.12  
 That previous list does not, of course, include the various legislative committees 
within the Senate and House of Representatives that deal with issues relating to terrorism 
or intelligence gathering. Nor does the DNI govern all of the actions of the Department of 
Defense or the State Department, which are both partially autonomous and include their 
own counterterrorism initiatives. It also does not even begin to encompass the non-
governmental, academic, and privately sponsored organizations that study and publish on 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 All information about the structure / oversight of the IC is taken from the various websites for each 
respective agency, as well as intelligence.gov’s “A Complex Organization United Under a Single Goal: 
National Security,” which has a handy infographic describing the chain of command among IC units.   
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the various aspects of Islamist extremism. Even when confining our scope to the official 
branches of the Federal Government, the sheer scope of publications about Islamist 
terrorists / radicals is staggering, especially when we consider the fact that the majority of 
texts produced by the IC are classified and unavailable to the general public. What this 
complex network of organizations, research projects, and documents suggests is an 
internal lack of coherency within the IC community, even after the attempt was made at 
the start of the first Obama administration to streamline the gathering / interpretation of 
intelligence and to organize the CT efforts of United States. And, even though the NCTC 
was originally designed as an intelligence hub for the federal government, it has not, in 
actuality, functioned as such, since each of the other elements in the IC community has, 
as mentioned before, remained autonomous in their gathering and analyzing of raw 
intelligence. Indeed, to judge from the prominence that it is given on their website, the 
most substantial accomplishment of the NCTC, aside from the intelligence briefings for 
the President’s office and the mysterious “National Terrorism Bulletin,” is the publication 
of the Counterterrorism Calendar, which mainly consists of reminders of significant 
terrorist attacks listed next to their respective dates, as well as biographical overviews of 
the most wanted terrorists, and instructions on procedures in case of bombing, chemical 
attacks, arson, etc. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the complexities of the IC network, changes in 
legislation dedicated to engagement with or the combating of terrorist ideologies have 
been remarkably slow. For example, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has not 
constructed legislation concerning ideology / radicalization prevention in the past five 
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years13, despite receiving testimony from multiple experts exploring the importance of 
the “war of ideas” in general and the propagation of radical ideologies through the 
internet in particular since before the September 11th attacks. The discernable public 
action from the House of Representatives and from the Senate on the counteracting of 
radicalization has been remarkably limited, for which a lack of communication between 
the members of the IC and congressional bodies has been blamed in several reports, 
including the Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States from 
2013, during which Senator Saxby Chambliss is quoted as saying: 
The Intelligence Community is obligated, under the National Security Act, to 
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of its 
intelligence activities, including covert action. We cannot do the oversight the 
American people expect of us if every request for information becomes a 
protracted battle … each one of you has made a commitment to this [Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence] to provide information when we request it. We 
understand that there may be rare exceptions to this rule, but we are now 
operating in an environment in which the exception has become the rule, and this 
simply has to stop. (4) 
What this suggests is that there is at least some truth to popular dramatizations of 
intelligence operations like Clear and Present Danger in which members of Congress are 
seen battling members of the CIA for access to information. Significant is the decision of 
a U.S. Senator to use a public hearing as a forum to chastise the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, the Director of the CIA, the Secretary of State for 
                                                
13 As of September, 2014. 
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Intelligence and Research, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and the 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In fact, Chambliss suggests that the 
IC has insulated itself from those congressional bodies to which it is required by law to 
report. Also, not only is it difficult for Congress to “do the oversight the American people 
expect,” as Chambliss claims, but it is also difficult for Congress to enact laws to allow 
for the combatting of terrorism on an ideological level, since they apparently do not have 
access to the necessary intelligence to do so from the IC. 
Having said that, there have been numerous laws passed concerning the gathering 
and dissemination of information, including the highly controversial H.R. 624, which 
allows for the “sharing of certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information 
between the intelligence community and cybersecurity entities, and for other purposes,”14 
as well as legislation dedicated to increasing education on the importance of 
cybersecurity. In the case of laws regarding the gathering of intelligence, especially by 
organizations such as the National Security Agency, there is little to no indication as to 
what will be done with the information once it is compiled, which is, I am certain, one of 
the reasons why both the American and international publics are uneasy about H.R. 624 
and laws like it. Similarly, it is not clearly defined what “cyber threat intelligence” or 
“cyber threat information” really looks like, so that the scope of the intelligence gathering 
capabilities of the federal government allowed by law remain unclear. In a congressional 
subcommittee hearing on cybersecurity in 2011, Representative Bobby Scott even noted 
that “it is important that we examine whether the laws have maintained an appropriate 
focus on behavior we all feel rises to the level of criminal—Federal criminal liability . . . 
                                                
14 The full text of the bill is available at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr624eh/pdf/BILLS-
113hr624eh.pdf> as of March 2014. 
 25 
we have expanded the scope of the law [to prevent hacking] on several occasions which 
has led to a disturbing expansive use in recent years.”15 This suggests that H.R. 624 is not 
the only bill that has been subjected to “expansive use” in the name of gathering 
intelligence on “threats” to security. 
The NSA and the federal government have also opened themselves up to a certain 
amount of ridicule from both international and domestic audiences by admitting to 
monitoring various online communities, including popular games like World of Warcraft 
(WoW) and digital worlds like Second Life. Although there is evidence to suggest that 
both WoW and Second Life have both suffered from money laundering in the aiding of 
terrorist efforts abroad,16 popular programs like The Daily Show have poked fun at the 
suggestion that a collection of “gamers and geeks” might pose a threat to the federal 
government, resulting in a public relations nightmare for an administration still reeling 
from the revelation by Edward Snowden that the NSA had carried out extensive 
surveillance operations without the knowledge of the public (including those being 
carried out in online communities). Again, part of the problem here is that neither the 
Obama administration nor the houses of congress have clearly articulated the reasons 
behind such intelligence gathering expeditions. Instead, we have to rely on information 
made public by Snowden’s filched reports as filtered through major news organizations, 
which simply claim that games are a “target-rich communication network”17 and that 
“[b]ecause militants often rely on features common to video games — fake identities, 
                                                
15 Cyber Security: Protecting America’s New Frontier 3-4. 
16 See “Detecting Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Activity in Second Life and World of 
Warcraft” by Irwin and Slay. Also, “Terrorist Uses of MMOEs” by K.K. Hausman. 
17 As quoted in “Spies Infiltrate a Fantasy Realm of Online Games” by Mazzetti and Elliot and published 
in The New York Times. 
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voice and text chats, a way to conduct financial transactions — American and British 
intelligence agencies worried that they might be operating there, according to the papers” 
(Mazzetti and Elliot). 
Putting on the Troll Suit: The IC and Online Communities  
In regards to the uses of MMOs (Massively Multiplayer Online communities), the 
emphasis has been placed on the tracking of money laundering18 or on the real world / 
virtual world correspondence of environments (according to a 2008 report by Mennecke, 
McNeill, et al.), which has been the issue of importance in Second Life.  Ignored are the 
communicative capabilities of these communities. This is the case for several reasons, all 
of which indicate a fundamental misunderstanding of the IC on the ways that these 
communities function. Peter Singer of the Brookings Institute states, “For terror groups 
looking to keep their communications secret, there are far more effective and easier ways 
to do so than putting on a troll avatar.”19  And, indeed, those who have played any kind of 
MMO would be aware of this, since many of them either rely on in-game chat protocols 
(with varying levels of privacy) or third party voice over IP (voIP) providers like Ventrilo 
that are easily replicable without having to deal with the added interface of the game or 
community in question. In fact, using an MMO to hold a secret conversation between 
various members of a terrorist group would be akin to attempting to hold a closed faculty 
meeting in the middle of a college’s student union at lunch when all of the students are 
armed with recording devices of various capabilities. 
                                                
18 Irwin and Slay, “Detecting Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing…” And McGraw and 
Hoglund’s 2007 book, Exploiting online games: cheating massively distributed systems. 
19 Also quoted by Mazzetti and Elliot in “Spies Infiltrate a Fantasy Realm of Online Games.” 
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Also, these terrorists would have to contend with a gaming community that is 
both wary of outsiders (“noobs”) and that has a varying amount of expertise in hacking 
both in the game world and outside of it. Having been an active member of World of 
Warcraft and having been in contact with members of other MMOs, including Second 
Life, Eve Online (another MMORPG that rivals World of Warcraft in population), and the 
newly popular League of Legends on different servers for more than a few years, I can 
say that it would be much more secure and much easier to hold a conversation outside of 
the game using a voIP or a text chat protocol than to bother with downloading the game 
software, creating a character, and then traveling to a location that may or may not be 
populated with other players and may or may not be secure. Had any of these IC 
members thought to either question the lack of engagement of the scholarly community 
with the communication capabilities of MMOs and their aid to terrorist activity or to 
crowdsource their problem to the collection of gamers in question, it would have been 
readily apparent that there were other, more readily available technologies with less 
danger of observation available to these extremist groups. 
It could, of course, be argued that it would be the height of idiocy for the IC to 
disclose specific information about ongoing intelligence gathering / counterterrorism 
missions, including those being carried out in online communities to combat 
cyberterrorism. And, indeed, revealing individual targets for surveillance or the details of 
particular real-world operations may compromise counterterrorism efforts. Having said 
that, this apparently idiotic move proved very effective when searching for the culprits of 
the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013. The FBI was able to effectively use social media 
to crowdsource information about the possible suspects in order to locate them more 
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quickly than they would have otherwise. Also, disclosing non-specific information (like 
the motivation behind such surveillance and the danger that these groups pose to both 
virtual and real world targets) from already complete surveillance operations like those 
carried out in WoW and Second Life, will hardly impact operations that are still ongoing, 
especially since Snowden has essentially opened these previously classified documents to 
various news agencies. Similarly (and I will expand on this in my conclusion), the IC is 
more likely to get an educated and well-motivated response from an audience that is 
invested in their online communities, like those who dwell in WoW. These are the people 
who have spent hundreds of hours in the world that the IC needs to gain access to, and so 
will be the most valuable resources in tracking down illicit activities.20  
The War of Action Versus the War of Ideas 
Another problem that the IC faces is a misguided focus on action rather than on 
combating radical Islamist ideologies despite substantial evidence (enumerated both at 
the start of this chapter and during the introduction) suggesting that their proliferation is 
significant problem that must be counteracted in order to combat the radicalization 
process that so often leads to acts of terrorism. We can see this emphasis on action rather 
than ideas both in the public statements from the White House and in the longer, more 
detailed publications coming from the various components of the IC involved in 
counterterrorism efforts. This is especially true of the documents published by the IC and 
the White House that are meant to articulate the overall strategy in counterterrorism in 
which even when cyberterrorism is mentioned, the stress is placed both on acts of 
hacking and espionage rather than on the more insidious proliferation of radicalizing 
                                                
20 To be fair, the FBI does have a program available to the public through which they can report suspect 
internet activity. However, it is not widely advertised. 
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messages. Likewise, the reports emphasize the physical or virtual actions that the IC can 
take in order to countermand these breaches of secure networks, despite the proliferation 
of hearings in front of the various congressional bodies dedicated to the risk posed by 
extremist rhetoric online. For example, in a yearly report required of the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) (in this case, James R. Clapper) and released at the end of 
January, 2014, although “Cyber” is listed first and, thus, given precedence over 
“Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation” and “Transnational Organized Crime” 
in the Table of Contents under the heading of “Global Threats,” the “Threat 
Environment,” as the report puts it, is all focused on acts of espionage and other forms of 
hacking and makes no mention of the radicalization efforts of various extremist groups: 
“We assess that computer network exploitation and disruption activities such as denial-
of-service attacks will continue. Further, we assess that the likelihood of a destructive 
attack that deletes information or renders systems inoperable with increase as malware 
and attack tradecraft proliferate.”21 The report goes on to enumerate the dangers that 
China and Russia both pose to secure U.S. networks (a fear also exhibited in other 
reports, like the aforementioned hearing, Cyber Security: Protecting America’s New 
Frontier) and international law for internet governance. We do have one recognition of 
the danger posed by terrorist organizations in the same “Cyber” section when the authors 
note that “Terrorist organizations have expressed interest in developing offensive cyber 
capabilities. They continue to use cyberspace for propaganda and influence operations, 
financial activities, and personnel recruitment” (2), but do not have any mention of 
                                                
21 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Page 1.    
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possible remedies to that use of the internet for radicalization purposes, nor do we have 
any further articulation of particular strategies in use by these “terrorist organizations.” 
Similarly, in a recent report (Current and Projected National Security Threats to 
the United States) stemming from an open meeting of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence designed to “inform the American public, to the extent we can, about the 
threats we face as a nation and worldwide” (1), the chairman of the committee, Senator 
Dianne Feinstein, credits the supposed diminishment of the “core of al-Qa’ida” to 
“terrorism-related arrests” (2) and then goes on to enumerate the “success of our criminal 
justice system in prosecuting terrorists” in the nine years since the September 11 attacks 
(438 convictions). She briefly mentions the importance of cyber-counterterrorism, but as 
with Clapper’s Worldwide Threat Assessment, she emphasizes “cyber attack” and “cyber 
espionage” (2). And, indeed, at this same hearing Clapper states, “. . . when it comes to 
distinct threat areas, our statement this year leads with cyber. And it’s hard to 
overemphasize its significance” (9).  However, he then highlights the risk of “state and 
non-state actors . . . gathering sensitive information from public and private sector 
entities, controlling the content and flow of information, and challenging perceived 
adversaries of cyber space.” He does not elaborate on what he means by “controlling the 
content and flow of information” or “challenging perceived adversaries” other than to 
claim that these unknown foes, which may include some terrorist organizations, put “all 
sectors of our country at risk – from government and private networks to critical 
infrastructures,” although this is perhaps in part because of an earlier portion of his 
testimony in which he takes congress to task for holding an open meeting on intelligence 
matters. Clapper, as the Director of National Intelligence and the nominal head of the IC, 
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seems to be solely focused on issues of network security, although we do get a hint of 
concern over communicative matters when he mentions the attempt by threatening 
groups to “control the content and flow of information.” 
At the other end of the counterterrorism process, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) has dedicated a whole series of projects to “The CyberDomain: Security and 
Operations.”22 Nestled among dated (circa 1990) graphics depicting binary code and an 
illustration of a motherboard on a special portion of their website dedicated to “Top 
Issues,” the DoD has included a both a comprehensive (albeit characteristically vague) 
game plan for their incursion into cyberspace as well as an RSS feed of news stories and 
features about cyberspace, press releases, and featured articles. Their strategy guide 
(entitled Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace), includes five 
different “Strategic Initiatives” that are, like the threat assessment from Clapper, the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Army and Navy cyber-divisions (as 
seen on their pubic web presence and various strategy statements of their own), solely 
focused on network security and the prevention of hacking, exploitation, and espionage.  
This collection of various documents, reports, webpages, etc. also evinces a 
growing preoccupation with state sponsored cyberwarfare coming from China and 
Russia, marking an shift away from their previous preoccupation with non-state actors, 
i.e. terrorist groups without a clear national identity. Even the organization of the texts 
from the DoD, CIA, and NCTC gives prominence to state-sponsored cyberwarfare, often 
devoting several paragraphs (or even whole sections) to China and Russia and relegating 
“other terrorist groups” to a few sentences here and there. This is not surprising given the 
                                                
22 Findable at <http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2013/0713_cyberdomain/> as of March 2014. 
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cooling relations between Russia, China, and the United States, but is a cause for concern 
when we consider that even though reports suggest that the core of Al-Qaeda is 
diminished, fringe groups and sole actors have become more and more active, as have 
militant Islamist groups like ISIS within the contested areas of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, 
Afghanistan, and etc. And, although cyber-espionage and hacking are certainly an issue 
worth considering, the IC and congressional bodies seem to be solely preoccupied with 
network security instead of discovering and counteracting root causes of such espionage 
or even considering that the proliferation of radical ideology is a danger worth 
combating. 
The one exception to this rule is the recent Twitter and Facebook-focused 
counter-radicalism campaign initiated by the State Department called Think Again Turn 
Away. It has, in recent months, been focused on diffusing the highly successful ISIS 
media campaign that has dominated the news in the latter part of 2014. However, the 
Think Again campaign, which utilizes text-like speech and internet-born slang along with 
graphic images of warfare, memes centered on the drawbacks of ISIS ideology, and 
hashtags has been a failure. According to Rita Katz, the director of the highly respected 
SITE Intelligence group, which monitors and analyzes jihadist activity online, the Think 
Again campaign, while “making a great step in the right direction by recognizing the 
importance of social media in jihadi recruitment” is largely ineffectual because it 
“provides jihadists with a stage to voice their arguments—regularly engaging in petty 
disputes with fighters and supporters of [terrorist] groups and arguing over who has killed 
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more people while exchanging sarcastic quips.”23 And, indeed, if we look at their Twitter, 
Facebook, and YouTube feeds, we can see comments like the following, which was 
posted on the Think Again Facebook page after the State Department linked to an article 
about ISIS forcing the shutdown of Syrian schools due to ongoing violence on 10 
November 2014: “These chanting rapist slavers don't have to look very far. Just copy the 
‘curriculum’ of Hamas/Palestinian Authority, financed by U.S. and European ‘aid’,” or 
the Twitter pro-ISIS account that posted to the Think Again Twitter feed 20 November 
2014 with, “To the evil forces of capitalism you are all dispensable, you are all collateral. 
The Islamic State sees you as a human being having rights.” suggesting that the internet 
denizens that respond to these accounts are, indeed, using the campaign in order to voice 
their own radicalized views.  
On the other hand, we have rabid believers in the obliteration of ISIS and 
“muslim” terrorists, such as one Twitter account that suggested that the United States 
“shove a missile” in an improbable orifice of ISIS followers and a Facebook account that 
notes: “Here's another ‘crazy’ idea. Don't allow massive immigration from countries that 
hate the United States. Am I a racist because I dare to say the OBVIOUS?” The 
comments on both of these Think Again accounts, of which the previous are a sample, 
tend to skew to the radical (either for against jihadist ideology) suggesting that there is 
very little real persuasion happening in this account – at least with the contested 
audiences in danger of radicalization that the State Department is attempting to recruit. 
Indeed, even if these at-risk populations visited these pages, (which is doubtful, given the 
narrow focus of social media accounts, unless they stumble upon posts in which accounts 
                                                
23 “The State Department’s Twitter War with ISIS is Embarrassing” appeared in Time on 16 September 
2014. 
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they do follow are linked), these audiences are unlikely to be convinced by statements 
made by organizations associated with a government they may not trust. In essence, the 
State Department lacks the ethos needed to convincingly address anything related to 
terrorism with hostile or ambivalent audiences, since it is a branch of the U.S. 
government. This is reflected in the comments made by pro-ISIS or anti-western accounts 
that claim, for example: “Jihad is far more then the narrowness your giving it. We fight 4 
a great & noble purpose while u wage war 4 worldly desires. ” or “no american has honor, 
dignity. americans don't care winning with honor, they just want to win at any cost ,” 
suggesting that any attempts at counter-radicalization made by Think Again can (and 
most likely will) be met with similar arguments based on the lack of credibility of 
Americans writ large or the United States government in particular.  
The IC and the Complex, Rugged Communication Environment 
Even when the IC makes the effort to fight the war on terror on an ideological 
level, like in the Think Again accounts mentioned above, however, they rely on outmoded 
communication models that have been proven to be ineffective. This is the point, of 
course, that the academic community could provide valuable insight into the necessary 
reformation of counterterrorism strategy. And, in fact, the theoretical basis for my 
discussion of the communicative strategies that are necessary in diffusion of the Islamist 
radicalization of communities / individuals is primarily taken from Corman and Dooley, 
two scholars working out of Arizona State University, and their  “Strategic 
Communication on a Rugged Landscape: Principles for Finding the Right Message,” 
along with several other publications form the Center for Strategic Communication, an 
academic think tank. One of the most important elements of the aforementioned article is 
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what the authors call the “rugged landscape” in communication. Corman and Dooley take 
the idea of the rugged landscape from evolutionary biologist Stewart Kauffman’s NK 
model, which, according to the authors, “explains how a system of components 
continuously improves by evolving over time” (5). A rugged landscape in the sense that 
Corman and Dooley are using it necessitates a complex search for the optimal solution to 
a problem because “[r]ugged landscapes are integral systems in which performance 
results from interdependencies and nonlinearities that exist between components in the 
system. This means you cannot change one variable in a patterned search without 
changing other variables at the same time” (6-7). What this also means is that each 
element in the system at hand, whether it is communicative or physical, is interdependent. 
Similarly, the rugged landscape is a complex and variegated space populated with hills, 
mountains, and valleys. Instead of conceiving of terrorists as one cohesive and 
homogenous entity that seeks to take over the world and therefore must be counteracted 
with a singular course of action, we must, the authors claim, take into account the 
differences in and among groups of terrorists that may not have the same communicative 
needs.  
Similarly, the communicative field itself will necessitate strategic moves tailored 
to the conventions of that medium as well as the population that utilizes it. This is 
especially true of internet environments because these outlets, as renowned media 
scholars, Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green note in Spreadable Media: 
Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture constitute “an emerging hybrid 
model of circulation, where a mix of top-down and bottom-up forces determine how 
material is shared across and among cultures in far more participatory (and messier) 
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ways” (1).24 This is especially true of the ISIS media campaign on Twitter, in that when 
Twitter admins suspended the accounts initially posting post-jihadist materials en-masse, 
ISIS proponents that had followed these accounts simply re-posted the banned content 
and created new accounts until there were almost fifty-thousand pro-ISIS Twitter feeds 
and up to forty-thousand posts per-day.25 And, as SITE Intelligence’s Rita Katz notes in 
“From Teenage Colorado Girls to Islamic State Recruits: A Case Study in Radicalization 
Via Social Media,” which (as the title suggests) explores the recent (as of October 2014) 
case of two moderate-Muslim American teenagers’ attempt to join ISIS after being 
radicalized by the group’s media campaign, “[a]s jihadi material is widely spread on the 
internet and then shared and retweeted, the once-distant conflict in the Middle East has 
crossed boundaries and resulted in several hundreds of Americans fighting with IS and 
dying in Syria and Iraq, only to be replaced by new recruits.” This, again, suggests that 
the very nature of the socially mediated internet environment requires a novel way of 
thinking for which the current government strategy is ill-equipped. 
 The counterterrorism strategies of the federal government seem to likewise miss 
the second implication of the complexity of the communicative and ideological landscape 
which is that: “Once a system – a social reality – is created, it has a tendency to sustain 
itself even in the face of contradictory information and persuasive campaigns. Members 
                                                
24 Jenkins, et al. are, of course, neither the first nor the only scholars to point out the changes that electronic 
media has brought to the communicative landscape. In fact, in Marshall McLuhan’s 1964 text, 
Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, the author coined the term “global village” in order to 
suggest that advances in media were contracting the world in ways that rendered it more and more similar 
to pre-literate times when oral communication was king. Similarly, the importance of the network in 
computer-mediated discourses has been well documented, as has the revision of the previous one-to-many 
communication model utilized by the big three (television) networks and large (or small) popular 
publications. 
25 According to a BBC article published on 19 June 2014 entitled “How Isis (sic) is spreading its message 
online”. The specific numbers of pro-ISIS accounts have varied from day to day as Twitter shuts them 
down and they reappear elsewhere under different usernames.  
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of the system routinely and often unconsciously, work to preserve the existing framework 
of meaning” (Corman, et al. 7-8). Thus, meanings and messages become even more 
difficult to disseminate due to the unwillingness of the audiences of those messages to 
shift their worldview. While Corman, et al. diffuse this problem by embracing the 
“pragmatic complexity” model, which emphasizes the disruption and variation of various 
communications as well as the embracing of complexity, I would also argue that the 
research being done in emotion in organizations (which I will outline briefly later) can 
significantly add to the discussion of how to engage in discourses with potential and 
current terrorist recruits. 
This lack of understanding of the communication strategies needed in these 
complex situations is, in fact, demonstrated in the Annual Defense Report from the 
Department of Defense and the Country Reports on Terrorism from the Department of 
State, the documents that together outline the United States’ official stance on 
communication with terrorist sects and present a detailed examinations of terrorist 
organizations. Country Report emphasizes the removal of key leaders from terrorist 
groups, although the authors of the report acknowledge that “[t]hese efforts buy us time 
to carry out the most important elements of a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy: 
disrupting terrorist operations, including their communications, propaganda and 
subversion efforts; planning and fundraising; and eliminating the conditions that terrorists 
exploit” (10). The authors then go on to say: “We must seek to build trusted networks of 
governments, multilateral institutions, business organizations, and private citizens and 
organizations that work collaboratively to defeat the threat from violent extremism,” thus 
showing that non-combative tactics are important when counteracting terrorist networks, 
 38 
even in the minds of the activity-based government. More importantly, the Country 
Report notes that “[r]adicalization of immigrant populations, youth and alienated 
minorities” (11) is a major problem and that: 
[I]t became increasingly clear that radicalization to violent extremism does not 
occur by accident, or because such populations are innately prone to extremism. 
Rather, we saw increasing evidence of terrorists and extremists manipulating the 
grievances of alienated youth or immigrant populations, and then cynically 
exploiting those grievances to subvert legitimate authority and create unrest. 
[ . . . ] Such efforts to manipulate grievances represent a “conveyor belt” 
through which terrorists seek to convert alienated or aggrieved populations, by 
stages, to increasingly radicalized and extremist viewpoints, turning them into 
sympathizers, supporters, and ultimately, in some cases, members of terrorist 
networks. In some regions, this includes efforts by AQ and other terrorists to 
exploit insurgency and communal conflict as radicalization and recruitment tools, 
especially using the Internet to convey their message. (10) 
The authors of the report acknowledge the importance of communication and ideology in 
the “radicalization” of at-risk populations. Even more interesting is the acknowledgment 
that these potential converts are not “innately prone to extremism,” but are seduced by 
terrorist rhetoric. The report even claims that “Counter-radicalization is a key policy 
priority for the United States” and that at-risk populations should be treated “not as a 
source of threat to be defended against, but as a target of enemy subversion to be 
protected and supported” (11). Once again, we see the emphasis placed on a complex 
understanding of the motivations and ideologies of target audiences. We also see the 
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authors of the report stressing the importance of “counter-radicalization,” a process that 
must include strategic communication and manipulation of ideologies within a 
recognizably diverse community. 
Having said that, the emphasis, again, is placed on combative and legal measures 
against terrorism that the United States government has taken in conjunction with the 
international community directly before and after these acknowledgements take place and 
throughout the rest of the report. Similarly, the only statement that gives us a sense of  
“counter-radicalization” is the following: “The key success factor in confronting violent 
extremism is the commitment by governments to work with each other, with the 
international community, with private sector organizations, and with their citizens and 
immigrant populations. Local communities are also a vital part of countering 
radicalization strategies” (11). And later on in the report in a section that purports to 
outline a their strategy to counteract terrorist ideologies, the solutions to the radicalization 
of vulnerable communities are to eliminate terrorist “safe havens” and to “address the 
underlying conditions that terrorists exploit at the national and local levels. These two 
measures should then induce alienated or aggrieved populations to become sympathizers, 
supporters, and members of terrorist networks by “addressing people‘s needs and 
grievances, by giving people a stake in their own political future, and by providing 
alternatives to what terrorists offer.” Much like the previously discussed Worldwide 
Threat Assessment coming from the ODNI and the various hearings in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, the report fails to mention ways to disrupt the spreading 
of terrorist ideologies through strategic communication. 
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 In the much shorter National Defense Strategy published in 2008,26 the 
Department of Defense betrays a much more simplistic view of the international 
landscape. In the first paragraph of the report, for example, the authors claim that: 
Beyond our shores, America shoulders additional responsibilities on behalf of the 
world. [ . . . ] We remain a beacon of light for those in dark places, and for this 
reason we should remember that our actions and words signal the depth of our 
strength and resolve. For our friends and allies, as well as for our enemies and 
potential adversaries, our commitment to democratic values must be matched by 
our deeds. The spread of liberty both manifests our ideals and protects our 
interests. (7) 
Aside from any immediate issues scholars in the humanities and social sciences might 
have with the statements about the indiscriminate spread of “democratic values” and 
“liberty” as a protection of “our interests,” we can also see here a lack of awareness of the 
complex nature of the communities that comprise those friends and enemies of the United 
States. There is a similarly simplistic description of terrorist organizations later on in the 
report: 
Like communism and fascism before it, today’s violent extremist ideology rejects 
the rules and structures of the international system. Its adherents reject state 
sovereignty, ignore borders, and attempt to deny self-determination and human 
dignity wherever they gain power. These extremists opportunistically exploit 
respect for these norms for their own purposes, hiding behind international norms 
and national laws when it suits them, and attempting to subvert them when it does 
                                                
26 The more recent versions of this document have not been altered much other than to include longer 
sections devoted to China and Russia. 
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not. (8) 
Not only are “today’s violent extremist[s]” lumped into one group, their goals are also 
merged so that it seems like there is a single vast conspiratorial “other” that seeks to 
overthrow and undermine international “norms.” Similarly, that “other,” which the 
authors of the report most often define as an extremist terrorist group can only be 
defeated by a reduction in uncertainty (11), “winning the long war” (12), and winning the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (13). What exactly “winning the long war” and winning the 
war in Iraq and Afghanistan mean remains unclear, which makes the likelihood of their 
achievement almost non-existent. There is likewise no mention of any specific ways in 
which we might accomplish those things nor is there any indication that there might be a 
communicative response necessitated by these violent extremists, perhaps because of the 
previously mentioned reluctance of the IC to publicly relate any information about 
counterterrorism strategy even in the most general terms.  
We have a similar simplification of the international landscape in the public 
statement from the White House attached to the 2011 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism as well as any documents marking the 10th anniversary of the 
September 11th attacks. Aside from the continued emphasis on action, the statement also 
reduces all “terrorist adversaries” to “al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, and its adherents,” which is 
a gross simplification of the varied nature of the terrorist landscape, especially given the 
differences in techniques and goals of terrorists worldwide. This statement, by both 
highlighting the “elimination” of al-Qaeda leaders and calling all terrorist threats al-
Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates (even though we can assume that President Obama and his 
staff are well aware that there are other terrorist groups out there), however, works to 
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deemphasize the continued dangers posed by terrorist groups and emphasizes the 
manageability of the terrorist threat, while reassuring an uneasy American public that 
progress is being made in the War on Terror. Therefore, from a public relations 
standpoint, we can see the logic behind the generalization and the emphasis on action.  
But for marginalized Muslim communities looking for a recognition that not all terrorists 
are Muslim and not all Muslims believe in radical Islam, this kind of gross simplification 
constitutes just another example of the federal government’s insistence on painting all 
Muslims with the same terrorist brush.  
More recently, President Obama’s speech addressing the ISIS (or ISIL, as the 
current administration calls the organization) threat not only simplifies the complex 
interplay of the groups in conflict in the Syrian and Iraqi regions (as well as worldwide), 
but also completely ignores the ideological threat posed by ISIS through their sustained 
propaganda campaign taking place on social media sites. In his speech, he claims that the 
United States (and a coalition of other nations) will “degrade, and ultimately destroy 
ISIL” while also aiming to eliminate the broader terrorist threat: “[W]e will hunt down 
terrorists who threaten our country, wherever they are. . . . This is a core principle of my 
presidency: if you threaten America, you will find no safe haven.” Again, we have a 
complex series of radical groups with varying tactics (both physical and communicative) 
rendered into a one-dimensional “terrorist threat.” There is also a similar emphasis on 
physical rather than ideological warfare, despite the well-publicized (and quite effective) 
sustained propaganda campaign carried out by ISIS. There is only one mention of 
ideological counterterrorism, and it is buried in the middle of the speech along with other 
(mostly) non-military strategies in “degrading” ISIS: “Working with our partners, we will 
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redouble our efforts to cut off its funding; improve our intelligence; strengthen our 
defenses; counter its warped ideology; and stem the flow of foreign fighters into -- and 
out of -- the Middle East.” What is perhaps most troubling, however, is the sentiment that 
ISIS and these amorphous “terrorists who threaten our country” can be defeated by 
“targeted [military] action” along with some humanitarian aid (something that has not 
been emphasized since this speech was given during prime time on 10 September 2014) 
rather than by a sustained campaign that includes ideological counterterrorism that is 
cognizant of the intricacies of terrorist organizations.  
The (Not so) Smooth Path to Radicalization 
All in all, there is very little attention paid to the not-yet-radicalized populations, 
even those within the United States and those in at-risk communities, as can be seen by 
the fact that almost all government publications are focused on current terrorists. Even 
the 2013 hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs sponsored by the NCTC, The Homeland Threat Landscape and U.S. Response 
actually spends very little time talking about the homeland at all, and instead insists that 
the “[a]l-Qa’ida core is a shadow of its former self, and the overall threat from al-Qa’ida 
in Pakistan is diminished” (1). Again, this makes sense from a public relations standpoint, 
since the director of the NCTC has to take pains to convince the members of the senate 
committee that the IC is, in fact, making progress in the War on Terror, but Director 
Matthew Olsen shifts the focus away from actual strategies to prevent radicalization of 
what they call “lone actors and insular groups not directly tied to terrorist organizations” 
– in other words, those radicalized individuals that have actually been responsible for the 
majority of the violence in the United States. He then quickly adds that the NCTC and IC 
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“continue to monitor threat information, develop leads, work closely with domestic and 
international partners, and develop strategic plans to combat our terrorist adversaries.”27 
This kind of vagueness, which is something that I addressed earlier in this chapter, is 
characteristic of reports and hearings attended by members of the IC, and tells us little 
about how seriously they take the radicalization of U.S. citizens.  
There is also a tendency in the governmental literature for the authors / speakers 
(in the case of hearings and transcripts from various speeches) to dehumanize the 
radicalized individuals, as is the case in the aforementioned hearing, The Homeland 
Threat Landscape and U.S. Response, in which U.S. extremists moved to violence are 
reduced to the acronym, “HVE,” which stands for Homegrown Violent Extremists. This 
use of an acronym, as well as the moniker, “Homegrown Violent Extremists” obliterates 
any consideration of personal identity, politics, beliefs, motivations, or any of the other 
myriad elements that has moved that individual to violence. And, even though NCTC 
Director Olsen acknowledges that these HVEs “remain the most likely global jihadist 
threat to the Homeland” (6), he then dismisses the danger that they pose by claiming that 
“the overall level of HVE activity is likely to remain the same: a handful of 
uncoordinated and unsophisticated plots emanating from a pool of a few hundred 
individuals” (6). And this is despite Olsen’s concession that the Boston Marathon 
bombers and other HVEs like them “are motivated, often with little or no warning, to act 
violently by themselves or in small groups” and that they have “exhibited few behaviors 
that law enforcement and intelligence officers traditionally use to detect commitment to 
violence.” In essence, we have a mixed series of messages in which these poorly trained 
                                                
27 I will address this burgeoning trend of what has been termed “microterrorism” in Chapter 6.  
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and disorganized HVEs are portrayed as vaguely threatening, but not overly powerful 
faceless actors with an anonymous series of motivations, except for those few inspired by 
“recent political unrest” (6). Olson’s report also relies on that assumption that there is 
one, homogenous space existing on the internet, the “online extremist environment” (7), 
instead of the varied communicative outlets that make up the networks utilized by 
Islamist extremists.  
This obliteration of both identity and differences between cohorts or individuals 
in danger of being radicalized by extremists continues on into the NCTC’s strategy 
section, which claims that:  
As our understanding of the threat evolves, so too must our approach to defeating 
it. As the April [2013] attack in Boston demonstrates, we may have little to no 
warning when a homegrown violent extremist mobilizes to violent action. Over 
the past year, NCTC has continued to our work with federal, state and local 
officials as well as community partners to expand efforts to raise community 
awareness about the threat of terrorist radicalization and recruitment. This 
coordinated approach ensures centralized policy direction and assessment, but 
accommodates local and community-based programs that vary across the country. 
Therefore, working side by side with interagency partners, we are building whole-
of-government approaches focusing on expanding government and community 
understanding and response of all forms of violent extremism, including al-Qa’ida 
inspired radicalization to violence in both real and online environments. (10) 
Aside from the vagueness typical of the IC when outlining strategy, the notion that the IC 
can “defeat” homegrown violence, points to the fact that they view the process of 
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radicalization as one continuously smooth path from normalcy to violent extremism that 
they can intervene in and disrupt, thus “winning” the war. This is also the case of the oft-
cited NYPD report, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, which includes a 
step by step progression to radicalization that reduces the transformation of a “normal” 
citizen to an extremist, which includes the following: 1) Pre-Radicalization 2) Self-
Identification 3) Indoctrination 4) Jihadization (6). The shortcomings of this gross 
simplification of the complexities of the psychological, political, and emotional 
interaction that leads an individual to violence has been addressed in other works (like in 
Marc Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad), but what I want to highlight here is the fact that the 
authors of these texts fundamentally misunderstand the at-risk populations even when 
these populations are mentioned in their texts at all. This misunderstanding will, 
according to the principles of effective strategic communication within the 
counterterrorism field mentioned earlier, render any attempt at ideological warfare 
largely ineffective.  
Conclusion 
 Through the examination of these disparate texts, we can see that the IC employs 
faulty communication and research strategies in several important areas due to four basic 
principles: A) the misreading of online communities and the ways in which they function 
for their users, B) a misguided concentration on the war of action instead of the war of 
ideas, C) a reliance on ineffective forms of communication, and D) the oversimplification 
of the radicalization process when they address such things at all. This is in addition to 
the complicated structure of the IC community and their reluctance to share information 
with congressional bodies as well as with the public. This then makes it even more 
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difficult to create a comprehensive strategy that includes ideological counterterrorism as 
well as communicative strategies that are better suited to the complex environment in 
which these agencies work. The failure of the current counterterrorism strategy (at least 
when it concerns extremist Islamist terrorists) is evidenced by the fact that al-Qaeda is 
still in operation and has actually increased their recruitment of Western audiences with 
English-language propaganda, as have other terrorist groups like Hezbollah, ISIS, and al-
Shabaab. Similarly, the growth of terrorist organizations in the recently war-torn areas of 
northern Africa and the Middle East testify to the failure of counterterrorist strategies 
abroad when the U.S. has intervened. Without a fundamental change in how the IC 
combats terrorist ideologies, the presence of extremist texts online is certain to spread, 
especially with the advent of technologies render it simple and cost effective to create 
communities of (potential) recruits.  
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CHAPTER 3: ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY AND THE (IMPOSSIBLE) REINSTATING OF 
THE WORLDWIDE CALIPHATE 
It must be squarely stated that there is and was no ideology except Islam that can 
unite the world and serve as a basis for a world state. Islam is the only religion in the 
world that considers entire mankind to be one family and proclaims that all human beings 
have descended from the same parents "O mankind, We created you from a single male 
and a female", declares the Qur'an.  
--Abul ala Mawdudi “Unity of the Muslim World” 
 
Introduction 
 In order to fully understand the current ideology of Salafi Jihadist groups like 
ISIS, which make up a good portion of the active Islamist terrorist population, 
counterterrorist strategists working the Intelligence Community (IC) and in other 
organizations with stakes in the diffusion of terrorist ideologies need to likewise 
understand the religious underpinnings of that ideology. As explored in the previous 
chapter, without a deep understanding of the motivations of these groups as well as the 
evidence cited in their texts, it is almost impossible to counteract their rhetoric. Similarly, 
non-Sunni groups like Hezbollah and the Assad regime rely on techniques explored later 
on in this chapter in order to keep their proponents continually motivated, even in the 
face of massive external pressure from international communities. Thus, what we are 
exploring here are the works of several foundational clerics, as well as the persuasive 
techniques that Islamist groups, both Shia and Sunni, have utilized based on the texts of 
these clerics. 
Starting with the passage above, transcribed from a speech by notable Muslim 
theologian Abul ala Mawdudi, we can see reflected a widely held ideal among both 
twentieth-century Islamist scholars like Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb and 
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contemporary “fundamentalist” groups such as Hizb ut Tahrir and Al Qaeda. According 
to these clerics / organizations, national and pan-national governments are “the root of all 
the evils in the world” (Mawdudi, Let us be Muslim) and are to be fought either 
ideologically or physically or both, depending on the philosophy of the organization to 
which the cleric belongs. The only answer to the moral crisis that these scholars see 
taking place in secular (and in most Islamic) governments is the establishment of a 
worldwide caliphate – an Islamist government guided by the principles set forth in the 
Qu’ran and by Shari’a (family law) as interpreted by the philosophy of the group in 
power.  
 There is a historical precedent for this type of state, which is based on 
constitutional and theocratic forms of governance, both in the time period directly 
following the death of Muhammed (called the “rightly guided” caliphates) and later on 
through the Umayyad (661-750) and Abbasid (750-1258) dynasties. There was also an 
attempted revival of the title of the caliphate during and directly following the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire, as well as a few smaller caliphates in the time periods between 1258 
and the early twentieth-century.28 The justification for the formation of these later 
caliphates varied depending on the group in power, but generally relied on verses from 
the Qu’ran and Hadith and classical theories of jurisprudence, especially those from Abu 
al-Hasan Ali ibn Muhammed ibn Habib more commonly referred to as al-Mawardi). Al-
Mawardi is especially useful to Islamist groups because he argues that the caliphate 
                                                
28 Specific information about the history of the caliphate is taken from Amira K. Bennison’s The Great 
Caliphs: The Golden Age of the ‘Abbasid Empire and Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds’s God’s Caliph: 
Religious Authority in the First Century of Islam. If interested in general information on the history of the 
caliphate, Wikipedia has a surprisingly thorough article on all of the major developments with specific 
recommendations for further reading. 
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system is not just a political necessity, but a religious one as well. He cites the same 
passage from the Qu’ran utilized by most Islamists, Surat al-Nisa 4:59, which states, 
“Obey God, obey the Prophet and those in authority among you.”29 al-Mawardi takes this 
as evidence of a hierarchy of authority starting with God and Muhammed and continuing 
with the descendants of the Quraysh (Muhammed’s) tribe who, al-Mawardi claims, 
should stand at the head of caliphate-style government. The reason I mention the 
historical instantiations and the juristic / religious bases for the caliphate system is that 
clerics that I will be focusing on in this chapter very seldomly mention the specific details 
of the kind of government that they would like to put into place, instead relying on a kind 
of nostalgic idealism that only tangentially connects with concrete realities historical or 
contemporary governance. 
 This is, in fact, what I what I will be focusing on here: the use of this nostalgic 
idealism used by Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qutb (the three most often cited twentieth-
century clerics in contemporary extremist websites). Specifically, I will examine the 
ways in which these clerics utilize what could be called ideal(ology) – the spreading of a 
certain set of beliefs (a caliphate style government) through the strategic use of heavily 
connotative, almost fable-like language. Because of both the political nature of this kind 
of discourse, as well as the clerics’ use of a certain kind of mythology, Louis Althusser, 
who examines both mythology and ideology will be particularly useful here. In fact, I 
will be utilizing Althusser’s well known essay, “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses” In order to further explore the ways in which Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qtub 
                                                
29 As cited in Souad Ali’s A Religion, Not a State: Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s Islamic Justification of Political 
Secularism. She has a useful summary of the four schools of jurisprudence along with her exploration of al-
Raziq’s text, which will be examined in this paper later on. 
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employ the Ideal to sell their vision of the caliphate. I will then look at some of the key 
texts in each of these authors’ arsenals and examine the ways in which the concepts 
outlined in section one are utilized. Finally, I will investigate impact of these texts on 
contemporary Islamist groups. 
 Although this chapter is focused on these early twentieth-century clerics, these 
scholars have had a significant effect on later jihadists, especially Salafi Jihadists, who 
are the among the contemporary incarnation of the populations calling for the 
establishment of the worldwide caliphate. If we look at Islamist texts being published by 
al-Qaeda, for example, we will see sections devoted reprints of Mawdudi and Qtub. Also, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, which is now the ruling party in Egypt was both founded and 
takes their philosophical stance from al-Banna. Thus, an exploration of these clerics and 
their texts is important in understanding these later Islamist groups, especially given that 
the majority of counterterrorist specialists, including the members of the IC, are 
specialists in political or military strategy and not Islamic and Middle Eastern cultures 
and are, therefore, often ignorant of these foundational scholars. Similarly, as stated 
before, in order to combat the ideologies put forth by the contemporary Islamists, we 
must first understand their patterns of thought and then work within them in order to be 
effective.   
Althusserian Ideology and the Myth of Reality 
 In Althusser’s works, as for many Marxist theorists like Horkheimer, Adorno, and 
Gramsci, myth and ideology in political and religious structures are of the utmost 
importance. Althusser defines ideology as an ahistorical construct. It is, he says “a pure 
illusion, a pure dream . . . nothingness”(33). He goes on to complicate this notion by 
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saying that “ideologies have a history of their own” (his italics) but “that ideology in 
general has no history”(34-5). What this means is that ideologies / ideology have a 
tenuous link to actual historical events. Instead, they (ideologies, in particular) create 
their own history. Althusser goes on to further articulate this concept, arguing that “they 
[ideologies] do not correspond to reality” (36) and that “they constitute an illusion” by 
“making an allusion to reality.” This results in the fact that “in ideology men represent 
their real conditions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form” (37). This suggests 
then, that ideology has a dialectical relationship with actual historical events in that it 
refashions history in order to create this set of “beautiful lies” that re-present their 
conditions of reality for their consumption. 
 Althusser names, as a cause of this need to refashion history / reality “Priests or 
Despots . . . a small number of cynical men who base their domination and exploitation 
of the 'people' on a falsified representation of the world which they have imagined in 
order to enslave other minds by dominating their imaginations” (37). This, of course, 
would fit with the overall emphasis that Marxists place on the domination of the lower 
classes by the ruling elite, but it also explains the utility of ideology for clerics and 
extremists alike in that, in order to be successful, they must motivate a large group of 
mostly uneducated, mostly poor, mostly disenfranchised followers.30 Having said this, 
Althusser goes on to complicate this notion that there is a one to one correspondence 
between a real event / reality and a false event /reality created by an evil power claiming 
that: 
[A]bove all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is  
                                                
30 See the US State department’s reports on terrorism for further analysis of the potential recruits for 
Islamist extremists. 
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represented to them there. It is this relation which is at the centre of every 
ideological, i.e. imaginary, representation of the real world. It is this relation that 
contains the 'cause' which has to explain the imaginary distortion of the 
ideological representation of the real world. Or rather, to leave aside the language 
of causality it is necessary to advance the thesis that it is the imaginary nature of 
this relation which underlies all the imaginary distortion that we can observe (if 
we do not live in its truth) in all ideology. (38) 
Or, as he later states, “[T]he representation given to individuals of their (individual) 
relation to the social relations which govern their conditions of existence and their 
collective and individual life [is] necessarily an imaginary relation” (39). Therefore, any 
relationship that the sets of beliefs that make up ideology might have to real historical or 
contemporary circumstances (and we can, I think, expand this beyond the relationship 
between men and their means of production) is a fiction.31 The process of meaning 
making in this kind of system is confined to the subjects between whom the ideology 
circulates. The importance of this for the discussion here lies in the fact that any reference 
that ideology might make to historical circumstances is a pretense based on an elaborate 
mythology that does not exist. And, in fact, this mythology is something that we can see 
appearing within these twentieth-century clerics’ and contemporary Islamists’ texts when 
they refer to this original Islamic state. This mythical state, as we will see, forms the basis 
for their ideological struggle against what they conceive of as the corrupt and oppressive 
West as well as their own national governments which are, they say, immoral and unjust. 
                                                
31 This idea is picked up and expanded on by post-structuralist theorists like Derrida and Foucault. 
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 It is interesting to note that both al-Banna and Qutb had dealings with the 
Marxists in Egypt as part of their work with the Muslim Brotherhood. Mawdudi also 
mentions Marxism (socialism) in his texts as a philosophy that is less effective as a total 
system of beliefs (something that we will get to later) than Islam. The reason mention this 
connection is that all three of these clerics have been, in one way or another, influenced 
by the modes of thought as set out by Marx, even if it was only a familiarity by way of 
combating their philosophical treatises. Aside from the overtly political nature of Marx 
and, later on, Althusser, that makes his discussion of ideology and myth in “Ideological 
State Apparatuses”32 particularly important here, the conceptual link between Marxism 
and Islamism according to these clerics will become more apparent as we examine their 
works. 
Abu ala Mawdudi and the Rule of Men over Men 
 Mawdudi, a twentieth century Pakistani Islamist theologian and the founder of 
Jamaat-e-Islami, which is an influential political party in and around Pakistan even today, 
is one of those oft-cited scholars in extremist publications, namely because of his stance 
on the inherent corruption of Western and Western-influenced governments. As he 
explicitly states in “Let Us Be Muslims,” “The root of all the evils you find in the world 
lies in the bad character of the government,” which is, according to Mawdudi, 
characterized by oppression, injustice, and immoral acts (like adultery and prostitution, 
for example). This is, he argues, because: 
[T]he government is out of gear. The hands that hold power are bad. They 
themselves commit oppression and also side with oppressors. . . . the prevalence 
                                                
32 This is an essay in his book Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays. 
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of wrong concepts of business and dealings, bad methods of living, the prevalence 
of oppression and misdeeds and destruction of God's creation, all these result 
from one thing: the keys of authority and power being in wrong hands. 
These “wrong hands” of which he speaks do not only belong to Western governments 
like the United States, but also to any institution in which “men rule over men.” In other 
words, any nation state and even pan-national organizations (Mawdudi specifically 
discusses the post World War 1 League of Nations) are inherently corrupt because men 
(and Mawdudi expressly uses this pronoun when discussing any issue in which power 
structures play a part) are inherently corrupt, especially if they are at all influenced by 
Western thought. The solution to this problem as he sees it is a worldwide government 
based on the early days of Islam, during and after the life of Mohammed. The Prophet, 
Mawdudi claims, “succeeded in setting up a model Islamic society and state” in which 
“[t]he social order was a perfect manifestation of the Islamic ideals of human civilization 
and culture, of morality and private ethics, of social justice and economic equity, of 
brotherhood and fraternity, of solidarity and cohesion.”33 Thus, we have this ideal state 
(and that is the chapter title for the section that the previous passage resides in) in which 
the subjects’ religious, social, and political lives are united under God during 
Mohammed’s reign as both the political and religious leader of Medina. 
This ideal Islamic state based on the caliphs from that first generation of Muslims 
is continually harkened to in Mawdudi’s other works, throughout which he claims that 
Islam is the only religion that can bring together all races as they were united in the early 
                                                
33 Unfortunately, almost all of the tracts that I will mention in this paper are available through web sources 
and are not paginated. Works like “Let us Be Muslims” that I mention here are often difficult to track down 
in print but can be found posted in various Jihadist or fundamentalist websites. 
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days of Islam. In “Unity of the Muslim World” he again references the caliphate 
established after Mohammed’s death, saying: 
When during the days of the pious Caliphs Islam crossed the Arab frontiers, a 
large part of the world came under its sway, Muslims of all parts of the world had 
only one spiritual and temporal head, the caliph. The entire Islamic world was 
governed by the same law. All Muslims formed one family. If a person, 
irrespective of whether he came from the East or West, accepted Islam, became a 
member of the Islamic society and enjoyed the same rights and privileges as did 
the Arabs. 
Thus, we have this representation of an idyllic world in which all men were united under 
the banner of Islam and in which all differences (apart from religious) were not just 
tolerated, but respected. This is in contrast to the image of the corrupt nation state (built 
earlier on in “Let us be Muslims”) that continually oppresses the devout. This ideal 
Muslim state in which “[t]he teachings of Islam no longer remain mere theoretical 
expressions, [but] they became a living reality in individual and social life” is what we 
(as his audience members) should strive to implement by obliterating national and pan-
national organizations and establishing a world caliphate. 
 Having said that, Mawdudi’s own description of this state based on the teachings 
of Islam suggests that reaching such a thing is not possible and that it is, in fact, a myth. 
He consistently relies on terms like “perfect” and “ideal” to describe the original 
caliphates while building for his audience the image of a world in which all men resided 
and will reside again in peace and harmony, willingly divesting his readers / listeners of 
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the actual historical events during that time period.34 Aside from the historical 
inaccuracies of Mawdudi’s account, we must recognize that the picture of the Islamic 
government, that thing that we should (again) strive for, is just what he claims it to be: an 
Ideal in the Aristotelian sense in that it is an unreachable perfection, a veritable Garden of 
Eden, the establishment of the “Kingdom of God on earth.”35 It is a utopia, in the same 
manner as the Christian conceptions of the Garden of Eden. This use of what rhetoricians 
like Kenneth Burke call “God terms,” or words with a heavy positive connotative 
meaning (like “family,” “holy,” or, indeed, “Garden of Eden”) and emotional resonances, 
along with his stark black and white divisions between wrong and right, evil (West) and 
good (East) coupled with his rosy description of the all encompassing Islamic “family” 
united by the total system of Islam despite a large population of what he would term 
“unbelievers,” elides the complex nature of both the start and the continuation of Islam as 
well as its relationship to external world. 
Indeed, these simplistic renderings of the past and present actually work to 
dissociate Mawdudi’s conception of Islam and Muslims from everything else. Mawdudi’s 
ideal caliphate exists without references to regions, people (other than the general “pious 
Muslim”), and time, decontextualizing this utopian vision upon which his ideology rests 
in much the same way that Althusser argues when claiming that ideology is “ahistorical” 
or, perhaps more to the point, that ideologies are “omni-historical” in that they are 
“immutable, present in the same form throughout what we can call history.” In this 
                                                
34 There are many good accounts of the early “guided” caliphates established by Mohammed’s successors. 
Since my focus here is on the nature of the tropes used by Mawdudi et al., I do not delve too much into 
what has already been well explained by historians and religious theorists. 
35 This excerpt is taken from a transcript of Mawdudi’s 1963 speech entitled “Islam Today.” Available at: 
<http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/islamtoday/index.html>. Last date of access: 7 May 
2011. 
 58 
particular instance, for example, Mawdudi’s caliphate could exist at any point throughout 
time, as could his original generations of Muslims, partially because of the lack of 
detailed historical / contemporary references, but also because of the fairy-tale like 
quality of his prose in which absolutes hold sway and evil inevitably falls before the tide 
of the good. If we look back at the earlier passage with this in mind, “When during the 
days of the pious Caliphs Islam crossed the Arab frontiers” becomes the start of a fable in 
which “Muslims of all parts of the world had only one spiritual and temporal head, the 
caliph,” the righteous spiritual leader of the Kingdom of God on earth, the ideal place 
where “[t]he entire Islamic world was governed by the same law,” and “[a]ll Muslims 
formed one family.” 
This fable-like quality of Mawdudi’s text then leads us back to Althusser’s claim 
that any ideology’s relationship to actual historical and contemporary circumstances is 
illusory. In this case, the original, perfect generation of Muslims as well as the ideal 
future in which all people are united under the banner of the caliphate-to-come, are really 
symbols of what was and what will be. If this is the case, the actual historical accuracy of 
these symbols should not (and, in fact does not, if we look at the popularity of these texts) 
matter to the audience because, as Althusser claims, “all ideology is centred . . . the 
Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Centre, and interpellates around it the 
infinity of individuals into subjects” so that, in a theoretical sense, belief in the ideal 
caliphate, the symbol at the heart of Mawdudi et al.’s, automatically makes the individual 
a subject in the Islamist ideology. Thus, the actual connection of the symbol (ideal 
caliphate) to any kind of “real” time and place is irrelevant. Indeed, if we look at the 
specific phrase used by Althusser in context with the post-structuralist theories on the 
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absence of the reference, the “Absolute Subject” cannot and always will be absent, an 
ephemeral image constituted by and of the beliefs of those “infinity of individuals” that 
are its subjects. Mawdudi and those like him have brought the ideal caliphate into being 
by their very belief in it. And because their texts on the caliphate continue to circulate, 
the ideal(ology) persists in existing. This, in fact, is part of what makes his rhetoric so 
powerful, because it can, in essence, apply to any circumstance and any time, which is 
something that will come up in Al-Banna’s work, as well. 
Hasan al-Banna and the Sacrifice of Jihad 
 Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the mid 
nineteen-twenties is another of those clerics that is often cited by contemporary Islamists, 
particularly because of his emphasis on the physical as well as spiritual / ideological 
nature of jihad. As he states in “The Message of the Teachings,” which is a short 
document outlining the ideology (guiding beliefs) of the Muslim Brotherhood, “Allah is 
our goal, / The Messenger is our example, / the Qur’an is our constitution, / Jihad is our 
way, / And martyrdom is our desire.” This is, in fact, one of the major differences 
between al-Banna and Mawdudi: al-Banna declared that the perpetuation of his particular 
set of beliefs (as shared by a multitude of his followers) should be carried out by 
“struggling with the tongue, pen, or hand,”36 whereas Mawdudi and his group, Jamaat-e-
Islami, concentrated on political and not military action, for the most part. Having said 
this, al-Banna and Mawdudi shared similar goals in uniting the world under a Islamist 
caliphate, just as their texts share analogous rhetorical appeals / structures.  
                                                
36 “The Message of the Teachings.” Found at: <http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/tmott/>. 
Last accessed on 7 May 2011. 
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Like Mawdudi, al-Banna harkens back to the early Muslims during the reign of 
the original, guided caliphates, which “reached the highest level of justice and mercy ever 
reported of any nation” and contrasts it with the failure of the modern (post World War 
II) governmental organizations, which he deems to be “alien systems” founded on 
“materialist pillars” that lead to “corrupted vices.”37 His emphasis on the materiality of 
the Western governments is a slight shift from Mawdudi, but fits in with both al-Banna 
and Mawdudi’s emphasis on the totality of the Islamic system, which is designed to 
“[offer] the most detailed, most complete, all-encompassing system compared to all other 
social philosophies that have ever emerged.”38 al-Banna further articulates this idea by 
claiming: 
Islam is a comprehensive system which deals with all spheres of life. It is a 
country and homeland or a government and a nation. It is conduct and power or 
mercy and justice. It is a culture and a law or knowledge and jurisprudence. It is 
material and wealth or gain and prosperity. It is Jihad and a call or army and a 
cause. And finally, it is true belief and correct worship.39 
In this passage, we can see al-Banna’s emphasis on the totality and the perfection of the 
Islamic system, something that is likewise highlighted by Mawdudi when he outlines the 
functioning of Islam as a political, theoretical (spiritual), and social entity.40 Interestingly 
                                                
37 “Towards the Light”. Available at: <http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/ 
towards_the_light/index.htm>. Last accessed on: 18 May 2014. 
38 “Peace in Islam”. Available at: <http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/ 
peace_in_islam/index.htm>. Last accessed on: 18 May 2014. 
39 “The Message of the Teachings” 
40 This is perhaps best articulated in “Islam Today”: [T] he starting point of the history of Islam as a world 
force was the acceptance by the whole Arab nation of the social, economic, political and cultural system of 
Islam sad its willingness to mould individual character and communal life in harmony with the principles 
of the new Faith.” “Islam Today” can be found at: <http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/ 
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enough, al-Banna also stresses the economic manifestations of Islam (“It is material and 
wealth or gain and prosperity”), which he decries in his description of the allegedly 
soulless Western state. 
Part of the reason for this apparent contradiction, I think, is al-Banna’s use of 
absolutes, much in the same way that Mawdudi utilizes God-terms to bring forth his ideal 
Caliphate. Islam, al-Banna claims, is the perfect governing system that stands against the 
evil materiality of the western governments as well as the (middle) eastern nations that 
have become tainted by their association with colonial states (e.g. England and Egypt). 
Islam also “came to announce human brotherhood and give glad tidings of a call to 
universality, to eradicate all forms of discrimination” and is a harbinger of “absolute 
equality.”41 in attempting to recreate Islam as this comprehensive and perfect system that 
will resolve all the ills of the world, al-Banna must forego coherence in some of the 
details of his doctrine, which then results in inconsistencies. In that aforementioned 
instance, he had to recover the material benefits of the Islamic system (while decrying 
materialism in the West) in order to create that complete and total perfection necessary in 
his myth(idea)ology. We can see this kind of inconsistency more clearly in the latter part 
of “Peace in Islam” when al-Banna attempts to both claim that Islam is an 
“uncompromisingly” peaceful religion of “absolute equality” that will “unite religions,” 
“respect every law before Islam, and . . . praise every nation of believers that existed in 
the past,” and justify violence as a response to the ideological opposition of Islamic 
doctrine. As he states, “Islam is a comprehensive message of social reform founded on 
                                                                                                                                            
peace_in_islam/index.htm>. Last accessed on 18 May 2014. 
 
41 “Peace in Islam”. 
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the noble principles of truth and goodness; it must remove from its path all sources of 
hindrance which may delay or prevent the propagation of its message.” In this latter 
quotation, al-Banna does not just validate force (and it is clear from the context of that 
quotation that “remov[ing] from its path all sources of hindrance” equates to the usage of 
physical violence) as a last resort “after exhausting all peaceful means of reconciliation,” 
but also rationalizes its use if another (and it is never really specified who this other 
might be) entity inhibits the spreading of Islamic ideology. And this is despite his earlier 
claim that Islam is a merciful religion that exists in a tolerant and cooperative world with 
other religions / races. Again, the reason for this lies in al-Banna’s attempt to create an 
ideal version of Islam that negates the “traditional view” of Islam as a “religion of the 
sword” while vindicating the use of violence as a means of spreading ideology, so that we 
have a version of Islam that is both peaceful and powerful, both material and spiritual, 
both unifying and singular. It is, like Mawdudi’s version of Islam and Althusser’s 
ideology, a fable-like creation with a tangential relationship to “real” circumstances. 
Sayyid Qutb and the Unique Generation of Muslims 
        Sayyid Qutb was, like al-Banna, a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt. He was heavily influenced by both al-Banna and Mawdudi and cites them often 
throughout his most well known works, including the most relevant text for our 
discussion here, Milestones. Like Mawdudi and al-Banna, Qutb conceived of the post 
World War I and World War II world as being in a state of crisis due to the lack of 
spiritual guidance in the modern (Western) nation states. As he states at the start of 
Milestones, “Mankind today is on the brink of a destruction . . . because humanity is 
devoid of those vital values which are necessary not only for its healthy development but 
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also for its real progress” (23). This passage (and others throughout his works) have this 
image of the soulless Western-based / colonial governments that cannot possibly fulfill 
the spiritual needs of men (women are noticeably absent from Qutb’s works). Qutb also 
harkens back to the original “perfect” generation of Islam during the time of Mohammed, 
explicitly (more clearly, perhaps, than Mawdudi and al-Banna) attributing the 
flawlessness of that generation to a life lived solely to the guidance of the Qur’an rather 
than to the presence of Mohammed.42 
What is also distinctive about Qutb’s work is his call for a complete separation 
between the Muslim and non-Muslim world, an idea that runs contrary to the unifying 
image of Islam proposed by Mawdudi and al-Banna. This perfect generation of Muslims 
at the time of Mohammed was so perfect, he argues, because of the new Muslims’ 
separation from their polytheistic roots. Thus, contemporary Muslims must strive to do 
the same and separate themselves from what Qutb terms to be the “Jahiliyyah,” the non-
Muslims (or those ignorant of Islam): 
We must . . . free ourselves from the clutches of Jahili society, Jahili concepts, 
Jahili traditions and Jahili leadership. Our mission is not to compromise with the 
practices of Jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it. Jahili society, because of its 
Jahili characteristics, is not worthy to be compromised with. . . . Our aim is to 
change the Jahili system at its very roots, this system which is fundamentally at 
variance with Islam and which, with the help of force and oppression, is keeping 
us from living the sort of life which is demanded by our Creator. (34-5) 
                                                
42 “The Holy Qur’an was the only source from which they quenched their thirst, and this was the only 
mould in which they formed their lives” (30). 
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In this way, Qutb argues for a complete separation from / transformation of the non-
Islamic world, so that his ummah (Islamic community) becomes a closed system. This 
resonates with his earlier declaration that the first “perfect” generation of Muslims was so 
because of their adherence to a strict Qu’ranic way of life, separate from their polytheistic 
roots. It is also, as stated before, at odds with both al-Banna and Mawdudi’s insistence 
that the Islam is a unifying religion that brings all peoples together. However, if we look 
at the latter part of that passage, we can see his ideological affiliation with the other two 
clerics in his insistence that the non-Muslim world must be transformed “at its roots” so 
that the faithful can be free of its oppressive influences. 
It is also apparent early on in Milestones (in the Preface, in fact) that Qutb has the 
same objection as Mawdudi to the structure of the non-Islamist governments. As he 
states: “This Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against Allah's sovereignty on earth. It 
transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of Allah, namely sovereignty, and makes 
some men lords over others” (27), which is similar to Mawdudi’s claims that it is the 
inherently corrupt nature of the non-Islamist men in power that has resulted in the 
downfall of the Western state. Qutb, in fact, expands on this by arguing that the 
Jahiliyyahh have asserted “the right to create values” and “to legislate rules of collective 
behaviour without regard to what Allah Almighty has prescribed.” He goes on to say:  
The result of this rebellion against the authority of Allah is the oppression of His 
creatures. Thus the humiliation of the common man under the communist systems 
and the exploitation of individuals and nations due to greed for wealth and 
imperialism under the capitalist systems are but a corollary of rebellion against 
Allah's authority and the denial of the dignity of man given to him by Allah 
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Almighty. (27) 
In this manner, Qutb goes a step further than Mawdudi in claiming that the non-Islamist 
governments’ oppression of its people is just a part of the larger goal of these men to 
usurp God’s authority. Thus, the Jahiliyyah becomes a singular entity, a stark figure 
determined to take the place of God in the lives of men. This, in fact, is why Qutb sees it 
as a thing that cannot be communicated or compromised with. Similarly, “It [the 
Jahiliyyah] is against the system of the universe” (57), Qutb says after he outlines the 
schema of natural laws, which are all attributed to the wisdom of Allah (56-7). Because 
of this opposition to “natural” laws, as well as the usurpation of divine authority, any 
contact with the non-Islamist modern world (Qutb takes pains to declare that the 
contemporary (twentieth-century) Western world is much more devious than the simple 
Jahiliyyah that populated Arab lands during Mohammed’s lifetime) will necessarily 
pollute the wellspring from which the faithful must drink. What this means, as well, is 
that the West becomes a representation of the unnatural, the corrupt, and the faithless. 
The West is not just faithless in the sense that it is secular, however. As we can see from 
his text, there is an added valence of meaning to that word, in that being without faith is, 
for Qutb, an active state, meaning that the faithless are, by their very existence, acting out 
against God, even if they are not purposefully spreading their unbelief. Thus, the 
Jahiliyyah are appropriating the authority of Allah. 
 What all of this means rhetorically, is that the Jahiliyyah becomes an Absolute, in 
Qutb’s text, just as the caliphate-to-be becomes a symbol of the Ideal for Al-Banna, and 
Mawdudi. And, in fact, Qutb enhances the purely symbolic nature of the Jahiliyyah by 
further claiming that it is anathema to “the Perfect” and “the Real,” which are both 
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embodied by “Allah Most High” (34), and the faithful that worship him in the “correct” 
way, so that each of these factions are decontextualized and ahistorical, in the same 
manner as Mawdudi’s ideal Muslim state and al-Banna’s “perfect” generation of 
Muslims that have been and will become again (which is something that Qutb details, as 
well). 
This use of opposing ideals (the Jahiliyyah as the representation of evil and the 
ummah as the representation of good) also, I think, brings new valences of meaning to 
Althusser’s claim that ideologies are constitutive, meaning that they bring their subjects 
into being by their very belief in them (that the sets of ideals and beliefs of ideologies are 
embodied in their subjects), in that the ummah, as the purveyors of True Religion can 
never quite break free of the Jahiliyyah, or the non-Muslim world. There can be no 
complete separation due to the complex interplay between nations on the global scale and 
the pervasiveness of mass and social medias (although the latter came to prominence 
after Qutb’s time). In this way, these two factions are eternally at odds so that we can 
never have the Jahiliyyah without the ummah. 
Ideology, Myth, and Contemporary Islamists 
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qutb are all 
cited as foundational scholars by many of the contemporary Islamist and extremist 
groups. If we look at the forums on Jihadist websites or the virtual libraries of 
organizations like Hizb-ut Tahrir (which calls for the foundation of a worldwide caliphate 
by political and physical means), we can see a plethora of each of these authors’ texts. In 
fact, most of the tracts used in this paper are from a Salafi Jihadist website called “The 
Pulpit of Monotheism and Jihad,” which calls for the use of suicide bombers and praises 
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the activities of organizations like Al-Qaeda. A basic search for any of these texts on a 
search engine will lead to these kinds of websites, in which Milestones might sit on a 
virtual shelf next to Awlaki’s “44 Ways to Support Jihad.” The reason for the 
pervasiveness of these works can be attributed, I think, to the ideological characteristics 
explored here through the lens of Althusser. As I have shown, these clerics continually 
decontextualize and idealize the worldwide caliphate, the “perfect” generation of 
Muslims (that were and that will be), and the opposition of the faithless West to the pious 
ummah. What this means is that these texts transcend specific times and places so that the 
beliefs that these authors espouse can then be applied by these groups to suit their own 
specific needs. This decontextualization and idealization, which will be explored in more 
detail even extends to Shia groups like Hezbollah, despite the ideological differences 
between the Sunni Salafi Jihadists and the Shi’ites. What this means in broader terms is 
that Islamists (and maybe radical religious groups in general, although that is beyond the 
scope of this text) rely on similar rhetorical principles even though the different factions 
may be hold a virulent hatred of each other.  
In a practical sense, this may be because the use of ideals and symbols instead of 
specific groups and historical circumstances makes these ideologies much more difficult 
to diffuse. The power of these constructs lies in the fact that these they are unattainable. 
We will never, for example, create Mawdudi’s perfect caliphate or come to know / 
resemble Qutb’s Perfect and Real God. Because of this, the followers of these belief 
systems will always have a goal to fight for (whether with the pen or with the sword). 
They will always have that driving force that propels them towards the divine. And, for 
those opposed to this kind of belief system it becomes a matter of necessity to attempt to 
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discredit these ideals, which is an almost impossible task given the malleability of the 
ideology in question. How, for example, can one combat a system of government that 
these organizations equate with the divine? How can counterterrorism experts diffuse this 
myth of the perfect caliphate or the Real, especially since those same counterterrorists are 
part of the system that these Islamists equate with the unfaithful, the corrupt? 
A partial answer to these questions lies in the works of Islamic scholar ‘Abd al-
Raziq, who refutes the necessity of the caliphate system. He stands in direct opposition to 
clerics like Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qtub, who all argue that the caliphate is a necessity 
according to religious doctrine and historical precedence. Although al-Raziq’s 
contemporaries claimed that he was irrevocably tainted by western philosophy, the whole 
of his text, Islam and the Foundations of Governance, uses the same texts as these clerics 
(the Qu’ran, Hadith, theories of law, and historical precedence) to argue for the 
separation of mosque and state. Because al-Raziq utilizes evidence / texts that are 
considered to be authoritative by the parties involved and works within their systems of 
ideology in order to diffuse them, his argument against the caliphate system and for 
political secularism should resonate more with an Islamic/ist audience. Al-Raziq’s 
exploration of the failures of the later caliphates are particularly useful in combating the 
claims that the system has been historically successful. In fact, the more often al-Raziq 
and scholars like him are read by both the Muslim and non-Muslim world, the easier it 
will become for those without social capital (governmental agencies, for example) in at-
risk communities to communicate with those who are likely to be radicalized by terrorist 
groups. Without these kinds of texts and without the recognition of the underlying 
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mechanisms utilized by terrorists in order to garner ideological fealty from their 
audiences, we have little hope of preventing the recruitment of new followers.  
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CHAPTER 4: AVATARS OF AN IDEAL FUTURE: THE (EMPOWERING) 
SYMBOLIC CAPITAL OF COMPUTER WALLPAPERS 
One ardent vernal day, his untroubled spirit shrilled cries of joy to cross over to 
the rays of light, his visage beamed for the florid freedom, and his virtuous body keened 
to bravely depart this life and repose in the soil of the South. He was notorious for being 
a stouthearted man, having the features of a fierce knight amid a battle in chorus with 
those of an innocent angel cascading with the rainfall on an inspirational day. The smile 
of this combating "Malak" (Arabic for angel) crowned his being with passion, granted the 
nation a pioneer man, and refused to fade away. This smile proclaimed him victorious 
after his martyrdom. 
-- Al-Intiqad Fatima Shaito, “A Martyrdom Story of an ‘Angel’: Martyr Salah Ghandour” 
 
Introduction 
 He stands tall above a striving crowd, holding his hand out as if to bless those 
reaching towards his imposing figure. Black and white clouds float close to his looming 
figure as the sun shines clearly on his craggy face, his white beard, and his dark turban. 
Most of his body is indistinct, as if a grey fog lays over everything below his robed chest. 
His expression is both serene and stern as he gazes out at the crowd, who hold their hands 
up above their heads in supplication. 
 We see a rocky beach at sunset. Pinks and blues streak across the sky and reflect 
off of the slight waves foaming among the dark grey stone outcroppings. A dainty seagull 
stands in profile at the center of the image, right at the horizon. In the foreground, a 
soldier is frozen in midair with his back to us. He is holding a flag on a long stick and is 
kneeling as if to thrust it into the ground. Next to the soldier’s body is a sentence in 
Arabic, praising the power of the Almighty, superimposed above the dark rocks of the 
beach in gleaming gold lettering. Above the soldier’s bent form, a large semi-transparent 
face gazes at us, his glasses, beard, and turban almost blending into the background 
colors of the water and sky. He appears four different times in the image, in the same 
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semi-transparent form, with his disembodied head and torso in different attitudes – as if 
he were caught at different points in a single speech. In one pose, we can see the shades 
of three microphones as he gestures up at the sky, in another, his fist is clenched, and in 
still another, he looks out over an invisible crowd and holds a finger to his temple. 
 These two images not only exemplify a certain kind of visual artifact that has 
been popularized among Shia Muslims in the wake of the invention of technologies like 
Photoshop that make the manipulation of photographs relatively easy, but also 
demonstrate (as will be show later in the chapter) the usage of the same idealization of 
religious figures and radical-fueled ideology explored in the previous chapter. We can see 
these images, which promote sympathy in their audiences for the pictured figures, 
populating photographic websites like Flickr as well as individual websites and blogs. 
Both of the images mentioned here, the first of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the second of 
Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, were created by unnamed Hezbollah 
members and posted on various websites, including Hezbollah’s main website, officially 
called “The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon”.43 The religious figures depicted in these 
particular images (and others that I will address later on) are decontextualized in the same 
way that a deer is decontextualized if I use computer software to remove it from its 
original place in a picture of a forest and paste it into the middle of a city. This 
decontextualization is demonstrated particularly well in the image of Nasrallah 
mentioned earlier in which we can still see shadows of the microphone bank on the 
                                                
43 The incarnation of the image of the Ayatollah Khomeini used on this paper was taken from the website 
for the AhlulBayt Islamic Mission, which is operated by U.K. Shia students, but it was originally circulated 
by Hezbollah as part of the promotional material for a documentary on the late Khomeini’s life and has 
been posted by a few different Shia websites in various different sizes and resolutions. 
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lectern in front of him, because he (and the microphones) are clearly not part of the 
sunset and beach in the background. They and the other religious and political figures I 
will discuss later on have been superimposed onto backgrounds depicting mosques, 
beaches, grass, and other manmade or natural landscapes. This decontextualization stands 
in stark contrast with the other kinds of images of religious and political figures on these 
sites, in that photographs in this second category are clearly embedded in a context – they 
are images from speeches, prayers, or meetings with other officials and are not clearly 
altered in any way. The Hezbollah website, for example, differentiates these kinds of 
contextualized photographs from decontextualized images by creating different sections 
within the general “Photos” page in which all their photographs, altered or not are 
included. The reason why I take pains to say this here is that the differences between 
these two categories of images not only exemplify what Susan Pearce, in Museums, 
Objects and Collections, would call “the ability of objects to be simultaneously signs and 
symbols” (27), but also demonstrate a shift from the ability of a material thing to 
commemorate into a capacity for it to act as an avatar for an idealized future in computer-
mediated cultures, rendering it into an Ideal in much the same fashion as the caliphate 
system for the Salafi Jihadists. 
Material Culture Theories of (Social) Being 
 Before I get to my central argument, however, the following questions need to be 
addressed, especially given that I am using material cultures theories to explore these 
virtual texts: Are these images material objects? Are they part of a material culture that 
can be studied in the same way that a vase or an archive or an artisan-created bust can be 
studied? Do they have a social function? Furthermore, are the images commodities? 
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Another reason that I am raising these questions, aside from attempting to address 
concerns about the theoretical lens I am using to explore these texts, is that these images, 
all taken from Hezbollah’s website, are virtual “things” with no physical residue, unless 
you count the computer screen on which they are shown. They are formatted to be 
computer wallpapers (an interesting term, in itself) and not to be sold, as demonstrated by 
the dimensions of the images, the various conventions of computer wallpapers that are 
used in these images, as well as the fact that they are free and available to the public, so 
that their status as material objects with the kinds of social capital that goes along with 
that status is suspect.44 We cannot hold these things. We cannot touch them or feel their 
weight, nor can we trace an extensive history behind each of these artifacts.45 These 
images are not even “true” photographs – representations of a particular time and place 
that we can visit, because they have been altered so fundamentally. These characteristics 
make the images I am discussing quite different from the objects usually discussed in the 
scholarly discourse on material culture. Having said that, there are essential 
characteristics in these images that render them examinable using the theoretical toolbox 
                                                
44 Although I cannot declare definitively that Hezbollah’s photographs are indeed intended for this specific 
purpose, there are certain qualities belonging to images designed for use as computer wallpapers, like the 
inclusion of natural landscapes, “framing” (the use of borders or repeated smaller images intended to mimic 
the physical framing of a picture or painting), and well-recognized symbols or figures. Hezbollah has 
utilized these conventions in the particular genre of images that I am examining, which suggests that they 
are primarily being thought of as virtual and not physical artifacts.  Similarly, these images have been 
circulated in blogs / other pro-Shia sites and have been marked as computer wallpapers. 
45 This is one of the major problems in taking on this kind of research into artifacts or texts produced by 
extremist groups, in that it is difficult to trace “true” authorship or complete a thorough biography as Igor 
Kopytoff would have us do for all material culture artifacts because these groups have such a strong point 
of view that colors any information they release and collectivist stance towards materials (this is a product 
of the Party of God, or the Islamic Resistance is a phrase oft repeated). Similarly, most of the information 
we get about virtual or physical artifacts is mediated through several different institutions, including our 
own government, which often does not include full citations or histories with their publication of these 
texts. Extremist websites also tend to disappear or are shut down by our state department, or are password 
protected. In fact, as I am writing this paper, the website where I retrieved the images I talk about here is 
non-functioning. **As of May 2014, Hezbollah has a new website that has been posted at a different 
address. It does not include the extensive photo archives included in the older sites. 
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of material culture. This lens of material culture theory will, in turn, help us to better 
understand the circulation of ideological fealty implied by the consumption of these 
virtual artifacts.  
Their status as commodities with a definite social function, according to the 
standards set by Igor Kopytoff and Arjun Appadurai, two of the foundational scholars in 
the realm of material culture, are suspect. As Kopytoff declares in “The Cultural 
Biography of Things”, the “exchangeability” of a thing is foremost in the definition of a 
commodity, as is the equivalence of the transaction taking place between giver / seller 
and recipient / buyer. Kopytoff later distinguishes this kind of transaction from that of a 
gift (and he uses Mauss to define the parameters of gifting) in which there is not an 
equivalence between the value of the given and the value of the received. And, although 
he claims that monetary gain is not a necessary element of the commoditizing process, he 
also argues that there must be some kind of exchange, implying that if there is no 
monetary gain, there should at least be some form of bartering. Similarly, this process of 
commoditization is distinct from the “counterdrive” of culture, which, as an essential part 
of its makeup, “needs[s] to set apart a certain portion of [its] environment, marking it as 
‘sacred,’” and “singular” (73), so that cultural impetuses are a counterpoint to the 
material commoditizing efforts of the capitalistic element of societies. Although Kopytoff 
does not specify whether this is a one-to-one, a one to many, or a many to many 
transaction in this passage, he later on references “commodity spheres” (71) in addition to 
equating the process of exchange to a bartering of a pot for a yam, suggesting that there 
are a various amount of levels for this kind of activity. According to this definition, no 
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matter the scale there must be a material and immediate (69) exchange of materials 
among the participants in this process.  
Arjun Appadurai, in “Commodities and the Politics of Value” likewise decries 
efforts to widen the definition of commodities / commoditization to include “goods 
intended for exchange, regardless of the form of the exchange” (6), again in deference to 
Mauss and his notion of gifting in which “total services and counter-services are 
committed to in a somewhat voluntary way” (5) and in which the “economic transaction 
is only one element, and in which the passing on of wealth is only one feature of a much 
more general and enduring contract”. It is this long-term contractual element that both 
Appadurai and Kopytoff object to.46 Each exchange in the commoditizing process must 
then, according to Kopytoff and Appadurai, be immediate (and it is this immediacy that is 
definitively foregrounded in Kopytoff, especially) and finite, which would firmly 
eliminate Hezbollah’s images from commodity status. Hezbollah is not, in fact, getting an 
immediate and material equivalent return of goods or services from the consumers of 
their images. These images are then rendered into gifts, an exchange in which an eventual 
return of goods or services is contractual. 
Is that true, though? Is there even a long-term contractual element to the 
circulation of these virtual things? Hezbollah does not require a promise of an eventual 
gift in return for the consumption of their products. These images are public, available for 
download just as any other image on a photo-sharing website without any form of 
monetary gain or bartering implied in the transaction. There are not even advertisements 
                                                
46 Although it may seem that I am being a bit unfair to both Kopytoff and Appadurai, who go on to focus 
their articles on other things besides the properties of commodities (Kopytoff on the cultural aspects of 
commodities and Appadurai on the social aspects of things), they found their articles on these axiomatic 
beliefs about the fundamental nature of commodities, which, I think, need to be interrogated. 
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on the screens on which they are displayed, ostensibly eliminating any overt economic 
gain from traffic on that page. Even had there been advertisements or paragraphs of text 
describing their needs for certain goods or for funds, there is still no requirement that the 
user give those things in return for the things he or she has received – the anonymous 
nature of the internet allows for the navigation and consumption of materials without 
Mauss’ “pain of private or public warfare” (5) as a consequence for a broken contract.  
As far as my particular argument is concerned, the status of the Hezbollah images 
as non-gifts and “non-saleable” items, as well as their lack of an immediate material and 
equivalent return of capital from the consumers of these products suggests that they are 
not commodities and not material culture artifacts, especially, again, given that there is a 
distinct lack of physical objects being circulated. However, not only are these images not 
singular or private (they are, included in a publicly displayed website, available for 
circulation among and consumption by the public), but also these artifacts do imply an 
equivalence of a certain kind of exchange in their circulation and display.47 There is an 
ideological fealty implied by the downloading of these images for personal (and not 
academic, as in my case) use that is tacitly, if not openly, acknowledged by the “giver” 
(and I use that term very loosely here). 
This ideological fealty, or, at the very least, ideological sympathy to Hezbollah’s 
cause is implied in the displaying of these images on our desktops (or in our homes if 
                                                
47 In fact, reading through these articles again has brought home to me the limitations of this kind of 
material culture in which most of the examples used are from “primitive” cultures. On the one hand, these 
cultures are, in a way that these scholars capitalize on, “pure” or in a “natural state,” which is, I think, why 
they are studied. On the other hand, the processes described are often so far removed from the forms of 
exchange we engage in every day, especially given the popularity of computer-mediated consumption, that 
the impact of the theoretical elements that are based on these examples is made a bit too abstract – a bit too 
distant from our everyday lives. This is partially, I think, due to the time period on which some of these 
articles are written, but is also a lapse in the current scholarship on material culture, in that the later 
scholars have not really engaged in complicating this material / virtual. 
 77 
these images are eventually printed), in that the Hezbollah imams or political figures are 
the dominant characters in these images.48 He (for the imams and politicians are always 
male) is usually pictured in the foreground, surrounded by a natural or religious 
environment and, if not, then he is surrounded by an area of visual interest so that the eye 
is drawn to him. For example, one of the images including Hezbollah Secretary General 
Hassan Nasrallah features a field of grass with an intensely blue sky in which Nasrallah is 
pictured in a large cartoon heart in the upper right quarter of the image holding a (rather 
terrified seeming) baby. The heart, as well as the framing and baby work to draw our eyes 
to Nasrallah rather than to the sky or grass, both of which are generic and undistinguished 
in addition to lacking any singular areas of focus. The prominence of these officials as 
well as the display of the images on computer desktops suggests that there is an element 
of what Pierre Bourdieu calls “symbolic capital” caught up in the circulation of these 
artifacts that is not acknowledged in Kopytoff’s or Appadurai’s discussion of the 
characteristics of the commodity, which is, to them, distinguished by that immediate 
economic exchange. This element of symbolic capital, as well as the implications that 
Pearce and Radley’s work has for Hezbollah’s images (which I will get to soon) suggests 
that they are, indeed, material objects, if we consider the wider implications of exchange 
and commoditization. 
Social Capital and the Implied Fealty of Display 
Bourdieu, in “Symbolic Capital” decries the notion that the term “commodity” is 
restricted to those things with a finite economic value and claims that there needs to be 
some consideration “for the strictly symbolic interest which is occasionally recognized 
                                                
48 There are also, I think, some interesting implications for the study of these images as material culture in 
this act of display that will be explored elsewhere. 
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(when too obviously entering into a conflict of “interest” in the narrow sense, as in 
certain forms of nationalism or regionalism) only to be reduced to the irrationality of 
feeling or passion” (177). What Bourdieu complicates is the duality between commodity / 
non-commodity based on an immediate and equal material return of capital that Kopytoff 
establishes in his general description of commoditization. This view of commoditization 
is faulty in that it is too restrictive, too dismissive of the kinds of exchange that involve 
immaterial, symbolic elements. Similarly, there is not, as Bourdieu suggests, a clear line 
between the decommoditized culture and commoditized things.49 In fact, Bourdieu claims 
that such “symbolic capital” as is generated by Hezbollah’s images, is “unthinkable” or 
“unnameable” to these “economists,” but is of the utmost importance. As he states later 
on: 
 Thus we see that symbolic capital, which in the form of prestige and renown  
attached to a family and a name is readily convertible back into economic capital,  
is perhaps the most valuable form of accumulation [ . . . ] Should one see in it a 
disguised form of purchase of labour power or a covert exaction of corvees? By 
all means, as long as the analysis holds together what holds together in practice, 
the double reality of intrinsically equivocal, ambiguous conduct. This is the pitfall 
awaiting all those whom [assume] a naively dualistic representation of the 
                                                
49 The “[ . . . ] the fundamental tautology ‘business is business’ strictly ‘cultural’ or ‘aesthetic’ interest, 
disinterested interest, is the paradoxical product of the ideological labour in which writers and artists, those 
most directly interested, have played an important part” (177), suggests a pointed critique aimed at scholars 
who discount the “superstructure” as Marx would call it, or the symbolic order in which their very texts 
circulate and are consumed. Perhaps this is one reason for the limitedness of this economic view of 
commodities? The authors of the texts do not want to believe that their works are involved in the process of 
commoditization and exchange? 
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relationship between practice and ideology, between the ‘native’ economy and the 
‘native’ representation of the economy (179). 
In Bourdieu’s estimation, then, the “symbolic capital” that is generated through increased 
respect, fealty, etc. is the most important commodity and can be directly translated into 
later wealth or, perhaps, social capital. And, although he is speaking about “primitive” 
cultures, specifically, we can see how this translates into more “advanced” cultures.50 If 
Hezbollah, through their distribution of images of their leaders can inspire in an audience 
an ideological fealty or sympathy, or even just an awareness of their cause, they can 
potentially call on that audience later on when they are in need of resources. This is 
especially important in extremist groups deemed to be terrorists or fundamentalists by 
various governmental organizations in that these groups cannot radicalize, an audience 
that they cannot reach – that they cannot publicize their cause to. Without new audiences, 
especially audiences in their target regions, these groups will stagnate. 
This is, if we look at any kind of propaganda or strategic communication (which 
is where we could categorize these artifacts), the goal of the sponsoring group is to raise 
the kind of “social capital” that Bourdieu refers to in order to convince a potentially 
hostile audience that their cause is just. We can see these appeals playing out tin he 
Hezbollah images pretty clearly through the use of religious icons (mosques, quotes from 
the Qu’ran), natural / peaceful scenes, and even through the very poses of the figures in 
question – they loom over a beseeching crowd or they hold their hands out in benediction 
or they look unswervingly and sternly out from our computer screens – all of which 
suggests an intended affiliation with Allah (nature, mosques, Qur’anic verses) and 
                                                
50 The use of quotation marks around the word “native” also suggests an awareness on Bordieu’s part of 
the limitations of such designations as “primitive” or “advance” or, indeed, “native.” 
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righteousness (various stances and facial expressions, the inclusion of children). And, 
even though the crudeness of these images may invoke ridicule from a skeptical or hostile 
audience, the circulation of the images still spreads the message of Hezbollah. In fact, by 
the use of these images in my paper, although this is in an academic setting, I am 
increasing the awareness of a (potentially) new audience about Hezbollah, their leaders, 
and their rhetorical strategies. 
Another important element of Bourdieu’s claim for us here is his refutation of the 
limited time frame for commoditization, in that the spreading of ideology is a long-term 
effort. As Bourdieu states: 
The acquisition of a clientele, even an inherited one, implies considerable labour  
devoted to making and maintaining relations, and also substantial material and  
symbolic investments, in the form of political aid against attack, theft, offence,  
and insult [ . . . ] As well as material wealth, time must be invested for the value  
of symbolic labour cannot be defined without reference to the time devoted to it. 
(180) 
These kinds of exchanges, Bourdieu argues, take time and effort – the accumulation of 
social or symbolic capital does not, as in Kopytoff’s commoditization process, happen 
immediately and in a one-time finite exchange. Instead, social capital is more akin to the 
process of gifting in that it implies a lengthy effort, if not a contractual one. This is, 
indeed, the process of exchange inherent in Hezbollah’s circulation of their images. Even 
though the cost of the production of these artifact is minimal given the availability of 
editing software (free or sold) and the quality of the images, there is a considerable 
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amount of time involved in the circulation of ideology so that that immaterial element is 
really foremost in this process. 
Myth, Memory, and Hezbollah’s Idealized Islamist State 
 Now that we have recovered Hezbollah’s images from their exclusion from the 
exchange of goods / services inherent in the circulation and consumption of material 
culture and have established them as commodities with social / symbolic capital, let us 
turn back to the Susan Pearce and her postulation that objects in fact embody or represent 
the symbol (as presented in the chapter, “Objects Inside and Outside Museums”), which 
is another important element in the consideration of the shape of the ideological 
landscapes hidden in these images and provides us with a framework for discussing the 
temporality of these artifacts. Essentially, what she argues is similar to what Bourdieu has 
to say about the inextricable way that exchange and commoditization are linked to social 
processes. To use her own words: “One way of putting their [objects’] social centrality is 
to say that they are intentional inscriptions on the physical world which embody social 
meaning [ . . .  ] Idea and expression are not two separable parts but the same social 
construct” (21). Again, she emphasizes that the object is a “real” physical thing, but also 
highlights the fact that the material thing is a thing embedded into a social context. She 
also claims that: “Objects (and other messages) operate as sign when they stand for the 
whole of which they are an intrinsic part [ . . . ] the relationship between the different 
parts of the whole is said to be metonymic. They operate as a symbol when they are 
brought into an arbitrary association with elements to which they bear no intrinsic 
relationship” (27). 
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What is significant for my purposes here is the fact that Pearce, emphasizes the 
ability of these artifacts to “carry the past into the present” and so to become a symbol for 
a time and place, thus establishing a specific framework for viewing material artifacts 
that we can alter in order to make better sense of how these wallpapers function, because 
this is not what the Hezbollah images that I have discussed so far have done. Instead, 
these images are so radically decontextualized that they do not stand for a single place or 
an event. They cannot be a symbol for the past in that they are composed of a pastiche of 
different images from different pasts – some so generic that we could not tell where or 
when that image was taken, so that we have neither sign nor symbol. There are, as I noted 
at the beginning of this chapter, such images on Hezbollah’s website. These other images 
are of these same religious and political leaders at different events – prayers, speeches, 
meetings, or even, in several cases, funerals. Funereal images are actually quite numerous 
in the Hezbollah’s photo galleries and are incredibly important in Shia cultures. We can 
see the coffin and deceased body of the Ayatolla Khomeini, for example, as well as the 
flower-strewn hospital bed of another religious leader. These photographs do, indeed, 
stand as a symbol for the event in question – as do the other photographs on Hezbollah’s 
website that commemorate what they call “Zionist terrorist attacks”, which feature dead 
children, displaced homeowners, soldiers, and other signs of violence In each of these 
cases, a date and an event name (such as the “terrorist attacks of 2006”) are attached to 
the collection of photographs, confirming their status as things which bring the past into 
the present for the viewers. 
So what, then, do we make of the altered images that Hezbollah has included in 
their collections – those pictures that are so manipulated that they do not stand for a real 
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place or time? What happens instead, I would argue, is that these images stand as a 
symbol for an idealized past, especially in the case of the artifacts from leaders, religious 
and otherwise, who have died. In these idealized representations of a past that never was, 
the man in question is a looming figure, giving a blessing to a crowd of worshippers. He 
is lecturing an invisible crowd with a sunset in the background and a lonely seagull 
vigilantly guarding the horizon, so that we have a virtual manifestation of an idealized 
version of the deceased leader. In those images that do not have this commemorative 
quality, we still have a symbolic link between the figure depicted and those elements I 
mentioned before: God, religion, righteousness, and power, so that the leaders of 
Hezbollah are symbols, again, for an ideal – they manifest those intangible, ephemeral 
elements in a material, if not truly physical, way. If we look at the rhetoric of the 
speeches from these selfsame officials, we will also see that there is continually a 
harkening forward to an idealized time and place free from the domination of the West.  
For example, in Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah’s speech on the Lebanese “Day of 
the Martyrs” (which coincides, incidentally, with our Veterans Day), we can see a 
celebration of the “chaste blood” of the suicide bombers and soldiers involved in 
repelling the American and Zionist attacks (as they put it): 
 [T]here is a predecessor [martyr] who is among the living, in the midst of life, and
 there is a subsequent follower. The martyr predecessor happily awaits the 
 succeeding follower and the subsequent follower, insisting on his pledge and 
 truthful promise yearns to join the predecessors, with his heart, mind and feet  
seeks that meeting, to earn that glorious honor. 
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We have pathetic /emotional appeals to honor (felt by those who are part of this Islamic 
resistance community) and fear (of those barbaric cultures intent on destroying Muslims 
and Arabs), but this time they are mixed with invocations of happiness and religious duty. 
Interestingly enough, we also have Nasrallah giving an epideictic speech in praise of the 
martyred suicide bombers while at the same time using those promises of honor and 
happiness after death in order to recruit those “subsequent followers”, i.e. future martyrs. 
These uses of fear, honor, anger, and satisfaction in religious duties completed, returns 
again and again throughout the speeches given by Hezbollah’s leaders (as well as leaders 
from other Islamist sects (see Sageman 2008)). There is also, however, a harkening 
forward to an idealized future – not only one in which God’s plan has finally come to 
pass, but also one in which the heroic figure has already died and is waiting to be joined 
by future martyrs, thus fulfilling the same function as the idealized caliphate system 
explored in the previous chapter. 
This looking forward to a romanticized and unattainable future is clearly 
manifested (symbolized, if you will) in these decontextualized images. Again, we have 
that idealized natural or religious background, the official gazing into the future or 
directly into the camera, and the shades of soldiers in the background (or foreground, in 
the case of the image with Nasrallah), melding both their militarism, their strong 
leadership, and their emphasis on the creations / will of God into one single artifact. We 
can see an example of this in one of the images of a non-Hezbollah party member that 
has been posted on Hezbollah’s website. The Ayatollah Khamenei (who has an 
interesting website of his own), the successor to the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran who is 
highly revered by the leadership in Hezbollah, is pictured in the foreground of the image 
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using a large pair of binoculars to gaze at an image of mosque, with the proverbial sunset 
in the background and a semi-transparent soldier in the wide border above the mosque. 
Thus, this image is a literal depiction of that looking forward to a religious future being 
watched over by a vigilant soldier, with an idealized sunset (perfect coloration and cloud 
cover) in the background in an interesting reversal of Pearce’s claim that “[i]t is the 
ability of objects to be simultaneously signs and symbols, to carry a true part of the past 
into the present, but also to bear perpetual reinterpretation, which is the essence of their 
peculiar and ambiguous power” (27). Because these images are acting as a symbol 
(acting as an avatar to a thing in which they are not intrinsically related) for an idealized 
future, they are essentially acting as a sign for that future, as well. What I mean by this is 
that this idealized future is just that – an ideal which cannot and will not come to pass – it 
is continually deferred in the same manner as the signified meaning of signifiers is 
always already deferred / differed in Derrida’s conception of differance. Thus, in standing 
in for such an ideal future, in representing that ideal future, the images intrinsically relate 
to that future. In fact, they are that future. 
(Co)Memory and Public Nostalgia  
This, then brings us to Alan Radley and his article, “Artefacts, Memory and a 
Sense of the Past”. What he argues is that objects act on two different levels: 
At the level of the individual, we are used to the idea of personal possessions  
being kept as mementos of times which we wish to remember. The assembly of  
such items is likely to be more haphazard that planned [ . . . ] Tossed into drawers  
or boxes and left for some years, these objects eventually become interesting  
because they are displaced from their time, from the context shared with other  
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items, and from social practices as part of which they were perhaps merely  
functional. [ . . . ] [They become marked out as indices of the past, as object to  
‘remember by’. [ . . . ] [T]he collective recounting of a shared past and the  
commemoration of events which may be prior to each individual’s own  
experience, is not only sustained by the world of objects and artifacts, but is, in  
part, shaped through the ways in which the world of things is ordered. (51-2) 
Thus, Radley argues that there is both individual (memory) and group (co-memory and 
commemoration) remembering. On the individual level, memory is messy, “haphazard”, 
relatively idiosyncratic, and related to an experienced event, whereas a group co-memory 
is a shared experience that is often carefully arranged by a sponsoring organization 
(museums, foundations, non-governmental organizations like the Daughters of the 
American Revolution) and is often related to an event or person that has preceded the 
lives of the participants. There is, however, another facet to individual and collective 
remembering in that both individual and communal remembering are “ordered to sustain 
certain myths and ideologies both about people as individuals and about particular 
cultures” (51). 
Radley even specifically mentions images, albeit images “as mental constructs” in 
conjunction with his discussion of the ideological implications of order and memory / 
commemoration and the thoughts of Frederic C. Bartlett, a psychologist studying 
memory in the 1930s: 
[ . . . ] [I]t was through the function of images that things appeared to play their  
part in remembering. Images – as mental constructs – serve to pick out significant  
features of experience through the affective colouring of a number of interrelated  
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interests. These interests, as mentioned already, are not haphazard but are  
constituted with the culture of social groupings who adopt or fashion objects to  
serve as condensed symbols. These artifacts are the material aspects of the  
relationships in which people act together, the object of the ‘attitude’ engendered  
by their interests and ideals. (56) 
In this way, Radley builds on what Pearce and Bourdieu have already established (and I 
am ignoring timelines here in favor of the ordering of the scholars in this text, which, in 
itself, has ideological resonances, since I am attempting to assemble an sense of 
coherency and symbolic ordering by manipulating the “real” theorists and their texts) in 
arguing that materiality has a symbolic / ideological representation through evoking 
certain kinds of memories, especially in commemorative displays, which are ordered in a 
way that is meant to evoke a certain ideological view of an event or person (dependent 
upon the culture and the aims of the organization). And, although he is speaking of 
Bartlett’s work and mental construction of imagery, we can transfer this discussion to 
physical / virtual images as well. They are, as I have demonstrated, arranged in a 
deliberate way to evoke a certain kind of feeling or thought in the minds of the viewers 
and a reflective of a definitely ideology / culture. Similarly, they are, in a way, reflective 
of a kind of nostalgia – a longing for an idealized future. 
 This is where we can pick up that use of the idealized future in Hezbollah’s 
images again, in that we have the same principles of deliberate arrangement, a focused 
rhetorical use of tropes to evoke a longing for a time in which God and Man (and I use 
that pronoun deliberately) are united under the military / religious rule of the caliphate (a 
government ruled by Hezbollah’s unique interpretation of Shar’ia, Islamic law) and 
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Hezbollah’s leadership, but this is a continually deferred future and not an idealized past. 
In both cases, however, the fact remains that the material artifacts that come to act as an 
avatar for this future and past are saturated with ideological and symbolic resonances. 
They are not static or quiescent things, but are continually (acted upon) act upon (by) 
their audience.  
Conclusion 
As commodities with a definite social and symbolic capital as well as objects with 
a clearly embedded social function, these images also problematize some of the current 
scholarship in material culture and, more importantly for us here, the rhetorical study of 
both virtual and radical religious texts. There are elements in these particular artifacts that 
need to be taken into account, including that element of nostalgia for a future that cannot 
come to pass. Similarly, there are some ideological implications for imagery and 
representation of faith / religious and political figures that also need to be considered, 
especially given the stricture in the Qu’ran against the holding of worshiping of idols. 
These men have taken on a larger than life (sometimes literally) status – they have come 
to represent an ideal  -- and have, thus, stepped into the realm of the idol, which has 
immediate political ramifications not only for the sects within Islam, but also for the 
United States government, in that these organizations are deemed to be sponsors of 
terrorism and, thus, must be combated against. As of yet, there is no literature examining 
these kinds of images, which have proliferated beyond the bounds of Hezbollah’s 
website. Yes, there are texts that study the differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims 
and the belief by the Shia population in these Imams (who, the Sunnis argue, are saints / 
idols), but there is no scholarship as of yet on the manipulation of images of political or 
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religious figures, nor has the IC really taken into account the rhetorical power of the 
artifacts or discourses surrounding these men, which is why this chapter is included in 
this dissertation, despite its emphasis on material cultures and rhetorical theory with an 
emphasis on the spread of ideologies in the world of (virtual) artifacts. Also, we can see 
many similarities between the rhetorical uses of the idealized caliphate system as well as 
the “perfect” generation of Muslims during the life of Mohammed and right after his 
death for the Sunni-based Salafi Jihadists and the idealized Imams and martyrs of the 
Shia Hezbollah organization. This suggests that, although their ideology differs vastly, 
there are links that can be exploited in their use of ideal tropes – perhaps by emphasizing 
those similarities to the groups in question, given their animosity for each other. 
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CHAPTER 5: MAKING THE MOST OF WEB 2.0: SYRIA’S BELEAGUERED 
MEDIA FEEDS, SALAFI JIHADIST NETWORKS, AND SOCIAL(LY) MEDIA(TED) 
COMMUNITIES 
[I]n the past, the ideology of violent Islamist extremism was limited to select web 
forum and pre-approved web videos…the [U.S. Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee] has seen a marked shift in online recruitment and 
radicalization [of individuals]. Previously, extremist web sites (sic) were primarily 
restricted from the general public. As a result, a potential recruit had to search out and 
befriend members of radical forums in order to be accepted and subsequently gain access 
to the functionality of the sites. Today, however, with the popularization of social 
networking sites, individuals who are becoming radicalized have the ability to find like-
minded individuals more easily. 
--Staff Members, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
A almost totally deviant [American] society full of illicit disgusting stuff can produce this 
type of events. 
May allah guide them or destroy them ameen 
--Forum Post in IslamicAwakening.com 
Introduction 
 The first quotation, taken from a 2012 report entitled Zachary Chesser: A Case 
Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown 
Terrorism explores a fundamental shift in the functioning of internet communications by 
Islamist terrorist organizations, especially in their communication with populations 
outside of their immediate sphere of influence. This particular report is focused on the 
aforementioned Zachary Chesser, who was an American, nominally Christian teenager 
with no ties to any terrorist organizations when he was radicalized between his senior 
year in high school and his freshman year of college. According to his own testimony and 
research carried out by both the FBI and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, 
Chesser, who is now serving twenty-five years in a federal prison for providing material 
support to a terrorist group (in this case, al-Shabaab), along with several other terrorism-
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related charges, was first exposed to Islamist extremism by several members of a soccer 
team sponsored by Hizb ut-Tahrir (an organization dedicated to the reestablishment of the 
caliphate) that he played for in the summer after his high school graduation. After that 
initial in-person exposure to radical Islamism, however, he was increasingly radicalized 
by Islamist content posted on various internet sites, especially in forums, on YouTube, 
and on blogs. (8) He eventually became a prolific producer of radical Islamist texts, 
posting frequently on various Islamist forums (including a few on 
IslamicAwakening.com, the website from which the second quotation at the start of this 
chapter was taken) and creating his own YouTube channel.  
The report, which also mentions that the median age of an American recruit to 
Islamism is 27 and “often very familiar with computers and the Internet” (1-2), also 
claims that “Chesser represents a growing breed of young Americans who have such 
comfort and facility with social media that they can adeptly use it to facilitate 
radicalization and recruitment to violent Islamist extremism that is accelerated as 
compared to traditional avenues of recruitment” (8). This suggests at least an awareness 
on the part of the federal government of the increasing importance of the internet in 
general and social media in particular, especially in the dissemination of radical 
ideologies and in the accelerated recruitment of often far flung adherents, despite the 
unwillingness of the IC in countering these radical ideologies (outside of surveilling 
online communities with suspected terrorist affiliations). In fact, the report goes on to 
argue that: 
With the popularization of social networking sites, individuals who are becoming 
radicalized have the ability to find like-minded individuals more easily [than in 
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previous years]. In addition, these social networking sites allow for a level of 
interaction and information sharing that was not feasible even a few years ago. 
Incendiary materials – including videos and lectures – are increasingly found not 
only on obscure web sites (sic) but also on some of the most widely accessed sites 
in the world – including Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube. (2) 
And, indeed, a quick Google search will yield Islamist-affiliated accounts in all three of 
the major social networking platforms, as well as in the now Facebook-owned Instagram. 
In fact, Instagram has become a major platform for the public relations posts of Syria’s 
Assad regime, which regularly updates its account with photographs of both President 
Bashar al-Assad and his British-born First Lady, Asma al-Assad.  
Assad’s regime, while not classified in itself as a terrorist organization, has 
undergone sanctions from both the U.S. and the international community since Syria was 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979.51 And, even though it is a national 
government (despite losing ground to both political dissidents and ISIS), it has also 
employed public relations tactics through social media apparatuses that will add to our 
discussion here, especially given the regime’s need to overcome the poor conception that 
Western / international governing bodies have of their recent actions. In particular, their 
repeated human rights violations as well as their reported use of chemical weapons 
against non-combatants has caused enough of an outcry from official international 
bodies, including NATO, the UN, and human rights organizations, that it has necessitated 
an employment of rhetorical techniques on social media that attempt and fail to deflect 
                                                
51 U.S. Department of State, “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” Also see their Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ 
fact sheet on Syria for more information. To sum up my rationale for the Assads’ inclusion in this 
dissertation, I am essentially focusing on their communication techniques, which share key characteristics 
with terrorist organizations.  
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criticism while building a community of adherents that add to their overall social capital, 
which makes an examination of their (mis)use of rhetoric relevant to our discussion of 
otherwise non-state, Sunni and Shi’ite  terrorist groups.52 
The use of social media platforms in propelling forward grassroots movements 
has been well documented in contemporary academia, especially as it relates to the 2011 
Arab Spring Revolutions.53 Egypt has been a particular focus for social media scholars 
and has some significance for our discussion here given the country’s continual political 
(and sometimes physical) struggle with Islamist forces like the Muslim Brotherhood 
(although the emphasis in these analyses has been on the aforementioned Arab Spring 
revolution). Also, the use of the internet by terrorist organizations has also been widely 
explored by various social science scholars, including Gabriel Weimann and the 
previously mentioned Steven Corman, et al. Having said that, the locus of these studies 
remains on the general practicalities of new media usage by Islamist terrorists, especially 
in official government documents. The humanities as of yet have had little to say about 
religious rhetoric in general, much less how these radicalized Islamist populations are 
utilizing social media in particular, which is part of the reason that I am taking pains to 
complete a detailed analysis here, in addition to exploring the functioning of strategic 
communication and propaganda in an inherently interactive media.  
The Assad regime in particular has conducted a failed campaign on social media 
for the purpose of deflecting criticism and enhancing its public image while the Salafi 
                                                
52 Indeed, the majority of the social media use by the Salafi Jihadist groups, as well, have been utilized to 
fulfill these two purposes – to enhance the public image of the organization in question and to build a 
community of followers (in multiple senses) loyal to their cause (which also builds their public profile), 
while also quickly coordinating activities between participants in disparate locations, something that I will 
discuss in more detail later on in this chapter.  
53 See Ali and Fahmy, Allagui and Kuebler, and Bashri, Metzley, and Greiner, among others. 
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jihadists like Al-Shabaab and Hamas have utilized these outlets to build relationships 
with disparate new audiences with more positive results. In order to more clearly 
articulate this claim, I particularly want to focus on the use of Instagram and Facebook 
by the Assad regime, and the use of interactive forums, YouTube, Twitter, and 
iPhone/Android applications by Salafi Jihadists in the vein of Zachary Chesser. Although 
these two communities have vastly different ideologies, I am bringing them together in 
this chapter because the rhetorical dimensions of their use of social media outlets bring 
light larger issues of interest to academics and counterterrorist strategists alike, including 
the implementation of persuasive and propaganda strategies and the formation of 
relationships in online, socially interactive environments. First, we will explore the 
borders between persuasion and propaganda by way of investigating the failures of the 
Assads’ social media feeds. We will then discuss the work of social scientist, Mark 
Granovetter, who has established a baseline for how we interpret the creation and 
maintaining of social networks, as well as more contemporary scholars focused on social 
media and the establishment of relationships / communities.  
The Social Media Accounts of the Assads: A Study in Propaganda or Persuasion? 
The Assads’ most frequently utilized social media outlet is the Facebook-owned 
Instagram, which, for the uninitiated, is an iPhone application that is also viewable on the 
internet, although some functions, like the ability to see who that account is following 
and who they are followed by is restricted to iPhone viewers. It allows for users to post 
images, mostly taken with their mobile devices, and apply various filters designed to 
mimic classic (some would say hipster) methods of film development while also 
captioning each image with text or a hashtag, which then places the image into a pool of 
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other hashtagged photographs. Users can have both private (meaning that other users 
have to request access to their photographs) and public accounts and can also cross post 
images to Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, and other social media outlets. Other account 
holders can follow, like, and comment on each image in a similar manner to Twitter. The 
Assads, who use the moniker “syrianpresidency”, have posted almost 300 images and 
have over 41,000 followers as of April 2014, making them one of the most popular 
accounts on Instagram. They are also clearly taken at various public events staged by the 
first family and are not candid cell phone photographs.54 They also have an account on 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, all of which are linked to their Instagram account 
through a periodically posted image of the icons utilized by each platform along with a 
caption in both English and Arabic that reminds their audience that they also can be 
found on those other forms of social media. In fact, if we look at their Facebook account, 
which, unlike their Instagram account, only uses the Arabic language, we will see many 
of the same images posted on their Instagram account posted on their timeline.55  
Their Facebook page is also quite popular, having over 150,000 likes (which 
allows Facebook account holders to see updates from syrianpresidency in their news 
feeds) and between 15 and 200 comments on each post, including photographs, that they 
include on their own timeline. There is not much interaction between the account holder / 
managers on either Facebook or Instagram aside from one of their latest posts (as of 
April 2014), which asked Instagram users to post images and illustrations of the Syrian 
                                                
54 The professional nature of these photographs is detectable in several areas, including the lighting, depth 
of field, and observation of basic photography rules, including proper framing.  
55 An interesting area for further research, even though it is slightly out of the scope of my examination 
here, would be to look at why the Assads’ Facebook page is Arabic only while their Instagram page is 
bilingual, including both Arabic and English.  
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flag that they then compiled into a video that was crossposted on both the Assads’ pages. 
Although the account managers (and I think it is safe to assume that both the Instagram 
and Facebook accounts are not managed by the Assads, themselves) have the capability 
to response to comments, they have yet to do so. This is especially apparent on their 
Instagram page in which they are following no one (not even the pages affiliated with the 
Assad militia, cyberwarfare division, or supporters), which indicates either a desire for 
impartiality or a reluctance in showing support for or an affiliation with other account 
holders.56 
If we look in detail at the photographs posted on Instagram, we’ll see that they are 
mostly of the (quite photogenic) Asma al-Assad, the elegant first lady, during her various 
outings completing charity work around Damascus, giving awards to deserving children, 
planting trees, and, in one case, wiping away a woman’s tear, as she hugs her – and this is 
all while wearing immaculately styled Western clothing, tastefully modest jewelry, and, 
in some cases, a Tiffany blue FitBit (a device that tracks the user’s exercise and sleep 
patterns, among other things). All of these images of Asma al-Assad in some way relate 
to the giving of comfort to women and children, fostering the burgeoning of new life, or 
raising the morale of her people, whether it is through the distributing of much needed 
goods to the Assads’ supporters or the giving of awards to accomplished Syrian students. 
Scattered among these Asma al-Assad are photographs of President Bashar al-Assad 
                                                
56 For example, the White House Facebook page, for example has “liked” several governmental initiatives 
like “Race to the Top”, websites like Stopbullying.gov, and organizations like the U.S. Marine Corps, 
which allows their audience to see those organizations in their timeline (at the right side of their page), thus 
suggesting a tacit support of that organization. The White House Instagram page, on the other hand, 
follows four other accounts, including one just (April 2014) created by Vice President Joe Biden, as well as 
the accounts operated by the staff of Michelle Obama,  the official White House photographer, and, oddly 
enough, the account operated by the Department of the Interior.  
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attending meetings, giving speeches, putting up tents during his military service, or 
consulting with the his troops, all while wearing a dark blue or black suit and somber tie. 
When looking at these images, it is easy to contrast those featuring Asma al-Assad and 
those focused on her husband, Bashar al-Assad, in that Asma al-Assad is portrayed as the 
nurturing, giving community leader while her husband is the military leader and policy 
maker who resides in the halls of governmental buildings, board rooms, and in the camps 
of his soldiers. What this suggests is that there is a clearly crafted message being 
conveyed by these images that emphasizes both the power and the compassion of a 
regime that has been troubled by international scrutiny and internal strife, and this has 
been picked up on by the popular media, who’s response we will get to in a moment, as 
well as by the Instagram users that have commented on the photographs.  
What is particularly interesting about the comments from the Assads’ followers is 
that both the positive and negative comments persist along with the image itself, even 
though the account holders do have the capability to delete comments. Whether this 
indicates a lack of attention on the part of the account managers, a reluctance to seem as 
if they are “policing” the comments remains to be seen. There is also a possibility that the 
Assads’ staff is either allowing their community to police itself or creating dummy 
accounts to post positive things so that it seems as though there is a balance between 
positive and negative comments. For example, in on one of the more recent photographs 
posted to the syrianpresidency account of Asma al-Assad embracing an elderly woman in 
a full hijab with the caption (transcribed as was posted on the syrianpresidency account 
with a quotation from Asma al-Assad): “‘Syria, like our #mothers, is pained but #strong, 
#tired but resilient.’ The First Lady, Mother's Day - 21st March 2014 "ةةييررووسس ممككللتتمم 
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ةةععووججوومم سسبب ةةييووقق.. ةةننااببععتت سسبب ةةددممااصص." ةةددييسسللاا ءااممسسأأ ددسسأأللاا – ددييعع ممأأللاا 21 ررااذذآآ 2014 Watch 
the full event: http://youtu.be/YfRQUP00nUQ #Firstlady #MDSyrianpresidency 
#Mothersday #Syrianpresidency #Syria #momday #instagood”,57 we can see both the 
author’s (or authors’) use of hashtags and links to other media (in this case, YouTube), as 
well as a not-so-veiled reference to the ongoing struggle against the rebel forces that 
reinforces the pathos of the image. The comments on the post are in several languages, 
including Arabic, Russian, and English. While the English-language comments are mixed 
(both negative and positive), the Assad supporters take pains to response to almost every 
negative comment, as we can see in the following transcript from the image in question 
(excluding usernames and transcribed as-is, including grammatical errors):  
---: Whats with the mothers of the sons who get shooted by the syrian army  
forces? 
---: @--- they were not killed by Syrian army forces, but the armed terrorists 
group the ones who did that with supporting from Arabian and some of foreign 
governments ,, 
---: Peace for Syria. Hope all satanic salafists "rebels" will be kick out of Syria. 
Pray for real people of Syria. Peace 
---: Bashar el asad is better than you and your family and he will stay and we love 
him he is our president if u dont like him go find a life stupid ans you are the dog  
---: ---, ---, you going down after those comments!!! You should love your 
neighbors. Hang on Assad! 
---: ALLAH ,SYRİA ,BASHAR. 
                                                
57Retrieved from Instagram on 30 October 2014. 
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---: Firaun!!!kill your own people,why u kill a kids!!truly firaun!! Allah will 
punish u!!58 
As we can see, members of the pro-Assad community have addressed all but the 
last comment, which was added two weeks after the initial photograph and comments 
were posted, suggesting that comments that are initially posted are “handled”, whereas 
comments posted some time after the image are ignored.  Nowhere in this comment 
thread (or any of the comment threads on the account’s images) does syrianpresidency 
intervene – leaving the negative comments to be addressed by the account proponents— 
either through overt threats or through ideological opposition.  
We can see the same kind of behavior on several images of President Bashar al-
Assad, as well, some of which include comments such as the following (on an image of 
al-Assad in a monastery reading a copy of the bible with a Greek Orthodox priest): “you 
protect Christian; (enemies of Islam) and you destroy muslims person, where's your 
brain? You're hitler, i'm not afraid of you, i'm indonesian, meet me there . And you're also 
syiah, and syiah is not islam, syiah is a fake religion which is financed by the Jews , once 
again, i'm not afraid of you .” This is then balanced with another comment on the same 
image: “Saudi is the real terorist! Allah bless u Mr. Al Assad! (I'm not syi'ah)”.59 In this 
instance, there is the added valence of the Sunnis’ (especially the Sunni Salafi jihadists) 
vehement dislike of the Alawite Assad regime – the “syiah” refered to in the first 
quotation— that has most likely prompted the second, pro-Assad respondent to add that 
he or she is “not syi’ah” and yet is still in favor of the regime— present here and in other 
                                                
58 Retrieved from Instagram on 30 October 2014. 
59 Retrieved from Instagram on… 15 November 2014. 
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“conversations” on the Assads’ Instagram feeds. These assaults on the Alawite tradition 
of the Assads as well as their ties to Shia Islam are of a similar nature to ad-hominem 
rhetorical fallacies employed by any number of internet users (and this particular attack is 
one of the ever-popular “you aren’t a real/authentic _______” responses to online texts 
that populate almost any webpage with a “Comments” section) and is not distinctive from 
them. In fact, we can see the same kind of responses to media posted by  
 Having said that, there is not always a clear counterbalance between positive and 
negative comments, especially on the Assads’ Arabic language Facebook account on 
which most comments on images are positive. Their Instagram feed, which is clearly 
bilingual, skews more to the negative and includes more English-language responses.  
As mentioned before, these accounts, like al-Shabaab’s Twitter feed, have not 
gone unnoticed by popular media sources or the public. In the case of the popular media, 
the response typical of the U.S. and international publications is that the Assads’ 
Instagram is, at its core, “sickening” or “propagandatastically fantastic”.60 But rather than 
dismiss this as another example of a dictator using the media to enhance his or her own 
public image, there is an added valence to their use of Instagram, which is briefly picked 
up on in another popular media publication, The Atlantic, in which the author, Megan 
Garber claims that:  
Syria can say what it wants about itself and its activities; people, however, can  
now say things right back to it. They can scoff at the image being presented. They  
can express outrage at it. They can agree with it. The point is that they can react to  
it, publicly – and their reaction can become part of the presentation of the image  
                                                
60 “Syrian President Bashar al-Assad joins photo-sharing internet tool Instagram” in The Telegraph, and 
CNN.com’s “Syria’s president is all smiles on is new Instagram account”, respectively.  
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itself. . . . It’s the core logic of the Internet – conversation, exchange, discourse  
that runs from top to bottom and vice versa – brought to strategic messaging. It’s  
what happens when propaganda, one of the most closed systems there is, meets  
the World Wide Web: a structure that is, by design, open. It’s what happens when  
propaganda comes with a comments section.61 
So, then, this analysis begs the question: How does audience interaction with 
communicative materials alter the “closed systems” that Garber claims is characteristic of 
propaganda? Also, how does this add to the overall failure of the Assads’ message in 
persuading external audiences?   
 If we look at the definition proposed in Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell’s 
foundational work, Propaganda and Persuasion, we will see a definition that very 
closely resembles the “closed systems” that Garber describes: “Propaganda is a form of 
communication that attempts to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist” (1) Although this may sound like circular reasoning, this conception of 
propaganda is immediately contrasted with persuasion, which they see as “interactive”, 
and which “attempts to satisfy the needs of both persuader and persuadee”, suggesting 
that we should add “and not the needs of the audience” to their first definition. In fact, the 
authors further define propaganda as: “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape 
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that 
furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (7), so that the desires and goals of the 
audience are really only important in that they provide material for the propagandist to 
work with in creating their text.   
                                                
61 “Assad’s Bizarre Instagram Account: Propaganda With a Comments Section”. 
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Also, propaganda is a one or several-to-many form of communication that should 
“give the impression of being personal” (5), even though, as Jaques Ellul claims in “The 
Characteristics of Propaganda”, which is another foundational text in the study of 
propaganda, “the individual must never be considered as being alone” (4), since 
“[e]motionalism, impulsiveness, excess, etc.—all these characteristics of the individual 
caught up in a mass are well known and very helpful to propaganda”, since the 
manipulation of these emotions are what propaganda is built on. This is even true of 
propaganda that is addressed to a single audience member Ellul claims, (as in the case of 
proselytizers going door to door to spread their belief systems) because, “although 
apparently one deals here with a single individual, one deals in reality with a unit 
submerged into an invisible crowd composed of all those who have been interviewed, 
who are being interviewed, and who will be interviewed, because they hold similar ideas 
and live by the same myths, and especially because they are targets of the same 
organism” (4). And, for those of us who have been hailed by that characteristic 
“Ma’am/Sir, this will just take a moment of your time!” or “Ma’am/Sir, may I ask what 
cable/internet/plumbing/moisturizer/etc. you use?”, we recognize that a “canned” speech 
with certain responses will follow if we stop to investigate what that person has to say. 
Indeed, if we deviate from the expected responses for an audience member for which the 
speaker has no scripted reply, we will most likely see the speaker falter, since the 
“conversation” is in reality not really a dialogue. Instead, it is a communicative action 
built on the message à receiver model, in which the receiver is expected to have a 
certain set of beliefs based on their age, gender, body type, class, etc. that the 
propagandist will manipulate. What is emphasized here is both the purpose of the text 
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and the intent of the author / speaker, which is what differentiates propaganda from 
formal and informal speeches given in front of a crowd or texts written for a mass 
audience. Propaganda is seen as an unscrupulous form of persuasion in which truth and 
truths are suborned and the aims of the speaker/writer are what matter most.62 What is 
also important for our purposes here, especially given our discussions Chapters 3 and 4, 
is the prominence given to the use of myth and desire in propaganda, since they are the 
fertile ground from which this form of communication grows.    
From this simple definition, it would seem that the inherent nature of social media 
in general and Instagram in particular would, in fact, defy the traditional nature of 
outright propaganda given the fact that it is inherently dialogic. Social media outlets 
should then fall more in line with what we would expect from persuasion, especially 
given that their further articulation of the parameters of persuasion, which they claim is 
“a reciprocal process in which both parties are dependent on one another” (33). In fact, 
Jowett and O’Donnell’s explanation of their vision of the “mutually satisfying” (32) 
persuasion is quite similar to Corman and Dooley’s “rugged landscape”, in that it, too, 
emphasizes the need for persuasion to filter into and negotiate within the persuadees’ 
existing system of ideologies.63  Indeed, without the give and take between participants in 
which systems of beliefs are integral parts of the communication process (communities 
are built around them, friends are connected by them, etc.), there is no “social” in this 
form of media.  
                                                
62 See Bennett and O’Rourke’s “A Prolegomenon to the Future Study of Rhetoric and Propaganda” for 
more detail on this.  
63 As Jowett and O’Donnell claim: “What happens is that the recipient of the persuasive interaction relates 
to, or contrasts the message with, his or her existing repertoire of information, beliefs, attitudes, and 
experiences” (32).  
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 So, then, if return to the Assads’ Instagram and Facebook feeds, we have to 
question whether or not they actually fit within that system of persuasion, since these 
media are interactive and, like the previously mentioned Atlantic article claims, allow for 
the comments, including negative feedback to “become part of the presentation of the 
image [or text] itself”. If we look closely at syrianpresidency, however, we will see that it 
is, only minimally interactive and is, as noted earlier, a carefully crafted collection of 
images presenting a view of the orderly and nurturing world the Assad family inhabitants 
that is at odds with other accounts coming from Syria, in which violence and chaos reign 
supreme, especially since ISIS has carved out large sections of the country. This latter 
element of the account falls much more in line with both the traditional view of 
propaganda that highlights the manipulative quality of this mode of communication 
(something that is definitely evident in syrianpresidency’s use of pathos, in addition to 
their crafted image), as well Jowett and O’Donnell’s claim that propaganda is 
“deliberate” (17), “systematic”, and is designed to “achieve a purpose that is 
advantageous to the propagandist” rather than being a “free and open exchange of ideas”.  
And, aside from one image that calls for audience members to send them drawings or 
pictures of the Syrian Flag (“Join Karim Bashar al-Assad and send us your #favorite 
picture or photo of the #Syrian #Flag. We will be posting your #best contributions on this 
page from 15 April. Send your contributions to [email address omitted] Happy 
Snapping#!”), the account is minimally interactive / responsive to its audience, at least 
openly so.  
 What this suggests is that syrianpresidency and accounts like it are hybrids of 
traditional persuasive and propaganda techniques, partially because their purpose (to 
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present a positive view of the Assad regime and to gain new followers) is at odds with the 
technology they are utilizing. What I mean by this, is that Instagram and Facebook are 
designed to facilitate the interaction between individuals and groups – we can see this in 
written into the structure of both platforms and in the various ways in which we form 
connections and networks of family, friends, and acquaintances, both professional and 
personal. These are peer to peer networks, not one to many, as was the case for most 
written forms of mass communication before the advent of the internet, and are thus not 
suited to more traditional methods of propaganda in which a message is given and 
received without the exchange of ideas typical of a debate. Thus, we have 
syrianpresidency attempting to utilize Instagram to gain a sympathetic audience through 
the use of an obviously crafted (false) message and failing, because the platform they are 
using allows, in fact does not function without, interaction between users. And they are 
failing in a way that actually gives their opposition an outlet with a large audience on 
their own media apparatus. What is interesting, as well, is that the Assads’ 
misappropriation of social media for propagandistic purposes actually highlights what our 
other population in focus, the Salafi jihadists, are doing correctly, therefore gaining an 
audience for themselves with an astounding rapidity.  
Granovetter’s Strong and Weak Ties in Online Communities of Salafi Jihadists 
This discussion of the connective properties of social networking sites then also 
brings us to Granovetter’s theories of social interactivity, which brings an added valence 
to the functioning of these communities and the success of the Salafi jihadists, like those 
groups Zachary Chesser adhered to. Before specifically addressing how these 
communities work for Salafi jihadists, however, I will briefly outline Granovetter’s 1973 
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article, “The Strength of Weak Ties”, so that we can get better idea of how his work can 
be applied to our texts. In his widely cited article, Mark Granovetter, an American 
sociologist currently teaching at Stanford University, posits that “the strength of a tie is a 
(probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the 
intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” 
(1361) and then goes on to claim that “most of us can agree, on a rough intuitive basis, 
whether a given tie is strong, weak, or absent”, all of which suggests that our 
relationships with others are pretty easily calculable by the amount of “face-time” that we 
spend with each other as well as the emotional commitment and the overall “intuitive” 
sense that tells us whether or not that person is a close friend / family member (he doesn’t 
distinguish between the two categories), something that is dramatically changed in the 
situation of the jihadists utilizing social media platforms, since intuition is a difficult and 
ephemeral sense that often relies on senses only available to us for face-to-face contacts. 
Indeed, this is proven out by the fact that researchers like William McCants, who works 
out of the Center for Naval Analysis, can both post in and observe jihadist forums 
without detection. And, although I have not posted in these groups myself or contacted 
any of these Salafi groups, I have been able to monitor them without detection, despite 
being shown as a “follower” on some of the ISIS Twitter feeds. And, as McCants claims, 
“Al-Qaeda forum users are usually anonymous. The links between them are unknown . . . 
they are already members of the radical choir singing to one another”, which suggests 
that there is an expectation on the part of the typical user that the denizens of these 
communities will both belong to a certain ideology and will share a set of homogenous 
beliefs that are typical in strongly-tied relationships, something that is proven out by the 
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comments on these feeds and the interaction between users. The other option, of course, 
is that the visitor to these sites will act as a hostile audience, given that interest followed 
by searching for social media feeds followed by interacting with those feeds can attract 
audience members that strongly disagree with those feeds, as well. We can see this in the 
“Think Again” campaign carried out by the State Department that was mentioned in the 
second chapter of this dissertation. Interactions with that feed were both strongly negative 
and strongly positive, but definitely not apathetic or indifferent.  
 Before we discuss that last point further, however, let’s return to the formation of 
strong ties in order to more thoroughly understand how these ties are transformed in 
online communities, since the complexities of these ties inform how we might understand 
and then counteract the spread of ideologies through these communities. Strong ties are 
further defined by the ideological and personality similarities between individuals (1362), 
which is, in particular, what complicates the relationship structures in these jihadi forums. 
These ties are strengthened by the amount of time that the strongly tied people spend 
together, whereas weak ties are more likely to involve heterogeneous thoughts and 
beliefs. Weak ties act as bridges between close knit networks of strongly tied individuals 
so that “individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of information from distant parts 
of the social system and will be confined to the provincial news and views of their close 
friends” (“A Network Theory Revisited” 202). This classification of connected 
individuals into strong and weak ties has implications not only on the interpersonal level, 
but also on the organizational level, which is what Granovetter is primarily concerned 
with. As he claims (again in “A Network Theory Revisited”): “The macroscopic side of 
this communications argument is that social systems lacking in weak ties will be 
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fragmented and incoherent. New ideas will spread slowly, scientific endeavors will be 
handicapped, and subgroups separated by race, ethnicity, geography, or other 
characteristics will have difficulty in reaching a modus viviendi” (203), hence the title of 
his work, “The Strength of Weak Ties”, since these interpersonal relationships between 
networks of strong ties are responsible for the movement of new information and the 
spread of ideas.   
This last part, of course, is complicated in virtual communities like World of 
Warcraft in which differences between individuals of different colors, creeds, and 
genders are flattened by the taking on of different personas and avatars that do not always 
align with the particular characteristics of the player in question, but what is also what is 
also important to the argument that I am making here is this notion that weak ties are the 
means by which information and ideas spread between dense networks of like-minded 
people. We can see an example of this “bridging” quality of weak ties in academia all the 
time, especially at large conferences where we go hear various speakers outline theories 
and works from scholars outside of our narrow specialties that we may not be familiar 
with. Similarly, we go to these conferences in order to network with others outside of our 
departments – we exchange business cards, we promise to e-mail or call if we find 
something of interest to that other person, etc. We often do not spend much time with 
these other academics, since they may live in other regions of the U.S. or other countries 
or work in other departments, but we can and do call on them in order to get or spread 
information. 
Because we tend to have specialized degrees and expertise, these kinds of 
contacts are necessary for our advancement into various positions with other universities 
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as well as in the furthering of our own knowledge. It is through these weak ties that we 
can also learn about new research being done in and outside of our fields, which 
demonstrates the power of weak rather than strong ties, since the people we tend to spend 
the most time with in our department have access to the same resources that we do. And 
this is not limited to work-related information. Weak ties are also responsible for the 
dissemination of cultural knowledge – slang terms, dirty jokes, etc. – that homogenous 
groups might not have access to (“Network Theory” 215), so that both cultural and 
professional resources are disseminated through these “bridges” between communities. 
 Social media scholars have been adapting Granovetter’s work since the late 
1990s. In an early (1997) article by Barry Wellman and Milena Gulia, the authors argue 
that “The lack of status or situational cues . . . encourage contact between weak ties. 
Often the only thing known about others is their email address which may provide 
minimal or misleading information.” (8). What this suggests that the authors not only 
take for granted that Granovetter’s strong and weak ties can be transposed from face to 
face communities / relationships to online communities, but also that the flattening 
(obscuring differences in race, gender, etc.) nature of discourse / relationships on the 
internet encourages the flourishing of relationships in the virtual communities in 
question, which are, they say, likely to form among the lines of mutual interests. Having 
said that, the mutual support that Granovetter mentions in his discussion of the formation 
of strong ties is present in these communities as well, since they are organized around 
lines of similar interests / ideologies so that participants with a heavy investment in the 
group are more likely to give support to other heavy users with which they have strong 
ties (9). Nor do the similarities between strong real life ties and strong online ties stop 
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there. Participation in virtual communities in which there are strong ties or participation 
in a one-on-one strong-tie relationship, they argue, is easier than it would be in real life.  
However, the authors do note after that excerpt that “much contact is between people 
who see each other in person and live locally”, which mitigates any kind of claim that 
they might make about the power of online communities in forging strong and weak ties, 
since the real-life / virtual-life distinction is blurred.64  
 Wellman and Gulia are not the only researchers investigating relationships that 
we form in online communities, although many other scholars like Danah Boyd, Judith 
Donath, and Nicole Ellison confine their discussion to websites explicitly dedicated to 
social networking (and with good reason, given the variety of virtual communities 
available) like Facebook and the mostly extinct MySpace and Friendster. A reoccurring 
theme in this literature is that inhabitants of these social networking sites use them to 
reinforce offline ties, as is the case in many Facebook pages used for local recreational 
team sports. For example, in Ellison’s piece, the authors claim in their study of a 
Facebook group that “Facebook users from this particular community are primarily using 
Facebook to increase their awareness of those in their offline community, which is 
contrary to the popular view of how inline social networking sites are used” (“A 
Facebook in the Crowd: Social Searching vs. Social Browsing” 3). Boyd and Ellison 
                                                
64 “Strong ties that are on-line have many characteristics that are similar to strong off-line ties. They 
encourage frequent, companionable contact and are voluntary except in work situations, One of two 
keystrokes are all that is necessary to begin replying, facilitating reciprocal, mutual support of tie partners’ 
needs. Moreover, the placelessness of email contact aids [a] long-term contract, without the loss of the tie 
that so often accompanies geographical mobility.” (10, authors’ italics) This claim is actually proven out in 
one of the groups that I helped create on Facebook to help facilitate the local recreational hockey 
community in the Phoenix metro area. I have met most of the 60 odd members of my Goalie Network 
Forum (modeled on the Research Network Forum, which operates at both CCCC and RSA) in person and 
consider some of them to be strong ties, but these mostly-weakly tied individuals are members of this group 
in order to gain information about local hockey games that may need a goalie, since they are often scarce 
and are difficult to play without. 
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likewise claim that “most sites support the maintenance of preexisting social networks” 
(“Social Networking Sites: Definition, History and Scholarship” 1), although they do 
acknowledge that other sites “help strangers connect based on shared interests”. Boyd 
specifically addresses strong and weak ties in her article, “Signals in Social Supernets” in 
saying that social networking sites “make establishing and sustaining large numbers of 
such [weak] ties more efficient” (7) in much the same manner that Wellman and Gulia 
assert that virtual communities of all types aid in the formation of acquaintances and 
gathering of other weakly tied contacts.  
What is interesting about their study and is applicable to my discussion here is 
their argument that websites and other kinds of online organizations fulfill the needs of 
the audience that their real-world lives have somehow not adequately met.65 I would also 
claim that instead of merely reinforcing real-world ties and facilitating the collection of 
weak ties, these online communities being formed on Facebook, Youtube, and various 
forums by jihadists function as a cohort of like-minded adherents to a certain ideology, so 
that they essentially become a collection of (at first and perhaps only) anonymous 
strongly / weakly tied individuals. This, then, has consequences for how scholars view 
the functioning of online relationships, but also how counterterrorism experts work to foil 
the proliferation of these ideologies and the acts being carried out by those moved to 
violence.  
                                                
65 There is also an interesting connection to the claims being made by foundational scholars like Qtub, al-
Banna, and Mawdudi (whose work I have already outlined in the second chapter), since they argue that the 
West and secular governments in general do not address the spiritual needs of their constituents, which is 
why their caliphate system should be implemented.   
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The blurring of the strong / weak ties is reflected in the acceleration effect that the 
FBI and Senate Committee on Homeland Security noted in the previously mentioned 
profile of Zachary Chesser. Previously, terrorist organizations would require a lengthy 
vetting process in order to bring a new member into the fold, so to speak. Salafi jihadist 
groups like al-Qaeda would previously have needed months, or even years to fully 
integrate a new member into a terrorist cell, something that is explicitly mentioned in 
their Lone Mujahid Pocketbook as being overturned in the Web 2.0 era and which we will 
talk more about in the next chapter. Even as of a few years ago, according to Zachary 
Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and its Meaning for the Threat 
of Homegrown Terrorism (hereafter referred to as Chesser) and mentioned at the start of 
this chapter, “Previously, extremist web sites (sic) were primarily restricted from the 
general public. As a result, a potential recruit had to search out and befriend members of 
radical forums in order to be accepted and subsequently gain access to the functionality 
of the sites” (2). In-person radicalization, training, and planning could take several years, 
as in the case of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which required more than two years just in the 
planning phase and would have required several more years in the recruitment and 
training of the terrorists in question.66 This is echoed by several other reports and 
congressional hearings, including the 2010 Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: 
How can we Address an Evolving Tool While Protecting Free Speech, in which Texas 
Representative Michael McCaul notes that “[t]errorists once had to travel to terror 
[training] camps in Pakistan to receive indoctrination and training. Now aspiring 
terrorists only need to open their laptop and connect to the internet” (3).  
                                                
66 Chesser, 3. 
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Indeed, since the advent of social media apparatuses, there has been a marked 
shift in the vetting process so that potential recruits and ideological adherents are much 
more quickly added into the existing online communities of extremists. As the authors of 
the Chesser report claim, “the interactive online experience can accelerate the 
radicalization and mobilization process” (3). They then go on to quote the 2010 testimony 
of Garry Reid, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, who stated in a congressional 
hearing that “[w]hat was once a lengthy process of establishing contact, exchanging 
ideas, arranging meetings, providing training, and developing attack plans can now be 
condensed into a much short timeline, across international boundaries, and beyond the 
reach of any single law enforcement agency or military task force” (3), so that the lengthy 
and complex implementation of an attack like that of the 9/11 is rendered obsolete, 
especially in light of the transnational nature of this new kind of terrorism. No longer do 
we have this reliance on strongly tied face-to-face contacts or even strongly tied online 
contacts reinforced by face to face meetings. Instead, we have the establishment of 
(sometimes solely) online communities of adherents that seemingly violate the principles 
set out by Granovetter and transposed to online communities by scholars like Donath, 
Wellman, and Gulia, as well as transforming traditional methods of propaganda, thus 
forcing scholars and counterterrorist strategists to reconceptualize the ways in which 
computer mediated discourses / networks function for extremist groups to account for 
both the acceleration effect that these hybrid social ties have on the radicalization of 
individuals as well as the increasingly rapid movement of intelligence between 
individuals and groups that would seem to only have access to the same pool of 
information.  
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CHAPTER 6: AL QAEDA’S INSPIRE MAGAZINE AND LONE MUJAHID 
POCKETBOOK: A STUDY IN THE EMOTION-LADEN RECRUITMENT OF 
(DIGITAL) WESTERN AUDIENCES AND THE SPREAD OF MICROTERRORISM 
 
R u dreamin’ of wagin’ jihadi attacks against kuffar? Have u been lookin’ 4 a way to join 
the mujahideen in frontlines but you haven’t found any? Well, there’s no need to travel 
abroad, coz the frontline has come to you. Wanna know how? Just read ‘n’ apply the 
contents of this guide, which has practical ‘n’ creative ways to please Allah by killing his 
enemies ‘n’ healing the believers’ chests.  
-Lone Mujahid Pocketbook 
Introduction 
 Al Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine was first published in the summer of 2010 on 
several jihadist forums, after which it spread, much like any extremist ideology, to 
countless other websites, social media networks, and counterterrorism discussion groups. 
There have been twelve issues of this English-language online-only publication, which 
has persisted despite the deaths of both its creator, Anwar al-Awlaki, and its primary 
technician, Samir Khan in 2011.67 The last issue, published in the spring of 2014 was 
directly preceded by the Lone Mujahid Pocketbook, from which this chapter’s epigraph is 
taken. The Lone Mujahid Pocketbook is comprised of a compilation of attack strategies 
from the first ten issues of Inspire that both empower the radicalized individual to act and 
eliminate the need for that person to undertake an often dangerous and expensive journey 
to training camps in the Middle East through the calculated usage of pathos, especially 
those emotional appeals focused on guilt, anger and sadness.   
Before we get to one of the central arguments of this chapter, however, I will 
briefly outline the history and contents of Inspire so that we may better understand the 
strategic value of the publication in the radicalizing of new individuals as well as the 
                                                
67 Yahya Ibraham claimed responsibility for the magazine’s editing after Awlaki and Khan’s deaths.  
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functioning of emotion within the publication. I will then outline the move from large-
scale terrorist attacks that were previously the hallmark of al-Qaeda to “microterrorism”, 
or small-scale attacks capable of being undertaken by individuals. After this, we will 
discuss the specifics of emotion theory that will shed light on the functioning of affect in 
moving the audience of Inspire to action. 
Public Reactions to Inspire 
There has, first of all, been some suggestion that this magazine is a hoax either 
published by an Islamist organization not affiliated with AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula) or created by the CIA. Although it is impossible to know for sure who exactly 
authored Inspire, the details in the text have been corroborated with other speeches, 
videos, interviews, etc. previously published by al-Qaeda and have been found to be a 
match. Similarly, the instructions for the creation of chemical weapons, pipe bombs, and 
other devices designed to promote violence suggest that this is not a creation of the CIA 
or another intelligence agency, since they would most likely balk at giving such 
information to the public. Having said that, American audiences, at least the American 
audiences and media that have become aware of this magazine, were skeptical of Inspire 
until it became clear that the Boston Marathon bombers were, in fact, inspired by the 
magazine. After that news was released, the tone of the news articles being published 
about the magazine changed and Inspire became “Al-Qaeda’s scariest and most 
unpredictable weapon”68 instead of jokingly naming it “the Southern Living for 
                                                
68 “Inspire Magazine: The Most Dangerous Download on Earth” published in GQ and written by James 
Bamford, December 2013.  
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aspirational terrorist death-cultists”.69 In fact, the same publication (Huffington Post) that 
made light of Inspire along with Stephen Colbert in 2011, outlined the dangers posed by 
Inspire and its effects on radicalized Islamists living in the U.S. in 2014.70 CBS News 
even mistakenly claimed that that Inspire was a “new magazine in English” in a video 
posted to the CBS website in March of 2014, although the magazine has been in 
existence since 2010, reinforcing the fact that the publication was only to be taken 
seriously by the media after the bombings took place.71 Despite the American public’s 
initial skepticism, the resurgence in prominence of this publication after a single (albeit 
effective) attack from two individuals claimed to be motivated by the magazine suggests 
that that it is, in fact, effective in moving western Islamists to action, as well as providing 
them with the tools to carry out violent attacks.  
A Well Designed Call to Action on the Behalf of Jihad 
Indeed, if we look at the magazine, itself, we can see that it seems like a 
legitimate text, not like a creation of the archetypal “guy in his mother’s basement” that 
we blame for most amateurish web / text design. Inspire Magazine’s twelve issues feature 
pages of image-laden, heavily edited text with colloquial (not always correctly colloquial) 
English72 carefully placed among backgrounds featuring digitally-rendered illustrations 
of desks, pencils, handguns, computer desktops, and other elements that are a 
commonality in their young, Western audiences’ home. These illustrations have even 
                                                
69“Al-Qaeda Magazine Awash in 9/11 Nostalgia, ‘Sour Grapes’” published in Huffington Post by Jason 
Linkins on 28 November 2011.  
70 “Al-Qaeda Magazine Calls for Car Bombs in the U.S.”, posted on 20 March 2014. 
71 “Al-Qaeda Launching new Terror Magazine in English”. 
72 After the deaths of Anwar Awlaki and Samir Khan, who are thought to be responsible for the majority of 
the editing and composition of Inspire, the English-language use of the magazine becomes much more 
erratic and full of errors.  
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included a soda stain on a background image of a table in one issue and a screenshot of 
the authors’ own computer screen that includes an English-language menu and the 
familiar Apple icon, perhaps in an attempt to bridge the gap between themselves and their 
targeted Western audience. In fact, it is clear from their first issue, in which the editor 
(who was at this point Anwar Awlaki) claims that “[i]t is our intent for this magazine to 
be a platform to present the important issues facing the ummah today to the wide and 
dispersed English speaking Muslim readership” (2) as well as from their choice of the 
English language, the various appeals that they use specifically targeting Muslims living 
on “hostile” soil, and design elements like the ones mentioned previously, that al-Qaeda 
is specifically addressing a Western (and perhaps westernized) audience.   
 Each issue of Inspire focuses on a different theme, such as the life and death of 
Osama bin Laden and the September 11 attacks (“The Greatest Special Operation of all 
Time”), although there are many commonalities between the twelve texts. Each issue, for 
example, includes a detailed explanation of an attack strategy that is capable of being 
undertaken by an individual, a section on responses from the international community 
that heighten the ethos of al-Qaeda, and a collection of short biographies of martyrs. 
There is also a “Letter from the Editor” section that provides valuable insight into the 
thought processes of the al-Qaeda leaders. What is particularly unique to this publication 
and also ties into the exploration of social media apparatuses in use by extremists in the 
previous chapter is the interactive nature of this publication. For example, in the very first 
issue, the editor specifically calls for input from their readership: “We . . . call upon and 
encourage our readers to contribute by sending their articles, comments or suggestions to 
us” (2). This is echoed on the last page of each issue, which includes the following call to 
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action: “If you are interested in contributing to this magazine with any skills – be it 
writing, editing, designing, or advice – you can contact us at any of the email addresses 
below. We strongly encourage you to use the Asrar al-Mujahideen [encryption] program 
to get in touch with us” (65). This same message appears on the back of every issue 
except for the twelfth73 (the last issue published at the start of this year) with slight 
variations, including one in particular (in the second issue) in which the warning, 
“[p]lease take special precautions when using the [encryption] program in order to avoid 
detection from the intelligence services” (72). After this statement, the editors include 
several email addresses from different hosts (Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo, etc.) along with the 
encryption key in question.74 Even the Lone Mujahid Pocketbook, which is mostly 
focused on reiterations of the various chemical weapons, shooting, and bomb-making 
instructions featured in the first ten issues of Inspire, includes seven pages of secure 
communication tactics and, in addition to the usual call for submissions, editing skills, 
etc., includes a question and answer section from previous audience feedback. There is a 
small red box on a white page (as distinguished from many of the other sections of the 
Pocketbook that are dark or filled with various brightly-colored graphics) with a small 
column of text that features advice for ways that doctors in particular can aid in jihad that 
says, “You can send your question to AQ via the emails provided in the Contact Page 
below. It is your right to ask, our duty to answer” (54). What is particularly interesting 
                                                
73 This issue is exceptional in several ways, the lack of the “how to communicate with us” section being 
one of them. It was also much more difficult to find than the previous eleven issues and is about half the 
length of the previous texts, as well. Whether this suggests that there is a break in the ranks of al-Qaeda or 
that the drone strikes and other counterterrorism measures are actually having an effect remains to be seen.  
74 In an interesting aside, I have shown these magazines to my students several times when we address the 
uses of particular design elements and emotional appeals in extremist texts and have had to warn them not 
to email the addresses listed, even if it just to “troll” al-Qaeda.  
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here are the words “right” and “duty” in reference to the asking of questions, since much 
is made in both Inspire and Lone Mujahid Pocketbook of the violation of religious rights 
by Western governments as well as of the duty of Muslims in the West to carry on the 
burden of jihad. What this suggests is that there is a reciprocal relationship between the 
audience of these publications and AQAP. In this case, it is AQAP that has the “duty” 
and their audience that has the “right” to ask for a response. Thus, this is, in some senses, 
the return on investment for the AQAP audience that had previously responded to the call 
to action that has been the focus of Inspire and Lone Mujahid Pocketbook.  
This interactivity is a striking change from their previously “closed” systems of 
terrorism that were restricted to a select few strongly-tied individuals and is an echo of 
the various uses of social media apparatuses explored in the previous chapter by Salafi 
Jihadists in general. Having said that, I think that we can presume that the email 
addresses used are only functional for a short period of time and are monitored by 
intelligence agencies in the U.S. and abroad, which limits their functionality as well as 
the input that Inspire editors can expect from their readers. What this suggests is that, in 
some senses, it is the seeming of openness to new recruits / new contributors that matters 
in appealing to new audiences, not the actual implementation of those contributions from 
outside sources. In the seemingness of adaptability, AQAP builds credibility with their 
audiences, especially audiences that feel disenfranchised by the authority figures in their 
own lives. Similarly, in a young population that is familiar with virtual organizations 
built on crowdsourcing and the hive mind (such as software and game developers, who 
often rely on beta testers and feedback from their subscribers or Facebook users, for that 
matter, who look to their friends for problem solving suggestions), this public appearance 
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of being an open system carries weight – it associates AQAP with other communities that 
their target audience is already embedded within.  
Also, there is a marked shift overall strategy in Inspire, by which I mean that 
AQAP is moving away from large-scale, complex attacks to what has been termed, 
“microterrorism,” i.e. small-scale assaults carried out by individuals or small groups of 
radicalized followers in what they would term “hostile territory”, as in the case of the 
Boston bombings or the foiled Times Square attacks. In fact, law enforcement agencies 
claim that the brothers responsible for the Boston Marathon bombings garnered 
instructions for building their weapons from Inspire, according to the testimony of the 
surviving terrorist. What is also significant, and something that I will address more in 
detail later on, is that instead of the claims based on reasoning and logic (albeit faulty 
logic) as we saw in the foundational clerics in Chapter 2 (although these clerics do make 
appearances in Inspire), they rely on a host of emotional appeals especially aimed at 
moderate Muslims and even more particularly at Muslims living in the West rather than 
focusing on the immediately present audience in the Arabian Peninsula that they can 
physically affect.  
Microterrorism and “Open Source Jihad” 
 First of all, however, let us return to this move away from large-scale attacks to 
smaller and more difficult to track individualized terrorism. This shift in tactics has been 
explored by popular media outlets in very general terms and by members of the IC and 
counterterrorism scholars working with the IC. Microterrorism (alternately called micro-
terrorism) has been recognized as a pressing danger, especially in the wake of the Boston 
Marathon bombings in April, 2013. However, the texts stemming from governmental 
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agencies exploring microterrorism have yielded contradictory results. There are even 
several reports, such as American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat that 
have both dismissed microterrorism as being perpetuated by “a tiny minority…exhibiting 
a number of conventional shortcomings” (1) and also highlighted the difficulty of 
tracking and preventing these attacks, all in the span of two paragraphs. Matthew G. 
Olsen, the 2013 director of the NCTC likewise claims that lone violent extremists “lack 
advanced operational training” that requires that they “seek assistance from like-minded 
extremists or pursue travel to overseas jihadist battlegrounds to receive hands-on 
experience” (The Homeland Threat Landscape and U.S. Response 6), the latter claim of 
which is incorrect given the availability of detailed tactics for individual violence 
available through the internet. His claim also suggests that terrorist operatives acting 
outside of a cell are ill-prepared and ill-suited to individualized action, since they must 
seek aid through what is likely a dangerous trip to overseas camps or risk being seen with 
other extremists inside their own communities, something that AQAP actually cautions 
against in Lone Mujahid Pocketbook. At the same time, Olsen argues that microterrorists 
“pose the most serious HVE [Homegrown Violent Extremist] threat” (6) despite the fact 
that microterrorists constitute only a small minority of “unsophisticated” and 
“uncoordinated” actors in the larger terrorist landscape. These contradictory claim 
suggest that more detailed research needs to be carried out in the examination of 
microterrorism tactics, especially given the potential complexity of tracking and 
preventing these lone-wolf attacks as well as the success that ISIS has had in attracting 
Western audiences to join their movement.  
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 To that end, let us look closely at the various ways in which AQAP suggests that 
the readers of Inspire and Lone Mujahid Pocketbook undertake individualized terrorist 
operations. In addition to the feature included in every issue of Inspire and compiled in 
the Pocketbook, the first issue of Inspire actually includes Part One of an article called 
“What to Expect in Jihad” written by Mukhtar Hassan.75 In it, he outlines two key 
elements for carrying out a successful mission, one of which is concerned with tactics to 
stave off depression and culture shock, and the other of which is focused on a list of 
things to bring on the journey. In the introductory paragraph to his article, Hassan states 
that he writes this particular article because of the following:  
Knowing what to expect in jihad is vital in order to avoid confusion, shock, and  
even depression. The psychological state of mind one is required to have in jihad 
is far removed from what we see in jihadi videos. In simple language, it’s not 
about he shooting and ambushing of the enemy; rather it is much greater than this. 
Here we will be covering numerous points throughout this series [of articles]. The 
transition in mindset is what one needs to focus on when reading these points. 
(45)76 
What is particularly interesting in this passage, aside from the fact that AQAP claims to 
be concerned with the mental wellbeing of their potential recruits, is the “transition in 
mindset” referred to by Hassan. What that suggests is that there is a particular way of 
                                                
75 Some authors in Inspire have retained the usage of their real names, but some have been altered for 
anonymity’s sake. It is never made clear which authors go by pseudonyms and which are real, aside from a 
few well-known figures like Anwar Awlaki. 
76 I’m basing the page numbers here on the PDF document pagination, which was originally set by the 
magazine creators. However, depending on where one finds their copies of Inspire, the pagination may 
differ slightly.  
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seeing and thinking and feeling required of potential mujahid, and that they view the path 
to jihad as more than just “the shooting and ambushing of the enemy”.  
This is further articulating in the next section, which appears as a handwritten 
page from a diary or notebook made to look as if it is resting on a partially concealed map 
casually thrown on a wooden desk. There is also what looks like a Post-it with a scrawled 
note that proclaims, “Not tackling the language makes you feel like a ghost”, holding 
down an image of a man sitting in the shadowed corner of a room with his head bowed. 
The passage, which is entitled, “Language Barrier”, states that:  
When coming to any land of jihad, it is important to be able to speak the local 
language fluently. . . . At first, it doesn’t bother one for some time as long as they 
know some basic expressions and words to get around. However, after weeks pass 
and as time goes on, it starts to have an effect on the heart. . . . One would begin 
to miss their homeland, the comforts, the easiness in life and so on. In other 
words, the whispers of shaytan will hit very hard even though you might be a very 
strong individual. (45) 
This quotation makes clear the motivation for addressing the issue of mental health in the 
mujahid as a method of preventing the potential terrorist from straying from the path. 
Additionally, AQAP is addressing an inherent ethos problem that most terrorist 
organizations have – i.e. the appearance of not caring about their followers, since they are 
essentially asking their recruits to risk or forfeit their lives for their cause. Thus, this 
appearance of caring solves the risk of losing potential terrorists to homesickness and 
depression and also adds to their credibility with their audience with their display of good 
will. Also, the initial display of compassion is followed by the advice to bring a friend 
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with to jihad so that “[you can] express yourself properly” (46) and avoid isolation and 
loneliness. The friend should, Hassan claims, “be a friend that understands you, and 
whom you trust. . . . to have a companion is essential in staying steadfast and remaining 
patient”. This further display of caring, however, is balanced out with the admonishment 
that “it you are unable to bring a companion, that doesn’t excuse you from performing 
jihad”. Aside from the use of emotions, both compassionate and cajoling, this article is 
focused on individual or small-group enterprises. These tactics are appropriate for small-
scale operations, but not for large group attacks, given that it is aimed at the lone actor 
and is further evidence of AQAP’s emphasis on microterrorism.  
 This focus on microterrorism is highlighted even more by the additional contents 
of the magazine, which include an except from Abu Mus Ab al-Suri’s book, The Global 
Islamic Resistance Call that is focused on the failures of traditional jihadist attacks 
featuring multi-person cells and large-scale attacks, and the detailed article on encrypted 
communications that was adapted for use in the Pocketbook. Furthermore, the article 
outlining the procedures for making a pipe bomb (followed by the Boston Marathon 
bombers) called “Make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom” by an author with the clever 
moniker, the “AQ Chef”, claims that:  
[E]very Muslim is required to defend his religion and nation. . . . There are many  
Muslims who have the zeal to defend the ummah but their vision is unclear. They  
believe that in order to defend the ummah they need to travel and join the  
mujahidin elsewhere and they must train in their camps. But we tell the Muslims  
in America and Europe: There is a better choice and easier one to give support 
to your ummah. This is individual work inside the West . . . My Muslim brother: 
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we are conveying to you our military training right into your kitchen to 
relieve you of the difficulty of traveling to us. If you are sincere in your 
intentions to serve the religion of Allah, then all what you have to do is enter your 
kitchen and make an explosive device that would damage the enemy if you put 
your trust in Allah and then use this explosive device properly. (33 author’s 
emphasis and italics) 
The empowerment of the individual in this passage in many ways echoes what I tell my 
composition students when they are drafting their proposal arguments at the end of the 
semester, which is that in order to move an audience to action, they must provide a 
manageable task or series of tasks for them to accomplish. And, what we see so often in 
effective proposal arguments stemming from the public sphere, we also see here. 
Namely, we have a plan of attack that is accomplishable by the individual using easy-to-
locate items that he or she can assemble in their own homes.  
Cyberwarfare verses Cyberrecruitment 
What is also interesting here is that there is no mention of cyberwarfare in any of 
the plans of attack presented in this issue of Inspire, and such things are minimally 
present in the eleven subsequent issues, as well as in Lone Mujahid Pocketbook. Their 
discussion of tactics dealing with the internet are mostly confined to the communication 
with other jihadists, especially AQAP. And, although there is a section of the magazine 
reminiscent of an entry in a dictionary that reappears in other issues of Inspire, called 
“Open Source Jihad”, the focus is not on the manipulation of cyber systems, even though 
the moniker “open source”, is most likely a reference to open source code. Instead, the 
text of “Open Source Jihad” is “[a] resource manual for those who loathe tyrants; 
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includes bomb making techniques, security measures, guerilla tactics, weapons training 
and all other jihad related activities” (32). Similarly, “[i]t allows Muslims to train at home 
instead of risking a dangerous travel abroad”, suggesting that, once again, NCTC 
Director Olsen was mistaken in his claim that microterrorists would need to “seek 
assistance from like-minded extremists or pursue travel to overseas jihadist battlegrounds 
to receive hands-on experience” as he stated in his examination of homegrown terrorists. 
The reason why I mention this here harkens back to the introduction of this dissertation 
and the first chapter in which I mentioned that the federal government has solely focused 
on combating cyberwarfare and hacking to its detriment, especially given the importance 
of combating terrorism on an ideological level. This, in fact, is partially proven true by 
the contents of this magazine, which stands as the most detailed set of tactics ever 
published by an extremist organization and includes a very minimal emphasis on hacking 
and the compromising of secure systems. That is not, of course, to say that there are no 
terrorist organizations dedicated to cyberwarfare – the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) is, 
in fact, one of these extremist groups that frequently infiltrates and subverts cyber 
networks. However, the emphasis in this series of publications as well as the instances of 
recruitment / calls to action in the other case studies that I have presented throughout this 
text indicate that the more much more attention should be paid to the proliferation of 
extremist ideologies on the internet and not just the waging of cyberwarfare, which is a 
much more straightforward problem.  
An Emotional Call to Action  
 This, then, brings us to the last part of this chapter, but also to the discussion of 
emotion initiated in the introduction of this dissertation. As stated in that introductory 
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chapter, emotion and its functioning as a motivating factor for (especially sympathetic) 
audiences has been undervalued in academics. As noted throughout this chapter, 
however, pathos plays a large part in the overall rhetorical strategy of both Inspire and 
Lone Mujahid Pocketbook. And, if we look back to Sauer and Ropo’s article, “Leadership 
and the Driving Force of Shame”, we can see that scholars in the communication and 
management field claim that “shame can be constructed [by leaders] as a liberating and 
empowering emotion” (60), something that is definitely present in the quotations 
mentioned throughout this chapter.  
 Another article that emphasizes the power of pathos published in 2009, “Political 
rage: terrorism and the politics of emotion”, written by two political science scholars 
(David Wright-Neville and Debra Smith) likewise notes that there has been little 
scholarship in the study of terrorism and emotion despite the recent resurgence in the 
study of affect and politics. In fact, much of the literature that Wright-Neville and Smith 
utilize is from other fields, including philosophy, psychology, and sociology. As the 
authors note, “[T]here has been a tendency [in studies of terrorism] to focus on 
delegitimising the actions of terrorists and favouring the objectives and perspectives of 
state security over any systematic examination of the subjective journeys of those who 
engage in sub-state terrorist practices” (88), suggesting precisely what I have argued over 
the text of this dissertation in that literature produced by counterterrorism strategists have 
focused on action rather than ideology – whether the ideology circulated within 
radicalized groups or the ideological warfare necessary to win the war of ideas against 
Islamist terrorists.  
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 What is also interesting, especially considering that the literature that does 
mention emotion is often dismissive of pathos, is the authors’ claim that:  
Reasons for this [lack of systematized examination of emotion] may include real  
difficulties surrounding both methodology and the obvious dangers in accessing  
and interviewing subjects. However, it may also be interpreted as a side-effect of  
long-running debates surrounding pathology or normality within terrorists’  
psychology. That is to say, in the largely successful attempt to establish that  
terrorists are driven by rational political beliefs rather than psychopathological 
tendencies, emotions may have been inadvertently relegated to the category of the 
“irrational”. (88) 
This is, indeed, the case for many works that discuss emotion, even when texts focus the 
radicalizing power of emotion rather than solely on its psychological origins /impact on 
potential terrorists, something that is still of much debate in counterterrorism studies. In 
fact, one of the only texts that I was able to find on radicalization and emotion (John 
Reich’s Radical Distortion: How Emotions Warp What We Hear), after summarizing 
several texts from radicalized individuals and groups, claims: “In spite of all the 
examples of hateful talk that I gave in chapter 1, we humans nevertheless have the 
capacity to be cool, rational, thinking, and calculating organisms” (49). The author then 
goes on to elaborate by saying, “We are not always dominated by our passions, and we 
would not do as good a job of getting along in life if we do as if we were always so 
emotional about things” (48), thus reinforcing the rational mind / emotional self split that 
Sarah Tracy talks about so often in her research on emotion in the workplace and what 
Wright-Neville and Smith likewise explore when they note:  
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The tendency to ignore the role of emotion in the public sphere has a long history. 
The Enlightenment’s favouring of science and reason over emotion has left us 
with an understanding of emotion as something that needs to be conquered or 
subsumed by reason. Underpinning most Enlightenment theories of emotion and 
human behaviour has been a conviction that emotion is problematic, something 
that distorts or interferes with reason. (89)77  
Despite these shortcomings in the academic and popular exploration of emotion, 
especially in rhetoric, Wright-Neville and Smith’s look at emotional appeals in what they 
call “neojihadist” literature is very useful for our discussion in that it highlights the power 
of emotion as a motivating factor in getting audiences to act, something that is often 
present in proposal arguments in mainstream culture as well as in the populations we are 
discussing here. In fact, the use of pathos in overcoming the initial conservatism of 
audiences is well documented in introductory composition textbooks like Everything’s An 
Argument (Lunsford, et al.) and Writing Arguments (Ramage, et al.) and is present in the 
advertising efforts of many advocacy groups.78  
 Part of the motivating factor for jihadists, Wright-Neville and Smith claim, is the 
long history of colonialism in the Middle East and North Africa, resulting in feelings of 
resentment and anger towards “the West”. As the authors note,  “Grassroots Muslim 
resistance to these perceptions has a long history stretching back several centuries when 
the accoutrements of Modernity were transposed onto the Muslim world via 
                                                
77 This problematic view of emotion in academic research will appear again in the conclusion, since part of 
we, as researchers, have to overcome is this bias against pathetic appeals in rhetoric in order to more fully 
understand how radicalization works.  
78 See, for example, UNICEF advertisements featuring Alyssa Milano and ASPCA advertisements 
featuring Sarah McLachlan.   
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colonisation.” This is something that I explored at length in the third chapter when 
discussing foundational twentieth-century Islamist clerics, but is also present in Inspire. 
For example, the most recent issue of the publication includes a partial transcript from a 
film entitled “Iman Defeats Arrogance” (roughly translating to “Faith Defeats 
Arrogance”) in which the author, called Dr. Aiman Adh-Dhawāhiry, states: 
Twelve years have passed since the blessed Battles of New York, Washington and 
Pennsylvania and since the American ignorance of invading Afghanistan; [A]n 
American ignorance that led to the crumbling of the American pride and exposed 
the crusaders' weakness. An ignorance which entangled America in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, and eventually running away from both defeated.  
The use of phrases like “American pride” and “crusaders” is deliberate in evoking 
cultural memories and, thus, shared emotions of anger towards colonial powers.79 Also 
deliberate is the use of the phrase “American ignorance” and “crusaders weakness”, both 
of which conjure up the seemingness of power on the part of the defensive party (in this 
case, al-Qaeda). This empowerment of the terrorist group in the face of (what they see as) 
hegemonic power structures that exist to subsume their culture and values works to 
likewise empower the individual potential or current jihadist as they see themselves as 
part of that structure working to take down these corrupt and evil forces. This seeing of 
the world as a series of corrupt forces is likewise noted by Wright-Neville and Smith 
when they explore how cognitive changes in an individual’s life can lead that person to 
                                                
79 Wright-Neville and Smith actually suggest that this resentment towards colonial powers is actually a 
“default setting” for those citizens of nations formerly under the rule of these powers. As they state: 
“Understanding the long history of humiliation, anger, resentment, envy and frustration which has arisen as 
a result of this history, and combining this with an understanding of the possible emotional default position 
of human agency under conditions of globalisation, is a critical step towards understanding the deeper 
dynamic forces which drive the urge to violent political behaviour in the modern world” (93). 
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“foster a hostile world view that leads to the possibility that an individual will seek out 
and join a group of like-minded individuals” (94), thus leading them to groups like ISIS 
and al-Qaeda. This empowerment of the individual “freedom fighter” in a world 
perceived to be dominated by hostile forces is also a good portion of the reason why the 
foundational Islamist clerics mentioned earlier as so popular with contemporary radical 
groups, in that these clerics offer what can be seem as an official (coming from within the 
respected communities of religious scholars) validation of action against the evil West.  
 What is also significant is Wright-Neville and Smith’s further exploration of the 
importance of power structures in evoking emotion. As the authors state:  
[P]eople do not join extremist or terrorist groups easily; membership is preceded 
by a series of evolutionary events whereby emotions are directed along a path 
hewn by the manner in which the individual experiences the socio-political 
environment in which they exist. In short, emotion, including that shaping 
terrorist behaviour, is inherently referential. Terrorists are not just angry, they are 
angry at something. Terrorists are not just humiliated, they perceive themselves 
humiliated by something or someone. In this sense, emotion is not merely a 
somatic reaction or reflex but a richly social occurrence in which the concept of 
power, or more precisely the personal experience of power, lurks as an ever 
present factor. (94) 
In this sense, Wright-Neville and Smith echo Corman and Dooley’s “Strategic 
Communication on a Rugged Landscape: Principles for Finding the Right Message”, in 
which they claim that an individual’s perceiving of outside events and messages will be 
filtered through their worldview, affiliations with groups, religion, etc., thus making it 
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difficult to reach hostile audiences. Wright-Neville and Smith, in adding an emotional 
component to this “rugged terrain” constituting an individual’s lens for perceiving the 
world, both provides additional insight into A) the proliferation of emotional appeals in 
jihadist literature like Inspire, B) the continued usage of foundational clerics by 
contemporary Islamists and C) the reason hostile and radicalized audiences are so 
difficult to reach.  
Conclusion 
 As I have shown throughout this chapter, both Inspire and Lone Mujahid 
Pocketbook can provide valuable insights to the counterterrorism community into both 
the shifting tactics of al-Qaeda from large-scale terrorist attacks to microterrorism and 
from group efforts to “lone wolf” attacks that are much more difficult to stop. What is 
perhaps more useful for both those of us in academics studying radicalized rhetoric and 
those in the IC attempting to diffuse the spread of radicalization by al-Qaeda are the 
communicative tactics utilized in these publications. What we can see, especially in 
conjunction with Neville-Wright and Smith’s article on the part that emotion has to play 
in the part of the radicalized or potentially radicalized audience, is the strategic value of 
the emotional appeals in Inspire and Lone Mujahid Pocketbook despite the lack of a 
systematized way of analyzing emotion in terrorist groups and a reluctance on the part of 
academic scholarship to take emotion seriously. As will be explored in the conclusion to 
this dissertation, this all has stakes in the ways that we can understand and then 
counteract the spread of radical Islamist ideologies.  
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CHAPTER 7: MAKING SENSE OF THE RADICALIZING (ONLINE) ASSEMBLAGE 
Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize that the 
prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American 
Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. At the same time Muslim, Arab, and Sikh 
Americans recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly American communities 
who, like other Americans, desire to prevent another terrorist attack. . . . Although many 
public officials support community engagement, significant challenges in the 
development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token 
discussions or community relations events. Striking a balance between security and 
liberty—relying on local communities to provide critical information to further proactive 
policing while simultaneously building trust and preserving the freedoms of community 
members—is seen as difficult. (4-5) 
--American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat 
 
Introduction: The Variegated Islamist Landscape 
 One of the things that has been highlighted again and again in this dissertation is 
the overall complexity of this issue, by which I mean the rhetoric employed on both sides 
of the prevention / recruitment rhetorical practices of violent Islamist extremists. As can 
be seen in the various case studies I have included in this text, this subject has wide-
reaching implications for scholars, counterterrorist experts working within the 
intelligence community as a whole, and law enforcement officials both internationally 
and domestically. As I have said throughout this work, scholars and IC members ignore 
the power and scope of religious rhetorics to their detriment, especially given the 
demonstrated power of the texts that I’ve examined, which have included everything 
from computer wallpapers, internet magazines, jihadist forums, Instagram and Facebook 
accounts, and foundational Islamist texts from the early twentieth-century. And this is 
only a sampling of the Islamist literature that exists in cyberspace. The importance of the 
internet as a radicalizing force and as a means of procuring a wide-reaching audience 
quickly and cheaply has also been brought to the fore with the rapid rise of ISIS, which is 
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perhaps the most prolific user of social media outlets to this date. There are many texts 
that have yet to be explored that can yield insight into the thought processes of terrorist 
organizations, including one of the most dangerous groups, al-Qaeda. Again, despite all 
of these factors, the growing number of political analysts that claim that “this stuff is 
important”, as well as the critical lenses that can be profitably applied to these groups, as 
proven by the sampling of primary texts and secondary research from different 
disciplines, we are not paying nearly enough attention to the rhetoric produced by these 
extremist groups in the academy and in the government. What follows in this conclusion 
is a brief overview of the findings of this dissertation as well as some suggestions for 
change in the future based on the analysis presented thus far.  
Why the Internet? 
 The internet provides several key advantages to terrorist organizations, including 
the ease with which materials can be transmitted to disparate groups, the inexpensive 
nature of most media, including social media platforms and email, which are both free, 
and the fact that large audiences can be accessed with a minimum of effort. It is also quite 
simple for these extremist groups to evade government scrutiny due to both the 
proliferation of texts and sundry communities in existence on the web. Similarly, if the IC 
finds a terrorist-affiliated account within a social network / website / forum or an entirely 
suspicious website and shuts it down, it is quite simple for that organization to repost the 
account or website somewhere else, so that governments cannot eliminate the threat of 
extremist website without blocking entire sections of the internet wholesale. This has, in 
fact, been the case with terrorist groups both large and small. Hezbollah’s website, for 
example, which includes those images examined in detail in Chapter 3, has moved three 
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times since I started this dissertation. Likewise, the Syrian Electronic Army, the sector 
within the Assad regime’s government that is responsible for the hacking of Facebook, 
Microsoft, and (reportedly) the CIA, has recreated Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram 
accounts multiple times after being shut down. ISIS has had a multitude of Twitter feeds 
and YouTube channels that they have successfully used to lure in new audiences, 
including two young women from Colorado despite said feeds / channels being 
repeatedly deactivated.80 In a sense, cyberspace has become the new public forum – a 
virtual town square that terrorist organizations are only too happy to take advantage of. 
This, of course, is not a new idea, given that Marshall McLuhan had introduced the idea 
of the “global village” in the 1960s with Understanding Media: The Extension of Man. 
What is new, however, is the fact that previously marginalized extremist Islamist groups 
that were restricted to an audience that was physically accessible from their secret 
compounds are now able to take advantage of an audience of an almost unimaginable 
size. 
The Governmental Response  
The federal government and, more particularly, the IC, have recognized that the 
internet is an important tool in the terrorist handbook. We can see that recognition in the 
majority of the reports, hearings, and press releases available from the U.S. (and 
international) organizations involved in counterterrorism and counterintelligence, 
including the text featured in the quotation from the epigraph at the start of this 
concluding chapter. What we don’t have is an effective and systematic way of addressing 
these admittedly dangerous uses of the internet. Instead, they have focused on actions and 
                                                
80 Rita Katz, “From Teenage Colorado Girls to Islamic State Recruits: A Case Study in Radicalization Via 
Social Media” 
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communicative strategies that have been demonstrated to be ineffective. As explored in 
Chapter One, this is the case because of a lack of cohesion in the US intelligence 
community, fundamental misunderstanding of the functioning of online communities, a 
misguided focus on fighting a war of action instead of a war of ideas, a reliance on 
outmoded forms of strategic communication when ideological counterterrorism is 
attempted, and a deep-seated lack of understanding of the process of radicalization. This 
is not to mention the lack of successful engagement with Muslim communities in at-risk 
communities, much in the vein of the previously mentioned passage, which claims that, 
although “law enforcement agencies came to realize that the prevention of terrorist 
attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab, and 
Sikh communities” (Bjelopera 4) there are:  
[S]ignificant challenges in the development of programs that foster substantive  
relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events.  
Striking a balance between security and liberty—relying on local communities to  
provide critical information to further proactive policing while simultaneously  
building trust and preserving the freedoms of community members—is seen as  
difficult. (4-5) 
This, of course, is in addition to the ethos problem that government agencies have with 
Muslim communities, as noted when Bjelopera, a specialist in organized crime and 
terrorism working for the Congressional Research service, states that: “law enforcement 
activities [are] perceived by [Muslim] community members to be unfairly targeting law-
abiding citizens or infringing on speech, religion, assembly, or due process rights” (5).  
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 A lack of ethos is, in fact, what renders many outreach programs from 
governmental agencies ineffective, including the leafleting carried out in war-torn regions 
like Afghanistan and Iraq and the “Think Again” campaign carried out on social media 
outlets by the State Department mentioned earlier. Simple logical reasoning will tell us 
that if the organization pamphleting a community is seen as being invasive, 
untrustworthy, and ignorant of your customs and beliefs, the members of that community 
will constitute a hostile audience that is unlikely to be persuaded to an alternative point of 
view or convinced to take action on behalf of that organization. This is, indeed, what has 
happened in many Muslim at-risk communities, which have been shown to feel 
marginalized, disenfranchised, and misunderstood, not to mention that these populations 
may also be suffering under economic hardships. And this is, in essence, what the 
communicative theories outlined in Chapter 2 and mentioned elsewhere have claimed: 
that the government strategies for countering terrorism ideologically are largely 
ineffective because they do not recognize the “rugged landscape” of the communicative 
environment in communities that are especially at-risk of radicalization.  
The Rhetorical Power of the Ideal 
 As explored in Chapters 3 and 4, despite the ideological difference between the 
foundational clerics often utilized in Salafi Jihadist groups and the current instantiation of 
the Shia Hezbollah, both groups rely on an unreachable Ideal to (continually) motivate 
their audiences. In essence, both groups create an unattainable, perfect landscape – for the 
foundational twentieth-century clerics like al-Banna, Qtub, and Mawdudi, this Ideal is 
based on the generation of Muslims alive during and right after the death of Mohammed 
that current Muslims should attempt to emulate by instituting the caliphate system. For 
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Hezbollah, it is a future built on the military might of their country, coupled with natural 
surroundings, and spearheaded by religious leaders like Hassan Nasrallah. These Ideals 
are only tangentially related to actual historical instances of the caliphate, in the case of 
al-Banna, Mawdudi, and Qtub, and only slightly resemble actual contemporary life in 
Lebanon, in the case of Hezbollah. For both groups, these Ideals are hallmarked by the 
use of fable-like language that highlights the absolute perfection of a culture-that-was and 
a culture-that-should-be. By retaining this fable-like language to describe the 
unattainable, these groups continually motive their audiences to reach for a reality that 
cannot and will never exist. Additionally, the quality of the language used catapults these 
Ideal futures / pasts into symbolic territory, making their usage by contemporary 
adherennts even more significant, since the spread of these artifacts (including the texts 
of Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qtub) implies an ideological fealty on the part of the 
audience that posts and shares this media online.  
Social Media, Propaganda, and Persuasion 
 In Chapter 5, we explored the usage of social media software by the Assad regime 
in Syria and contrasted their usage of social media outlets with the far more successful 
use of this media by Salafi Jihadist groups like ISIS. In the Assad’s case, the regime 
mainly shares propaganda materials on their Facebook and Instagram feeds, which is an 
inappropriate use of that media, given its inherently dialogic nature. ISIS, on the other 
hand, encourages collaboration with their viewers and has a reciprocal relationship with 
their multitude of followers. In many ways, the ideological fealty implied by the sharing 
of foundational scholars’ texts and Hezbollah computer wallpapers resembles the 
functional relationship between distributors and “likers” (those people who “like” posts 
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and, thus, show support for the cause by having their screen names posted on that 
organization’s page, feed, etc.), for that matter, of radical texts in that the audience in 
question is demonstrating overt or implicit (if said audience member only “likes” a post, 
but does not comment in support of the cause or repost the material on their own pages) 
sympathy with that organization. This allows the organization to amass a large audience 
very quickly, especially given the ease of sharing and posting comments on social media 
feeds. This appearance of ideological fealty then also increases the presence (or seeming 
of power / importance) of the movement or group, even if it is not particularly effective 
on the ground. Said appearance of power then works to enhance the appeal of 
radicalizing organizations with an audience that feels disenfranchised and powerless in 
their daily lives.  
The Emotional Appeal of Inspire Magazine 
 Inspire magazine and the Lone Mujahid Pocketbook were the focus of Chapter 6, 
in part because these publications, which constitute the first comprehensive attempt by al-
Qaeda to specifically address an English-speaking audience, offer insight into the tactics 
of this group. There has been a shift in their strategy from focusing on large-scale (more 
easily foiled) attacks to microterrorism, which are small, more difficult to detect and 
prevent assaults. These acts of microterrorism are capable of being undertaken by 
individuals and, thus, can happen anywhere at any time. While the scale of microterrorist 
attacks are much less grand than those events that were previously the hallmark of al-
Qaeda, they are capable of wreaking great havoc, as was the case of the Boston Marathon 
bombings in 2013. Thus, they constitute a great danger in the overall threat landscape that 
will be difficult to diffuse just using action – i.e. assassinating leaders of causes and 
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arresting individual terrorists – since detecting these attacks is problematic, to say the 
least.  
 This, then, leads us to the other portion of this chapter, which was devoted to the 
ideological threat posed by Inspire and the Pocketbook. Despite their initial dismissal by 
mass media and political pundits, both of these publications proved effective in 
prompting action in at-risk audiences, like those constituted by the two marathon 
bombers. Much of the effectiveness of the magazines lies in the authors’ usage of 
emotion to persuade their adherents and potential adherents to action. First, the authors 
create a semblance of compassion for their lone wolf terrorists by including articles on 
mental and bodily well-being. Then, they instill feelings of guilt (for not acting, if he or 
she is a passive audience member), anger, and resentment by playing on the legacy of 
colonialism by Western countries as well as rendering hostile governments into vast and 
evil hegemonic constructs that can only be defeated by the righteous indignation that 
leads to action of al-Qaeda. In more thoroughly exploring the part that emotion has to 
play in the appeal to at-risk audiences like in case study presented here and Wright-
Neville and Smith’s article, which was mentioned in that chapter, we can better 
understand the rapid spread of radicalization, especially in nations previously under 
colonial rule.  
A Call to Action 
Based on my findings in this dissertation, I can make several recommendations 
for changes in both the academic community and the Intelligence Community in order to 
better understand and counteract the terrorist threat.  
In the academic community, we need to complete the following tasks: 
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1) Pay more attention to religious and radicalizing rhetoric. By largely ignoring these 
texts, we are A) suggesting that these populations and their texts are not worthy of 
study and B) Ignoring an important component of the larger discourse community 
that has become more and more prominent in the wake of the internet’s 
anonymous structure, which allows for extremists of many different ideologies to 
voice their opinion with little consequence.  
2) Take into consideration the part that pathos has to play in the dissemination of 
arguments and the moving of an audience from sympathetic to active. By 
dismissing pathos as a “lesser appeal”, we undervalue its use in overcoming the 
initial conservatism in an audience, thus moving them to action.  
3) Explore discourse communities, even if we find their ideologies distasteful. 
Although we may not agree with their points of view or find them destructive, 
that does not mean that there is no value in analyzing their texts. To the contrary, 
in order to affect change, we must understand the ways that their groups function.  
For the Intelligence Community and congressional bodies involved in counterterrorism 
efforts, I have the following recommendations:  
1) Focus on ideology as well as on action. The exclusion of ideology in public policy 
concerning counterterrorism efforts only partially addresses the terrorist threat. 
Although leaders of radical Islamist groups may be assassinated by drone strikes 
or arrested, that does not prevent the radicalization and then action of a new 
terrorist. In fact, the death and martyrdom of prominent Islamist ideologues only 
works to galvanize new populations into action. 
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2) Recognize the fact that the terrain on which these terrorist organizations operate is 
complex and difficult to manage. By relying on outdated modes of 
communication, as well as showing gross ignorance of the media in which they 
are attempting to intervene, the IC is only working against their own cause by 
losing credibility with an audience (of gamers, hackers, and nerds) they might 
otherwise have been able to use to their advantage.  
3) Construct a comprehensive means of counteracting the proliferation of 
radicalizing materials on the internet. Shutting down websites, social media feeds, 
etc. of extremist groups is ineffective. It is much to simple for them to create a 
new site, a new IP address, or even encourage their followers to spread their 
message after the initial source of those materials is deactivated. Instead of 
focusing on shutting down these websites, create a countermessage on these same 
media outlets that works to diffuse the ideology. The “Think Again Turn Away” 
project spearheaded by the State Department is a step in the right direction, but is 
hampered by the lack of credibility that the institution has with any at-risk 
audience.  
4) Thus, the federal government should offer incentives for authority within the 
moderate Muslim community to become involved in this counter-radicalizing 
effort. Only by increasing the volume of the moderate Muslim community, thus 
solving the lack of ethos of the State Department in counteracting extremist 
media, can we work to combat these extremist groups by working within their 
ideological system. Souad Ali’s text, A Religion, not a State: Ali ‘abd al-Raziq’s 
Islamic Justification of Political Secularism provides a comprehensive example of 
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a respected scholar using religious text to diffuse the myth of the caliphate 
system.  
5) And, finally, the IC needs to pay more attention to scholars in the humanities and 
social sciences that research radicalization and terrorism. These constitute some 
of the best scholars with expertise in areas that will be of benefit to the Federal 
Government in their War of Ideas.  
By following the previous suggestions, we can more clearly combat the spread of 
extremist ideologies worldwide. These groups constitute a very real danger both in the 
regions in which they are active as well as in far reaching corners of the world, as has 
been shown most recently by ISIS, an organization that managed to recruit young women 
from the United States to join their cause solely through the use of the internet. Without 
taking measures to stem the spread of these Islamist ideologies online, we may face a war 
on multiple fronts, since these texts are readily available and easily found using a 
computer (or a phone or a tablet), an internet connection, and a search engine.  
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